HassanSahudenJanelleBurdPOLPlanningStudies

Report
Presenters
Janelle Burd, PE, LEED AP BD+C
Sr. Mechanical Engineer/Fuel System Specialist
• 27 years of experience in fuel system design
• Pipeline Integrity Management Plans (IMP- POL)
• Engineering Project Planning Studies
Hassan Sahudin, PE, LEED AP BD+C, ENV SP
Sr. Structural Engineer/Project Manager
• 25 years of experience
• Specialized focus on fueling facilities
• Pipeline Integrity Management Plans (IMP-POL)
• Engineering Project Planning Studies
1
PETRO Expo 2013
Pipeline Integrity Management Plan
(IMP-POL)
and
Project Planning Studies
(PPS)
Common Deficiencies
18 November 2013
Agenda
• Burns & McDonnell Overview
• IMP- POL’s & Planning Studies
• Assessment Objectives
• 3 Most Common Deficiencies
 Pipe Support
 Thermal Relief
 Containment
• Additional Deficiencies
• Conclusion
• Q &A
3
Burns & McDonnell
Overview:
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Founded in 1898
100% Employee-Owned
Over 4,300 Employees
$2B in Revenues per year
More than 30 Offices
We deliver successful DOD projects worldwide
50+ years of experience in design, construction,
inspection and operational assistance of POL facilities
Partners include AFCEC, USACE, NAVFAC, National
Guard, Reserves, DLA HQ, DLA-Energy
Our Mission: “Make Our Clients Successful”
4
U.S. POL/Fueling Project Sites
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International Fueling Project Sites
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IMP-POL and PPS Sites
IMP-POL:
• 6 Regions total


57 sites completed
17 sites future
• Follow-On IMP:


1 site in US
2 sites in Japan
Project Planning Study (PPS):
• 14 sites in US
• 1 each in Italy, Greece, Gitmo
7
IMP-POL and Project Planning Studies
What is an IMP-POL and Project Planning Study?
• Funded by Defense Logistic Agency – Energy (DLA-Energy)
• Two Parts of DLA-Energy’s Centrally Managed Program (CMP)
• Condition assessment programs
Piers and Marine
Loading Arms
Project Planning
Study (PPS)
Cathodic
Protection
System Integrity
Management
8
Automated Fuel
Service Station
Automatic Tank
Gauging
Tank Integrity
Management
(API 653 & STI)
Terminal
Automation
Pipeline Integrity
Management
Plan (IMP-POL)
Pipeline Pressure
Testing (API 570)
Rail Maintenance
Pressure Vessel
Inspection
(API 510)
Hydrant System
Tuning
(upcoming)
Ultimate Goal
Ultimate Goal for DLA-Energy and Installations:
• Provide site specific record for each facility
 Condition assessment
 Testing and inspection
 Intervals
 Responsible execution agency
• Plan and fund projects, improvements and repairs
• Risk management
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Typical Codes and Standards
• Local, State, and Federal Environment Governing Standards
• API and ASME
• NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code
• UFC 3-460-01, Petroleum Fuel Facilities
• UFC 3-460-03, Maintenance of Petroleum Systems
• UFGS-01 35 29, Safety and Occupational Health Requirements
• 33 CFR 156, Oil and Hazardous Material Transfer Operations
• 40 CFR 112, Oil Pollution Prevention
• 49 CFR 195, Transportation of Hazardous Liquids by Pipeline
• DESC-P-12 - DLA-E / DESC Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization
(SRM) Funding Policy for Fixed Petroleum Facilities
10
Assessment Objectives
Provide DLA-E and Base Fuels Personnel with:
• Assessment of facilities conditions and pipeline integrity
• Overview and understanding of existing POL infrastructure
• Record of the general integrity and condition of the piping systems
• A “road map” of integrity management and maintenance
• Identification of highest-risk elements
• Recommendations for further actions
11
IMP-POL – Common Deficiencies
Common
Deficiencies
found during
site
assessments:
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• Pipe Support Issues
• Thermal Relief Issues
• Valve and Flange Seals – Weeps and Leaks
• Soft Materials – Brass and Bronze Valves
and Piping
• Galvanic Reactions – Dissimilar Metals
• Soil-Air / Concrete-Air Interfaces
• Coating Failure
• Cathodic Protection Issues
Planning Studies – Issues
Common
Deficiencies
found during
site
assessments:
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• Pipe Support Issues
• Thermal Relief Issues
• Secondary Containment Issues
• Insufficient Fuel Lab Ventilation
• Corrosion/Coating Failure
• Lighting Issues
• Use of Sight Flow Indicators
• Lack of EFSO Stations
• Grounding Issues
3 Most Common Deficiencies
 Pipe Support
 Thermal Relief
 Secondary Containment
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Deficiency 1 - Pipe Support
Issues:
• Lack of Isolation Pads
• Concrete Saddles
• Support failure
• Temporary Supports
• Inadequate Support
• No Lateral Restraint
• Spring Can Supports Disengaged
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Pipe Support
Lacks Isolation Pad
 Metal-metal contact
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Pipe Support
Concrete Saddle
 Concrete-steel contact, moisture collection
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Pipe Support
“Clamshell” anchors
 Moisture collection
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Pipe Support
Metal Roller Supports
Metal-metal contact
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Pipe Support
“Spider” Supports
Corrosion, displaced support
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Pipe Support
Improper pipe supports
 Lacks Lateral Restraint
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Risks: Pipe Support
Risks from Undetected/Unaddressed Issues:
• Excessive pipe movements
• Pipe or joint failure
• Equipment and Tank Damage
• Unintended release
• Environmental impact
• System shut down
• Impact to mission
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Risk Mitigation: Pipe Support
Risk Mitigation Recommendations:
•
Metal to Metal contact – Teflon barriers, pads, pipe collars
•
Concrete saddles – Replace with approved pipe support
•
Support failure – Perform pipe stress analysis and replace
•
Wood support – Replace with approved material
•
Inadequate Support – Replace with appropriate style
Owner Impact – Preventative maintenance is less costly than equipment
repair/ replacement and potential environmental clean up
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Deficiency 2 - Thermal Relief
Issues:
• Insufficient Thermal Relief
• Cascading Issues
• Improper Setting
• Thermal Reliefs Not Tested
• Closed Isolation Valves
 The internal pipe pressure increase resulting from fluid thermal expansion
can equal as much as 75 psi for every degree rise in the fuel temperature
if not relieved!
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Thermal Relief Risks
Risks from Undetected and Unaddressed Issues:
•
•
•
•
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Over pressurization of equipment and valves – Costly repairs and
replacement
Leaking Flanges and Joints – Increased maintenance costs
Danger to operators due to high system pressures
Potential for catastrophic failure of pipe or components
Thermal Relief Risk Mitigation
Risk Mitigation Recommendations:
•
•
Conduct a thermal relief study
Change operating procedures
– leave relief valve open
Owner Impact – Preventative maintenance is less costly than equipment
repair/ replacement and potential environmental clean up!
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Deficiency 3 – Secondary Containment
Regulations: 40 CFR Part 112, NFPA 30, and UFCs
Issues:
•
Absence of Secondary Containment
•
Cracks in Containment Concrete
•
Joints Sealant Failure
•
Liner System Problems
•
Lack of Containment Curbs
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Secondary Containment
Absence of Containment Over Water
 Risk contamination of waterways
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Secondary Containment
Absence of Containment at Grade
 Risk ground contamination
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Secondary Containment
Absence of Containment Below Grade
 Risk groundwater contamination
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Secondary Containment
Cracks in Containment Concrete
 Breach in Containment
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Secondary Containment
Joint Sealant Failure
 Breach in Containment
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Secondary Containment
Liner System Problems
 Ineffective Containment
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Secondary Containment
Lack of Curbing
 Ineffective Containment
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Secondary Containment
Say What?
 Leak Detection Plant
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Containment Risks
Risks to unaddressed problems:
• Inability to detect small leaks
• Inability to contain fuel spills
• Environmental impact
• Non-compliance
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Containment Risk Mitigation
Risk Mitigation Recommendations:
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Repair cracks in concrete
•
Seal joints with jet-fuel resistant sealant
•
Provide adequately sized secondary containment or remote spill
containment system
•
Install perimeter curbs on equipment pads/pipe causeway
Owner Impact – Preventative maintenance is less costly than equipment
repair/ replacement and potential environmental clean up!
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Additional Deficiencies
Additional Deficiencies:
•
Brass/Bronze Bodied Valves
•
Sight Flow Indicators
•
Soil-Air / Concrete–Air Interfaces
•
Product Labeling
•
Lubricated Swivel Joints
•
Fuel Lab Inadequate Ventilation
•
Coating Failure
•
Dissimilar Metals
•
Inadequate Ground Clearance
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Brass/Bronze Bodied Valves
Issue:

Soft bodied valves and piping such as brass, bronze
and copper present in fueling system.
Risk:

NFPA 30 and 30A - Metals with lower melting point
are not to be used in fueling systems.
Recommended Mitigation:

Remove and replace with UFC compliant valves and
piping.
 UFC 3-460-01 - valves are to be CS or SS bodied.
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Sight Flow Indicators
Issue:

Sight flow indicator in certain configurations are
subject to tank head pressure or system pressure.
Risks:

Sight glass failure may cause significant leak
 UFC 3-460-01 - Sight flow indicators are not to be
provided on thermal relief piping, filtration
devices, or product recovery tanks.
Recommendation:

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Remove sight flow indicators in these
configurations and repair the piping.
Soil - Air Interface
Issue:

Piping is not properly coated.
Risks:

Deterioration of Extruded Polyethylene (UG pipe
coating) coatings due to UV exposure
Recommendation:

Expose the soil/air interface, prep and coat 12
inches below grade level and 6 inches above.
 Heavy body, surface tolerant epoxy coating
 Compatible with polyethylene and the existing
aboveground pipe coating.
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Lubricated Swivel Joints
Issues:
 Lack of proper maintenance/lubrication may
cause seized joints
 Typically found at Truck Loading / Truck
Offloading. (All Products)
Risks:
 Compromised fuel quality (Aviation Fuel)
 UFC 3-460-01: Aluminum or SS non-lubricated
swivel joints
Recommendation:
 Replace with non-lubricated type swivel joints
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Fuel Lab Inadequate Ventilation
Issues:
 Inadequate ventilation rate
 Improper equipment
Risks:
 Air quality concern
 Explosion hazard
Recommendation:
 Replace with proper fume hood
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Coating Failure
Issue:
 Coating failure causing pipe corrosion
Risks:
 Leaks in pipes
 Failure at supports.
Recommendation:
 Clean and recoat
 Piping - UFGS Spec Section 09 97 13.27.
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Dissimilar Metals
Issues:
 Galvanic corrosion
Risks:
 Failure of bolts
 Maintenance issue
Recommendation:
 Provide isolation flange kit
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Inadequate Ground Clearance
Issues:
 Piping located too close to grade
Risks:
 Corrosion
 Maintenance issue
Recommendation:
 Raise piping
 18” clearance min
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Conclusion
How thorough assessments help Bases/Installations:
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Identify items with higher risks of failure
•
Recommend Mitigation Plans
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Reminder of items requiring maintenance and repairs
•
Awareness of funding mechanism
A well-qualified consultant is a critical partner in your success !
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Questions / Answers
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