Sofía Silva Berenguer sofia @ lacnic.net Internet Exchange Points Workshop Paramaribo - Surinam AGENDA • • • • • • How the Internet Works Intro to BGP IPv4 Exhaustion and IPv6 Deployment Internet Exchange Points How to request Internet Resources Advanced topics – – – – – Route Hijacking Leaks Attacks against the path Well known incidents Securing the Routing System HOW THE INTERNET WORKS Interconnection of Networks http://prezi.com/agzxt0exlfpk/network-interconnection/ Internet Routing ASN 6057 announces 220.127.116.11/16 ASN 8158 receives 18.104.22.168/16 The prefix 22.214.171.124/16 is propagated with BGP to the Internet Atributos: 126.96.36.199/16 AS_PATH ASN1 ASN3 ASN6057 Transit and Peering • Transit – Traffic and prefixes originating from one AS are carried across an intermediate AS to reach their destination AS – Usually for a fee • Peering – Private interconnect between two ASNs – Usually for no fee Transit and Peering ASN 65538 ASN 64511 Transit ASN 65536 Peering ASN 65537 Peering in an Internet Exchange Point (IXP) • Internet Exchange Point – Common interconnect location where several ASNs exchange routing information and traffic ASN 65536 ASN 65537 ASN 65538 ASN 65539 IP address, where they come from? Standards Central Registry Distribution Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) distribute IPv4, IPv6 and Autonomous System Numbers * * Distribution Sometimes the distribution is done through National Internet Registries (NIRs) Allocations and Assignments End user Regional Internet Registries INTRO TO BGP Border Gateway Protocol • A Routing Protocol used to exchange routing information between different networks • Exterior gateway protocol • Described in RFC4271 – RFC4276 gives an implementation report on BGP – RFC4277 describes operational experiences using BGP • Works on TCP port 179 More about BGP • Learns multiple paths via internal and external BGP speakers – Initial exchange of entire table • Incremental Updates – Picks THE bestpath and installs it in the IP forwarding table – Policies applied by influencing the bestpath selection • • • • Keepalive messages exchanged Many options for policy enforcement Classless Inter Domain Routing (CIDR) Widely used for Internet backbone Neighbors • BGP speakers – Internal (iBGP) if they are in the same ASN – External (eBGP) if they are in different ASN eBGP iBGP ASN 65538 ASN 65536 Where to use BGP: Stub Network ASN 65536, Transit Provider • Only one exit for customer • Not really need to add BGP ASN 65538, Customer Multihomed Network Transit Providers ASN 65538 ASN 65539 • Different situations possible • • • ASN 65536 • ASN 65537 • Peering in IXP Multiple links to same ISP Secondary for only backup Load share between primary and secondary Selectively use different ISPs Peering at IXP INTERNET EXCHANGE POINTS Why peer? • Consider a region with one ISP – It provides internet connectivity to it’s customers – It has one or two international connections • Internet grows, another ISP sets up in competition – They provide internet connectivity to their customers – They have one or two international connections • How does traffic from customer of one ISP get to customer of the other ISP? – Via the international connections Why peer? (Cont.) Internet ASN 65536 ASN 65538 Why peer? (Cont.) • Yes, international connections… – If satellite, RTT is around 550ms per hop – So local traffic takes over 1s round trip • International bandwidth… – Is much more expensive than domestic bandwidth – Becomes congested with local traffic • Wastes money, harms performance Why peer? (Cont.) • Solution: – Two competing ISPs peer with each other • Result: – Both save money – Local traffic stays local – Better network performance – More international bandwidth for international traffic Why peer? (Cont.) Internet ASN 65536 ASN 65538 Why peer? (Cont.) • A third ISP enters the equation – Becomes a significant player in the region – Local and international traffic goes over their international connections • They agree to peer with the two other ISPs – To save money – To keep local traffic local – To improve network performance Why peer? (Cont.) • Peering means that the three ISPs have to buy circuits between each other – Works for three ISPs, but adding a fourth or a fifth means this does not scale • Solution: – Internet Exchange Point Why peer? – Non-financial Motivations • • • • Low latency Control over routing Redundancy Aggregation benefits w/peering and Transit at IXP • ISP relationships – be one of the cool kids • Marketing benefits • Network reliability Internet Exchange Point • Every participant has to buy just one whole circuit – From their premises to the IXP • Rather than N-1 half circuits to connect to the N-1 other ISPs – 5 ISPs have to buy 4 half circuits = 2 whole circuits -> already twice the cost of the IXP connection Simple Topology • Layer 2 fabric • N^N BGP relations IXP Design • Each ISP participating in the IXP brings a router to the IXP location • Router needs: – One Ethernet port to connect to IXP switch – One WAN port to connect to the WAN media leading back to the ISP backbone – To be able to run BGP IXP Design (Cont.) • IXP switch located in one equipment rack dedicated to IXP – Also includes other IXP operational equipment (Management network, TLD DNS, Routing Registry, Looking Glass, etc.) – Optional: Second switch for redundancy • Routers from participant ISPs located in neighbouring/adjacent rack(s) • Copper (UTP) connections made for 10Mbps, 100Mbps or 1Gbps connections • Fibre used for 10Gbs and higher speeds Peering at an IXP • Each participant need to run BGP – They need their own AS number – Public ASN, NOT private ASN • Each participant configures external BGP with the other participants in the IXP – Peering with all participants Or – Peering with a subset of participants IXP - Routing • ISP border routers at the IXP generally should NOT be configured with a default route or carry the full Internet routing table – Carrying default or full table means that this router and the ISP network is open to abuse by non-peering IXP members • ISP border routers at the IXP should not be configured to carry the IXP LAN network within the IGP or iBGP – Set BGP next-hop to local router (Cisco IOS nexthop-self) IP Address Space • Some IXPs use private addresses for the IXP LAN – Public address space means the IXP network can be leaked to the Internet, which could be undesirable – Filtering RFC1918 address space by ISPs is Best Practice; this avoids leakage • Some IXPs use public addresses for the IXP LAN – Address space is available from LACNIC – IXP terms of participation usually forbid carrying the IXP LAN addressing in the ISP backbone Hardware • The IXP Core is an Ethernet Switch (Mandatory) – Therefore invest in the best and most expandable equipment that its financial circumstances allow – Having 2 switches is good for redundancy if the funds can allow • Route Server (Optional) – Provides ease of configuration for new members – Direct peering between the IXP members can be implemented in the absence of the Route Server Hardware (Cont.) • Other optional equipment – Web Server (website, monitoring, etc.) – Mail Server (email, mailing list, etc.) – Transit Router (to provide Internet access to the IXP website, email and staff Internet access) – Route Collector (Looking glass which assists IXP members with troubleshooting. It can also be used to collect routes for statistics measurements) Hardware - Suggestions • Try not to mix port speeds – If 10Mbps and 100Mbps connections available, terminate on different switches • Insist that IXP participants bring their own router – Moves buffering problem off the IXP – Ensures integrity of the IXP – Security is responsibility of the ISP, not the IXP Location • The location of the IXP is very important. • The IXP location should be neutral and low cost. • In considering the IXP location the following factors should be considered: – – – – – – – Space Environment Control Security Power Access to terrestrial Infrastructure Cabling Support Recommendations and Best Practices • Only announce your aggregates and your customer aggregates at IXPs • Only accept the aggregates which your peer is entitled to originate • Never carry a default route on an IXP (or private) peering router • Failing to do so leads to route-hijacks and leaks General Info about IXPs . . . Source:https://prefix.pch.net/applications/ixpdir/summary/ . . . General Info about IXPs . . . Source: https://prefix.pch.net/applications/ixpdir/?show_active_only=0&sort=traffic&order=desc General Info about IXPs Source: https://prefix.pch.net/applications/ixpdir/summary/ipv6/ HOW TO REQUEST INTERNET RESOURCES • Go to https://solicitudes.lacnic.net/ • Or fill out a form and send it in the body of a message to [email protected] – You can find templates at: http://lacnic.net/templates/ • Once the online request or the form has been processed by the system, the requestor will receive a confirmation email with a ticket number. • After that the hostmasters will analyze the request. • If the request is approved, it may be necessary to pay a fee and to sign the Registration Service Agreement. Who can request resources? • The person allowed to request resources for an organization is the Administrative POC. • To request resources through the new Requests System you will have to log in using the Administrative POC handle. Requesting an ASN • In order to qualify for an ASN allocation the organization should have: – A unique routing policy, meaning a policy that differs from that applied by the upstream provider. – Or, a network with more than one independent connection to the Internet. (Multi-homed site) • From January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2010 Lacnic assigned ASN of 16 and 32bits upon request. However, since January 1, 2011 Lacnic stopped making distinctions between the assignment of 16- and 32-bit Autonomous Systems Numbers (ASNs) and will only assign ASNs from a general 32-bit pool. This change will be introduced to comply with the Global Policy "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Policy for Allocation of ASN Blocks to Regional Internet Registries" adopted in September 2010. Micro-assignments to Critical Infrastructure • Micro-assignment -> prefixes between /24 and /20. • For projects and network infrastructure that are key or critical for the region, such as IXPs (Internet Exchange Points), NAPs (Network Access Points), RIRs, ccTLDs, among others. • IXPs or NAPs must meet the following requirements: – Duly document the following aspects: • Prove by means of their bylaws their IXP or NAP capacity. The organization shall have at least three members and an open policy for the association of new members. • Submit a diagram of the organization's network structure. • Document the numbering plan to be implemented. – Provide a utilization plan for the following three and six months. – If the applicant does not already have an IPv6 block assigned by LACNIC, simultaneously request an IPv6 block in accordance with the corresponding applicable policy. • The rest of the applications shall be studied based on the analysis of the documentation justifying the critical and/or key aspects of the project. • Organizations receiving micro-assignments shall not sub-assign these IPv4 addresses. Requesting an IPv4 block for ISPs • To qualify for the allocation of a /22 block the org must: – Prove usage or immediate necessity of a /24 – Submit a detailed one-year usage plan for a /23 – Agree to renumber from previously allocated space and return those IP addresses to their ISPs within 12 months – If the applicant does not already have an IPv6 block assigned by LACNIC, simultaneously request an IPv6 block in accordance with the corresponding applicable policy. • For a larger block additional requirements apply Requesting an IPv6 block for ISPs • To qualify for an initial allocation of a /32 block the organization should: – Be a LIR (Local Internet Registry), which means being an organization that assigns address spaces for its network services customers – Not be an end site (end user) – Document a detailed plan for the services and IPv6 connectivity to be offered to other organizations (clients) – Announce the allocated block in the Internet inter-domain routing system, with the minimum possible level of disaggregation to the one that is publishing the IP blocks, within a period no longer than 12 months. – Offer IPv6 services to clients physically located within the region covered by LACNIC within a period not longer than 24 months More info • Policy Manual – http://www.lacnic.net/web/lacnic/manual • Registration Services – http://www.lacnic.net/web/lacnic/servicios-registro ADVANCED TOPICS Route Hijacking • This occurs when a participant in the Internet Routing announces a prefix for which it has no authority • Malicious or by operational errors • More know cases: – Pakistan Telecom vs. You Tube (2008) – China Telecom (2010) – Google in Eastern Europe (various AS, 2010) – Latin American cases (beginning 2011) Route Hijacking AS 6057 announces 200.40/16 ASN 8158 ASN 8158 receives receives y 188.8.131.52/16 184.108.40.206/16 220.127.116.11/24 AS 15358 announces 18.104.22.168/24 22.214.171.124/16 AS_PATH ASN1 ASN3 ASN6057 126.96.36.199/24 AS_PATH ASN1 ASN15358 Leaks • There is not a standard definition of leaks • But it happens when an ASN “leaks” noncustomer or self-originated routes to other peers. • The effects is to give transit to those networks for the peers of the ASN Route Leaks 2001:db8::/40 65536 2001:db8:100::/40 65537 How this should work without leaks 2001:db8::/40 ASN 64511 Traffic to whole 2001:db8::/40 goes this way 2001:db8:100:/40 Transit 2001:db8::/40 2001:db8:1/48 ASN 65536 2001:db8::/40 Peering ASN 65537 2001:db8:100:/40 Route Leaks 2001:db8::/40 65536 2001:db8:100::/40 65537 2001:db8:1::/48 65536 65537 Now a Route Leak ASN 64511 2001:db8::/40 Traffic to 2001:db8:1::/48 goes this way ASN 65536 2001:db8::/40 2001:db8:1/48 2001:db8::/40 Peering 2001:db8:100:/40 2001:db8::/40 2001:db8:1::/48 ASN 65537 2001:db8:100:/40 Transit Attacks against the path • AS Insertion: – A router might insert one or more ASNs, other than its own ASN, into an update message • False (Route) Origination with valid ASN: – A router might originate a route for a prefix using an ASN not authorized to originate routes for that prefix. Attacks against the path AS 6057 announces 200.40/16 ASN 6057 ASN 8158 ASN 8158 receives receives y 188.8.131.52/16 184.108.40.206/16 220.127.116.11/24 Fake AS 6057 announces 18.104.22.168/24 22.214.171.124/16 AS_PATH ASN1 ASN3 ASN6057 126.96.36.199/24 AS_PATH ASN1 ASN15358 WELL KNOW INCIDENTS Pakistan Telecom vs. Youtube • On Sunday, 24 February 2008, Pakistan Telecom (AS17557) started an unauthorized announcement of the prefix 188.8.131.52/24 (Youtube) • One of Pakistan Telecom's upstream providers, PCCW Global (AS3491) forwarded this announcement to the rest of the Internet, which resulted in the hijacking of YouTube traffic on a global scale. • Reason: “Fat fingers” • Video de RIPE NCC – http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IzLPKuAOe50 Moratel vs Google • Reported by Cloudflare on November 06, 2012 • Google's services experienced a limited outage for about 27 minutes over some portions of the Internet. • Moratel (23947) was “leaking” Google one route and packets were going through Indonesia • Reason: “Fat fingers” ASN and Prefix Hijack • On 2011 one large European ISP complain that one of their prefixes was being announced by a Mexican ISP • The Mexican ISP review their network but could not found the problem • Later it appears that a Brazilian ISP was using the Mexican ISP’s ASN to announce the European prefix • Reason: Poor BGP knowledge SECURING THE ROUTING SYSTEM Recall how Internet Resources are managed Recall how Internet Resources are managed IANA ARIN ISP LACNIC NIC.br NIC.mx APNIC ISP #1 LIRs/ISPs RIPE NCC LIRs/ISPs End users ISP mx •Each RIR is an authoritative source of information about the relation “user” <-> “resource” •Each RIR operates its registration data base •Members and RIRs sign Service Agreements between them AfriNIC Who has the "right" to use resources? • When an ISP obtains resources from its RIR (IPv6/IPv4/ASN): – The ISP has to notify its upstream ASs which prefixes are going to be announced via BGP – This is usually done via e-mail, web forms or by updating an IRR (Internet Routing Registry) • Upstreams verify (or at least they should) the right of use for the announced resources – RIR WHOIS Text-based and not really suitable for automatic usage – IRR WHOIS Non-signed information, little additional tools provided for verification of usage rights except for names, phone numbers and email POCs • This verification process is sometimes not as thorough as it should be What is RPKI? • RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure) allows the validation of an organization right to use of a certain resource (IPv4, IPv6, ASN) • RPKI combines the hierarchy of the Internet resource assignment model through RIRs with the use of digital certificates based on standard X.509 • RPKI is standardized in the IETF through the SIDR WG. It has produced RFCs 6480 – 6492 RPKI • All RPKI signed objects are listed in public repositories • After verification, these objects can be used to configure filtering in routers • Validation Process – Signed objects have references to the certificate used to sign them – Each certificate has a pointer to an upper level certificate – The resources listed in a certificate MUST be valid subsets of the resources listed in its parent's certificate – In this way a trust chain can be traced to a "trust anchor" both cryptographically as well as in CIDR terms X.509 v3 certificates with RFC 3779 extensions Version • X.509 Digital Certificates – Subject, validity period, public key and other fields • With extensions: – RFC 3779 defines extensions that allow the representation of Internet resources as certificate fields • List of IPv4, IPv6 and ASNs assigned to an organization • Implemented in OpenSSL 1.0c onwards Serial Number Signature Algorithm Issuer Subject Subject Public Key Extensions Subject Information Authority (SIA) Authority Information Access (AIA) Addr: 10.10.10.0 Asid: 65535 ROAs • Using Certificates we can create objects describing the origin of a prefix • ROAs: Routing Origin Authorization – ROAs contain data on the allowed origin-as for a set of prefixes – ROAs are signed using the certificates generated by the RPKI – Signed ROAs are copied to the repository ROAs (ii) • A simplified ROA contains the following information: Prefix MaxLen Origin AS Valid Since Valid Until 184.108.40.206/17 20 6057 2013-01-02 2013-12-31 220.127.116.11/22 24 28000 2013-01-02 2014-12-31 • These ROAs states that: – "The prefix 18.104.22.168/17 will be originated by ASN 6057 and could be de-aggregated up to /20" "This statement is valid starting on Jan 2, 2013 until Dec 31, 2013" • Other ROA content – ROAs contain cryptographic material that allows validation of the ROAs content ROAs (iii) - Validation • ROAs validation process includes: – Criptographic validation of End Entity certificates (EE) that are included in each ROA – CIDR validation of resources listed in the EE against the resources listed in the issuing certificate – Verification that prefixes listed in the route origin attestations are included in the prefixes listed in the EE certificates of each ROA Creation of ROAs Creation of ROAs Origin Validation • Routers build a database with the information they receive from the caches • This table contains – Prefix, Min length, Max length, Origin-AS • By applying a set of rules a validity status is assigned to each UPDATE prefix • Network operators can use “validity” attribute to construct routing policies Origin Validation VALID UPDATE 22.214.171.124/9 ORIGIN-AS 20 IP prefix/[min_len – max_len] Origin AS 172.16.0.0 / [16-20] 10 126.96.36.199/[8-21] 20 • If the "UPDATE pfx" is not covered by any entry in the DB -> "not found" • If the "UPDATE pfx" is covered by at least one entry in the DB, and the origin-AS matches the ASNs in the DB -> "valid" • If the origin-AS does NOT match -> "invalid" Origin Validation INVALID UPDATE 188.8.131.52/22 ORIGIN-AS 20 IP prefix/[min_len – max_len] Origin AS 172.16.0.0 / [16-20] 10 184.108.40.206/[8-21] 20 • If the "UPDATE pfx" is not covered by any entry in the DB -> "not found" • If the "UPDATE pfx" is covered by at least one entry in the DB, and the origin-AS matches the ASNs in the DB -> "valid" • If the origin-AS does NOT match -> "invalid" Origin Validation INVALID UPDATE 220.127.116.11/9 ORIGIN-AS 66 IP prefix/[min_len – max_len] Origin AS 172.16.0.0 / [16-20] 10 18.104.22.168/[8-21] 20 • If the "UPDATE pfx" is not covered by any entry in the DB -> "not found" • If the "UPDATE pfx" is covered by at least one entry in the DB, and the origin-AS matches the ASNs in the DB -> "valid" • If the origin-AS does NOT match -> "invalid" Origin Validation NOT FOUND UPDATE 22.214.171.124/9 ORIGIN-AS 66 IP prefix/[min_len – max_len] Origin AS 172.16.0.0 / [16-20] 10 126.96.36.199/[8-21] 20 • If the "UPDATE pfx" is not covered by any entry in the DB -> "not found" • If the "UPDATE pfx" is covered by at least one entry in the DB, and the origin-AS matches the ASNs in the DB -> "valid" • If the origin-AS does NOT match -> "invalid" Routing Policies with Origin-validation • Using the BGP validation attribute network operators can construct routing policies • For example: – Assign higher preference to routes with status “valid” than routes with status “unknown” – Drop routes with status of “invalid” • Very important, RPKI is a source of data, operators are free to use it as it suits them better RPKI in action Routers validate updates from other BGP peers RPKI Management System Caches feeds routers using RTR protocol with ROA information Cache Repository Caches retrieve and cryptographically validates certificates and ROAs from repositories RPKI Operation Modes • “Hosted” mode – LACNIC issues certificates and keeps public and private keys in its systems • Certificates are issued at the request of member organizations – LACNIC provides a web interface for management • “Delegated” mode – Each organization has it’s own certificate, signed by LACNIC’s CA – The organization sends signing requests to LACNIC, who returns them signed • “Up-down” protocol RPKI today • 5 CAs and repositories working (RIRs) in hosted and delegated mode (just APNIC) • Validation, CA and origin validation working software and devices • Some other tools built around (bgpmon, LACNIC Labs, RIPE Labs) • ~ 11,700 routes signed (~ 8.9% 1,226 invalid or hijacks) • Origin Validation available in Cisco, Juniper, Quagga, BIRD LACNIC’s RPKI Structure Self-signed RTA LACNIC RTA LACNIC’s Resources Signing chain LACNIC Production <<INHERITED>> ISP #2 ISP #1 Resouces of ISP #2 ROA End Entity cert. Resources of ISP #1 ROA End Entity cert. End User CA #1 (Resources of EU#1) ROA End Entity cert. ROA End Entity cert. LACNIC’s RPKI Structure (ii) • CAs – Entity that issues certificates (bit CA=1) • ISPs can use the certificate to sign it’s clients’ certificates • Certificates Repository – Repository of certificates, CRLs and manifests – Accesible through “rsync” • Management Interface – User web interface for those who prefer “hosted” mode RPKI CA Services • Children certificates issuance when the registration database is updated or on user demand • Children certificates revocation in a centralized manner or on user demand • Periodic issuance of CRL for CA certificate • CA Certificate and children certificates publication in a public repository (rsync) Conclusions • The routing system is one of the core operations of the Internet • Still is vulnerable to attacks and bad configs • Some work has been done (RPKI, Origin Validation) • We need to continue our work – Protocol specification – Deployment (Filtering, RPKI, Origin validation) Links / References • LACNIC’s RPKI System – http://rpki.lacnic.net • LACNIC’s RPKI Repository – rsync://repository.lacnic.net/rpki/ • To see the repository – rsync --list-only rsync://repository.lacnic.net/rpki/lacnic/ • RPKI Statistics – http://www.labs.lacnic.net/~rpki Questions? Comments? CASA DE INTERNET DE LATINOAMÉRICA Y EL CARIBE twitter.com/LACNIC facebook.com/ LACNIC youtube.com/user/lacnicstaff gplusme.at/LACNIC Sofía Silva Berenguer sofia @ lacnic.net Thank you!