Information System Profile Contractor: Lockheed Martin, Missiles and Fire Control Address: 1701 W. Marshall Dr. Grand Prairie, Texas 75051 Cage Code: 64059 IS Number: 240 This IS Profile is associated with ODAA Unique Identifier: 64059-20040803-00001 Preparing System Security Plans JSAC 13 -14 April 2011 DD254 • The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires that a DD Form 254 be incorporated in each classified contract. The DD Form 254 provides to the contractor (or a subcontractor) the security requirements and the classification guidance that would be necessary to perform on a classified contract. • Invitation for Bid (IBF), Independent Research and Development (IRAD), Request for Proposal (RFP), Request for Quotation. Security classification guide or other relevant security docs (Required prior to beginning a IS profile) Identify classification and handling caveats ◦ Identify IS USER required training based on classification and handling caveats ◦ COMSEC: information includes accountable or non-accountable COMSEC information and controlled cryptographic items (CCI). ◦ Closed area/ Safe training required “White board” meeting to discuss computing system requirements Engineering and program requirements Unclassified and Classified systems Allocate, Build and pre-Certify systems based upon ODAA technical baseline settings. Why the Defense Security Service denies (DSS) an Interim Approval to Operate (IATO) • Missing or incomplete Unique Identifier (UID) • ISSM did not sign the IS Security Package Submission and Certification Statement • Missing Hardware List / Software List / Configuration Diagram • Physical Security not adequately explained • No signed DSS Form 147 (Record of Controlled Area) if the system is in a Closed Area • No Certification Test Guide or NISP Tool Results were provided • Missing letter from Government Contracting Activity (GCA) if any variances are needed • Missing MOA when required • Identification and Authentication not adequately addressed • Any unique issues that would require denial of the IATO Missing or incomplete UID Physical Security not adequately explained Any unique issues that would require denial of the IATO Special Procedures Other Special procedures: N/A Yes If yes, describe: Other Comments or Additional Information: Classified media may be utilized at the same or higher classification and or handling caveat, contact the ISSM for specific details. Hard drives and other media will be destroyed by sending it to the NSA or by returning it as classified back to the data owner. Overwriting of hard drives is NOT an approved method of Sanitization. Temporarily inactive drives or infrequent use of the hard drives is not uncommon. These procedures pertain to drives not used for a Week or longer. In lieu of conducting Weekly online audits of the hard drive, the drives will be placed in Bag and the opening sealed with Tamper Proof Seals. Each week, the Bags will be inspected to ensure usage has not taken place. If or when a Seal is broken, an entry will be made in the Seal Log identifying the reason. When the drives are used, the anti-virus definitions will be updated, work conducted, then an on-line audit of the drive completed and then the drive will be bagged and seal placed over the opening. The action will be recorded in the Maintenance and or Seal Logs as appropriate and in the weekly record audit. The ASTi / Telestra 4 hardware has a BIOS password length limitation of 7 characters. It will accept upper/lower case and special characters, but does not enforce any complexity requirements. Missing Hardware List / Software List / Configuration Diagram No signed DSS Form 147 (Record of Controlled Area) if the system is in a Closed Area No Certification Test Guide or NISP Tool Results were provided No Certification Test Guide or NISP Tool Results were provided No Certification Test Guide or NISP Tool Results were provided Missing MOA when required MOU Requirements • When information systems accredited by different DAAs are to be interconnected, an MOU is required to be completed and signed by the DAAs for the systems involved. MOUs are created to describe the security responsibilities and other information as agreed upon by two or more designated approving authorities or DAAs. • Contractor-to-Contractor system interconnections do not require an MOU when DSS is the DAA for all systems involved. Missing letter from GCA if any variances are needed • A signed copy of the customers Risk Acceptance Letter on Government letterhead. • stating they are willing to assume the residual risk for the alternate trusted download procedures. • Note that Risk Acceptance Letter's must be updated when the plan is reaccredited every three years. • For special purpose systems not part of a larger system the facility needs to explain the need to the GCA and get risk acceptance letter to include GCA security guidance since the system won't meet NISPOM requirements. • Operating system must be NISPOM compliant, or have a Risk Acceptance Letter from the GCA. Identification and Authentication not adequately addressed Any unique issues that would require denial of the IATO Restricted Areas… MAINTENANCE, OPERATING SYSTEM & SECURITY SOFTWARE CHANGE LOG This log is used to record additions, removals, maintenance, and changes to hardware, installation, and testing of O/S & Security Software. DATE SYSTEM/DEVICE DESCRIPTION COMPONENT ID NUMBER DESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS PERSON/ (Company if appl) PCL ESCORT All entries must include date, description of action, and person taking action. Company of person performing action is only required if they are not an employee. Escort is only listed when the performing person does not have the requisite clearances and/or NTK. PCL must be included for entries involving changes to hardware or software. Hardware changes must include system/device description, id number and clear/sanitize actions if applicable. Missing or incomplete UID ISSM did not sign the IS Security Package Submission and Certification Statement Missing or incomplete UID Question Time?