IAEA - Safety Culture Symposium

Report
IAEAs Approach to
Safety Culture Assessments
Monica Haage – [email protected]
Expert on Safety Culture and Human & Organizational Factors
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
The IAEA Safety Culture Framework
Safety Culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations
and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, protection and
safety issues receives the attention warranted by their significance.
The 2007 IAEA glossary
The internationally agreed IAEA normative
framework defines strong safety culture into:
- 5 characteristics
- 36 attributes
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Recognized that safety culture is an essential component of
the defence in depth and need to be addressed proactively
Safety is a clearly recognized value
Attributes
• High priority to safety: shown in documentation,
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communications and decision- making
Safety is a primary consideration in the allocation of
resources
The strategic business importance of safety is reflected in
business plan
Individuals are convinced that safety and production go
‘hand in hand’
A proactive and long-term approach to safety issues is
shown in decision-making
Safety conscious behavior is socially accepted and
supported (both formally and informally)
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GS-G-3.1
Accountability for safety is clear
Attributes
• Appropriate relationship with the regulatory body exists, which ensures
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that the accountability for safety remains with the licensee
Roles and responsibilities are clearly defined and understood
There is a high level of compliance with regulations and procedures
Management delegates responsibilities with appropriate authority to
enable accountabilities
Ownership for safety is evident at all organizational levels and by all
individuals
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GS-G-3.1
Safety is learning driven
Attributes
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A questioning attitude prevails at all organizational levels
An open reporting of deviations and errors is encouraged
Internal and external assessments, including self-assessments are used
Organizational and operating experience (both internal and external to
the facility) is used
• Learning is enabled through the ability to recognize and diagnose
deviations, formulate and implement solutions and monitor the effects of
corrective actions
• Safety performance indicators are tracked, trended, evaluated and
acted upon
• There is a systematic development of staff competencies
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GS-G-3.1
Safety is integrated into all activities
Attributes
• Trust permeates the organization
• Consideration for all types of safety, including industrial and
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environmental safety and security, is evident
Quality of documentation and procedures is good
Quality of processes, from planning to implementation and review, is
good
Individuals have the necessary knowledge and understanding of the
work processes
Factors affecting work motivation and job satisfaction are considered
Good working conditions exist with regards to time pressures, work
load and stress
Cross-functional and interdisciplinary cooperation and teamwork are
present
Housekeeping and material condition reflect commitment to
excellence
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GS-G-3.1
Leadership for safety is clear
Attributes
• Senior management is clearly committed to safety
• Commitment to safety is evident at all management levels
• Visible leadership showing involvement of management in safety related
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activities
Leadership skills are systematically developed
Management assures that there is sufficient and competent staff
Management seeks the active involvement of staff in improving safety
Safety implications are considered in the change management process
Management shows a continuous effort to strive for openness and good
communications throughout the organization
Management has the ability to resolve conflicts as necessary
Relationships between management and staff are built on trust
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GS-G-3.1
IAEA Safety Culture Publications http://www.iaea.org
Document
Title
Safety Fundamentals No. SF-1
Fundamental Safety Principles
Safety Requirements No. GS-R-3
The Management System for Facilities and Activities
Safety Requirements GS-R-Part 2
(supersedes Safety Requirements No.
GS-R-3)
The Management System for Facilities and Activities – draft DS-456 – to be
published 2015
Safety Guide No. GS-G-3.1
Application of the Management System for Facilities and Activities
Safety Guide No. GS-G-3.5
The Management System for Nuclear Installations
Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-4
Safety Culture
Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-15
Key Practical Issues in Strengthening Safety Culture
Safety Report Series No. 11
Developing Safety Culture in Nuclear Activities
Safety Report Series No. 42
Safety Culture in the Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants
Safety Report Series: No 74
Safety Culture during Pre-Operational Phases – Published Sept 2012
Safety Report Series:
Performing Safety Culture Self-Assessments –– approved and expected to be
published 2014/2015
Safety Report Series:
How to Continuously Improve Safety Culture – draft – to be published 2015
TECDOC-1321
Self-assessment of safety culture in nuclear installations
TECDOC-1329
Safety culture in nuclear installations
TECDOC-1707
Regulatory Oversight Of Safety Culture In Nuclear Installations
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IAEAs Approach to
Safety Culture Continuous Improvement
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Culture is seen as something we can influence,
rather than something we can control
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Culture work needs to encompass the whole
organization – not only as a top-down process
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Edgar Schein’s well established iceberg metaphor
helps to understand and how to continuously
improve safety culture
Artefacts,
Behaviour
Attitudes
• observe visible aspects (artefacts and
behaviour, “above surface”) and;
• interpret this information to reveal the cultural
reasons behind (found in attitudes, values and
basic assumptions, “below surface”)
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For safety culture improvement, the IAEA
emphasises human interactions (shared space)
including trust, mindful communication, learning
attitude, inquiring attitude, self-accountability,
diversity, self-reflection etc.
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Values
Basic
Assumptions
IAEA Safety Standards
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Safety Standard GS-G-3.5:
Assessment of Safety Culture
Safety Culture Self-Assessement should:
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Include the entire organization
Several different self-assessment tools should be used (e.g. interviews, focus
groups, questionnaires, observations and document reviews)
• A designated team representing all organizational levels and functions at the
installation should carry out the self-assessment
• A specialist in safety culture should be included in the team
• The self-assessment team should receive training
• The self-assessment team should summarize the results and identify areas for
improvement and may suggest actions to be taken
• The results should be reported to the management at an appropriate level
• A follow-up assessment should be performed
The independent assessment of safety culture should follow a similar approach
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Basis of the safety culture assessment
methodology
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Member States requests to IAEA to provide practical guidance
IAEA Safety Standards
Behaviour and social science
Past experiences
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Overall characteristics of the IAEA safety
culture methodology
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Multiple-methods approach
Explorative, open approach
Raw material for interpretation
Data in itself say little about culture (tip of
the iceberg)
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The IAEA Safety Culture Assessment Methodology
• Using several assessment methods
Interviews
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Interviews
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
Interview technique
• Open-ended questions
• Striving towards a non-structured interview technique
• Explorative – more like a conversation
Structured
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Semi-structured
Non-structured
Focus Groups
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
Focus Groups
• The purpose of focus groups is to develop a broad and
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deep understanding rather than a quantitative summary
7 – 10 participants (2 Facilitators)
Various cross-section of the organisation
• Job, Grade, Age, Department, etc.
A highly effective method for “listening” to others’ views and
gain insight into group dynamics
Used to draw out attitudes, feelings, beliefs, experiences
and reactions in a way that is not feasible using other
methods
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Questionnaires/Surveys
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
Why surveys?
• To capture attitudes and impressions of a large
population
• To make sure that everyone in a organization
has had an opportunity to make his/her voice
heard
• To establish a baseline and be able to track
changes over time
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Disadvantages of surveys
• Surveys identify symptoms rather than causes
• The information collected is about what employees think
they think – this is not the same as how they really act!
• Surveys are subject to response bias, e.g. respondents
may feel that they should respond in certain ways
• Questionnaires say more about what the person asking
questions thinks is important than what the respondent
feels is important!
Safety culture only make sense in a qualitative perspective
and caution should be made when using quantitative methods
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IAEAs Safety Culture Perception Questionnaire
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Observations
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
Why observations?
• Visible manifestations of culture
• What you see is factual – whether it should have
happened or not!
• Should involve observations in different areas and
with different people across the organization to
ensure the validity of the findings
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Document Review
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
Why document review?
• Documents communicate the organizations values and
expectations
• Reveal approaches/beliefs related to ensuring compliance,
e.g. how positional power authority is distributed, degree of
formality, approaches to corrective actions, etc.
• May reveal actual work practices, e.g. event reports.
• Can show how the organization thinks, e.g. in documents with
analytical content.
• A document says a lot about how the organization presents
itself – to itself.
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The IAEA Safety Culture Assessment Methodology
• Separation of descriptive and normative
Descriptive
Normative
‘is’
‘should’
Based on data
and a theory of
culture
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Based on data, a
theory of culture
and a norm
The IAEA Safety Culture Assessment Methodology
• Performed in silos – each assessment
method treated separate
Survey
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Interviews
Focus
groups
Observations
The IAEA Safety Culture Analysis Process
e. g. self-assessment
Final Issues;
Normative,
evaluative analysis
Overarching themes: Image(s) of culture
Cultural
themes
Cultural
themes
Cultural
themes
Cultural
themes
Cultural
themes
Cultural
expressions
Cultural
expressions
Cultural
expressions
Cultural
expressions
Cultural
expressions
Interview data
Survey data
Focus group
data
Document
data
Observation
data
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IAEAs Approach to
ISCA
Independent Safety Culture Assessment
within Operational Safety Review Team (OSART)
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Standard GS-G-3.5:
Assessment of Safety Culture
Safety Culture Independent Assessment should:
The independent assessment of safety culture should follow a similar approach as
self-assessment
• The independence and qualification of the members of the assessment team
should be considered crucial for the success of the assessment
• The team should be staffed with sufficient diversity of experience and should
include specialists in behavioural science, with knowledge of statistical
methods of analysis
• The independent assessment team should aim at identifying strengths and
areas for improvement
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The ISCA Teams Area of Expertise
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Psychology
Cognitive science
Sociology
Social Psychology
Organizational theory
Cultural theory
Leadership and management theory
Human Factor / Human Factor Engineering
Organizational Factors
Resilience Engineering
ITO (interaction between Individuals, Technology and
Organizations)
Basic knowledge; Nuclear technology, nuclear organizations,
regulatory framework
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OSART Findings and Safety Culture
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The IAEA ISCA Assessment Methods
Sources of information:
Interviews
Team Findings
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Core of IAEA Safety Culture Analysis Process
e. g. independent assessment within OSART
Final Issues;
Normative,
evaluative analysis
Overarching themes: Image(s) of culture
Cultural
themes
Cultural
themes
Cultural
themes
Cultural
themes
Cultural
themes
Cultural
themes
Cultural
expressions
Cultural
expressions
Cultural
expressions
Cultural
expressions
Cultural
expressions
Cultural
expressions
Interview
data
Survey
data
Focus
group data
Document
data
Observation
data
Team
findings
data
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Example of amount of safety culture facts
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Team findings: Circa 220 facts
25 interviews: Circa 150 facts
7 observations: Circa 30 facts
7 focus groups: Circa 80 facts
Survey 389 participated 97 questions
In total about 480 fact excluding the survey
material
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Reporting of the results
• Recommendations for areas in need of
attention
• Three senior managment workshops to
reach a shared understanding
• Exit meeting
• Report
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…Thank you for your attention

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