Document

Report
Towards Lasting Peace and Stability
Lessons Learned in Iraq and Afghanistan
UN and GCTF Good Practices for
Rehabilitation and Reintegrtation of Violent
Extremist Offenders
Presented by
Dr. D.M. Stone, MajGen USMC (Ret)
Detention: Viewed as a Problem
Historic failures in
custody and care serve
as recruiting tools for
foreign fighters.
Detention had also
served as a place for
insurgents to conduct
recruiting, training, and
disciplining of future
combatants.
Defining Strategic Success
VICTORY
• Establish an alliance with
moderate Iraqis
• Empower them to effectively
marginalize violent extremists
• Provide momentum to the process
of reconciliation with Iraqi society
The Plan
•Phase I: Apply COIN principles to TIF, separate
extremists from population, and protect populations
both inside and outside the TIF
•Phase II: Defeat the insurgency within the TIF,
succeed in the battlefield of the mind, and identify
ideas which are contagious
•Phase III: Engaging populations with detainees,
families, and releasees and establish a “social
epidemic” which advances the objective of
empowering the moderate ummah to marginalize the
violent extremists within Iraq
TF-134 Goals
• Ensure standards of care and custody
• Determine if detainee is Imperative Security Risk
- if so, reduce the risk, replace the destructive
ideology
- when no longer a threat, release
• Identify detainees who are Enduring Security Risks
• Collect information from detainees and provide
intelligence
• Defeat any insurgency within the TIF
Previous Detention Process
(before July 2007)
MAG CELL
Capture
Release
GO Review
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
&CRRB
Detention
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
AFTER
Current Engagement Process
Capture
MNFRC Rehearing
C2X/Corps Vetting
Interrogation MAG CELL & CCCI Assessment &
Transition In
Family
VOTECH &
Advocacy Work Programs
Govt of Iraq Reintegration &
Reconciliation
Pledge & Guarantor
Civics & Islamic
Discussions
Release
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
MNFRC &
C2X/Corps Vetting
Education
Post-Release
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
BEFORE
The
Powder Keg Exploding,
Jihadist University
Poor Intelligence2004-2007
Inability to Segregate
Extremists
No Services
Inadequate Command and
Control
In 2007 there were a total of SIX detainee murders and up to 25 severe mutilations.
In 2008 there have been zero detainee murders and zero mutilations.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
AFTER
Empowering moderates through:
Intelligence
Reconciliation
Services
Segregating Violent
Extremists
Proper Command and
Control
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
TF Bucca Force Reduction Impacts
BEFORE
AFTER
Disturbance/Riot
Escape
Murder
Tunnels
40
35
30
10
5
0
JAN
07
DEPARTURE OF 16TH MP BDE
15
* TIFRC SERVICES BEGIN
20
ARRIVAL OF 16TH MP BDE
25
FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JULY AUG
07
07
07
07
07
07
07
SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN
07
07
07
07
08
* TIFRC Services did not start until Sep 07
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
FEB MAR APR
08
08
08
26 Week Moving Avg.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Reintegration Services Start
Pledge Start
27 Apr - 3 May 08
2007
2-8 Mar 08
6-12 Jan 08
11-17 Nov 07
16-22 Sep 07
2006
22-28 Jul 07
27 May-2 Jun 07
1-7 Apr 07
4-10 Feb 07
10-16 Dec 06
15-21 Oct 06
20-26 Aug 06
2005
25 Jun - 1 Jul 06
30 Apr - 6 May 06
5-11 Mar 06
8-14 Jan 06
13-19 Nov 05
18-24 Sep 05
24-30 Jul 05
2004
29 May - 4 Jun 05
3-9 Apr 05
6-12 Feb 05
40
12-18 Dec 04
17-23 Oct 04
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
TIF Weekly Re-internments 2004-2008
2008
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
MNFRC Start
JIDC
ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE
MEETING
PLACES
INSURGENT AND TERRORIST TTPs
CELL
ORGANIZATION
SAFE
HOUSES
IDENTIFY
INSURGENT
LEADERS
4XEFP
IIRs
PENDING
ATTACKS
CACHE
LOCATIONS
INTEL SUPPORT TO SONS OF IRAQ
IED EFFORTS
WITH JIEDDO,
CEXC, AND NGIC
WEAPON
SMUGGLING
ROUTES
INTEL SUPPORT TO MISCAP
IDENTIFY SONS
OF IRAQ
INFILTRATORS
UTILIZE
LEGAL
SYSTEM
5XIIRs
NINEWA
IP CDR
ABU
NUR
SOURCE
OPNS
OVERFouty
1000
PV2 Byron
INTERROGATIONS
AQI PERCEPTION
OF SOI
IDENTIFY
RECONCILIATION
CANDIDATES
ASSESS SONS OF
IRAQ
EFFECTIVENESS
RECOVERED
TRIBAL
ENGAGEMENT
DEVELOP
TARGETS
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
TIF Release & Re-Internment
Cumulative Releases
Cumulative Re-Internments
Cumulative Re-Internment Rate
2004 2004-2005 2004-2006
10350
20412
34368
37
571
1606
0.36%
2.80%
4.67%
2004-2007
43319
2847
6.57%
2004-2008
49632
3145
6.34%
7 Sept-31 Dec 07 7 Sep 07-17 May 08
3743
8546
6
28
0.16%
0.33%
Cumulative MNFRC Releases
Cumulative MNFRC Re-Internments
Post MNFRC Re-Internment Rate
Cumulative Re-Internment
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
2004
2005
2006
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
2007
2008
COIN Operations
Engagement Programs
Western
Prime Minister
President
- Civics
- Education
Executive
- Votech
- Jobs
- Religious Discussion
PanArab
Vice Presidents
GoI
PartnershipsLegislature
MNFRC
MEDIA
Iraqi
Detainees
Ministries
Special Populations
- Youth
MOJ
- Women
MOHR
MOE
- Mentally challenged
- Foreign Fighters
ICRC
- Enduring Threats
INGOs
Social/Cultural
Outreach
Sheiks/Leaders
Tribes/Clans
Amnesty
International
USG
& MNF-I
UN
MNC-I
Families
OSD
CALL
USM-I
Strategic Releases
Strategic Releases: Capitalize on external Arab IO capabilities using
Foreign Fighter detainees willing to publicly speak against Jihad
Sunday, 18 September 2005
“Bernie’s” Timeline (ISN 168058— al Shayie)
Dec 2004 – Failed VBIED attack on Jordanian Embassy
31 July 05 – Turned over to Saudi Arabia
Mar 2008 – Bernie meets the DCG-DO in Saudi Arabia
There is inadequate prison bed space in which to
house current and projected inmate populations.
CJIATF-435 MajGen Stone
UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO
17
Battlefield of the Mind
Moderates
Extremists
GOI and Coalition
United Nations Best Practices
•
•
•
•
•
Defining Goals and Objectives
Prison Context
The Role of Different Actors
Reintegration Components
Looking to Other Relevant Fields
Defining Goals and Objectives
• #1 In developing a rehabilitation program, it is
important to first clearly define the program’s
goals and objectives and identify indicators of
success and failure.
• #2. Good prison standards and practices can
offer an appropriate starting point for building
an effective, safe and smoothly operating
rehabilitation program.
In Coalition and GIRoA detention/corrections, there is a lack of a validated inmate
classification system to identify prisoners by category, risk and radicalization.
CJIATF-435 MajGen Stone
UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO
21
• #3. An importanat first step is developing an
effective intake, assessment and
classification system for new inmates.
• #4. Where possible, States should consider
establishing separate facilities for those
inmates going through the rehabilitation
programs.
• #5. Ensure that all relevant staff are
appropriately and professionally trained and
educated to deal with the complexities of
reintegration or rehabilitation efforts.
“Radicalization”
Afghan
Criminals
CJIATF-435 MajGen Stone
Radical
Islamists
UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO
23
The Role of Different Actors
• #6. Some measure of control should be
maintained over the inmates’ communication,
both within and outside the prison.
• #7. Rehabilitation Programs should incorporate a
broad range of cross-disciplinary experts, with
close coordination among the relevant
departments and personnel involved.
• #8. Psychologists can play a key role in the
rehabilitation process and should be fully
integrated into these programs.
Just One Cell Phone Call Away . . .
Serena Hotel
Attack
Pol-i-Charki Wing 3
CPD Action
Take Down
Bombs
The
Next
Attack
Kidnappings
Assassinations
CPD Headquarters
Bombing
• #9. As the personnel in most frequent contact
with the inmates, it is important that prison
officers understand and are carefully attuned to
the rehabilitation process, even if they are not
directly responsible for its delivery.
• #10. When appropriate, States should integrate
religious scholars into the rehabilitation process.
• #11. Law enforcement officers who are
interviewing inmates during the rehabilitation
process should receive specialized training and
should coordinate these activities closely with the
rehabilitation professionals.
• #12. Victims and victim’s advocates can be
powerful voices and States should consider
including them in rehabilitation programs,
where appropriate.
• #13. Former violent extremists can be
influential with those going through the
rehabilitation process and should be included
where possible and appropriate.
• #14. Charismatic members of the community
can also help inspire change and should be
included in rehabilitation programs where
possible and appropriate.
Reintegration Components
• #15. Rehabilitation efforts should include
behavioral and cognitive skills programs.
• #16. Rehabilitation programs should include
basic education courses where possible and
appropriate.
• #17. Rehabilitation programs should include
vocational skills training and employment
assistance where possible and appropriate.
• #18. States should consider finding ways to
recognize the achievement of inmates who
have completed the rehabilitation program.
• #19. States should consider whether inmates
should be eligible for sentence reduction or
other more lenient treatment based on the
completion of rehabilitation courses.
• #20. States should consider whether
additional financial support can be provided
to inmates and their families who have
completed the rehabilitation courses.
• #21. States should consider developing
aftercare programs to enable the treatment
to continue after the inmate has left the
prison setting.
• #22. Consideration for protective measures
should be given when there is evidence that a
reformed terrorist may face threats to his or
her life, or the lives of family members, upon
release from custody.
• #23. Formal or informal, parole-like
monitoring post release can be an effective
method to prevent recidivism.
• # 24. Families should be integrated where
possible and appropriate into rehabilitation
programs.
• #25. Fostering a welcoming community
environment for the inmate post-release is
critical to long-term success.
Other Relevant Fields.
#26. As States design rehabilitation programs,
they should look, as appropriate, to other
relevant fields beyond terrorism for lessons
learned.
Success Dependencies
Corrections
Police Training
War
Strategy
Rule of Law
Isolate
insurgent
forces from
external
support
Agriculture
Political Will
Reconstruction
/PRT
CJIATF-435 MajGen Stone
UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO
33
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Dahuk
Dahuk
Bashur
Arbil
Tall Afar
Mosul
Irbil
1
2
Ninawa
Dayr az Zawr
At Tamim
FLB JOSHUA
Sulaymaniyah
Kirkuk
IRAN
As Sulaymaniyah
Hamadan
Salah
ad Din
FLB
SYCAMORE
OBJ
Samarra
CHARLIE
SYRIA
Al Qaim
12
Diyala
LSA ANACONDA
Baqubah
Ar Ramadi
Ar Rutbah
1
5
Baghdad
Fallujah
10
Wasit
Babil
Al Hillah
Karbala
Al Anbar
H4
Karbala
H3
Al Kut
Al Kufa
An Najaf
Dezful
Al Amarah
Ad Diwaniyah
Al Qadisiyah
22
JORDAN
As Samawah
Maysan
Dhi Qar
FLB CEDAR
Ahvaz
6
An Nasiriyah
Tallil
An Najaf
Ar’ar
Az Zubayr
9
Al Muthanna’
Rafha
SAUDI
ARABIA
Al Basrah
1
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Safwan
Al Basrah
Umm Qasr
Kuwait City
KUWAIT
4

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