Police cooperation

Report
Standard training programme in judicial
cooperation in criminal matters
within the European Union
© copyright
Version: 3.0
Last updated: 20.12.2012
The European Judicial
Training Network
With the support of the
European Union
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logo of the training organiser
Training organised by
(name of training organiser)
on (date) at (place)
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Title (of the training/ module)
The European Judicial
Training Network
With the support of the
European Union
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Module 5
Police cooperation
Version: 3.0
Last updated: 20.12.2012
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Contents
1. Introduction (history)
2. Exchanging information
1.
Europol
2.
The SIS
3.
Interpol
4.
Liaison officers
5.
Financial Intelligence Units
6.
Cooperation in border areas
7.
Police Chiefs Task Force
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3. The stakeholders
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1. Introduction
1. Police cooperation before 1990:
•
Somewhat informal
•
Bilateral cooperation, Interpol, Trevi etc.
2. Schengen (Convention of 1990)
•
Information exchange, SIS, cross-border surveillance and hot pursuit
•
Gradual expansion to almost all Member States
4. The Hague Programme (2004): exchange of information and internal
security strategy
5. Lisbon Treaty: institutional changes in particular
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3. Europol (1995)
2. Exchanging information
Comments:
•
Initial work: to facilitate the secure transmission of information
•
Europol: sharing and analysis of information
•
‘Principle of availability’
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Source of problems often = internal coordination issues
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2. Exchanging information
•
Article 39 of the Schengen Convention has long been the only general
legal basis (= hereinafter Art. 39)
•
Replaced by the Framework Decision of 18 December 2006 on simplifying
the exchange of information  start of implementation of the principle of
availability (= hereafter the FD)
•
(Note: the Prüm Treaty (partially integrated into EU law by Decision
2008/615/JHA) goes beyond the Framework Decision of 18 Dec 2006 by
establishing direct access but limited to three types of information – see
below)
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2.1. Legal procedure for the exchange of information
2. Exchanging information
(2.1. Legal procedure for exchange of information)
2.1.1. Scope: General (all offences)
2.1.2. Information concerned
•
Art. 39: not specified
•
2006 FD: determining criterion = availability of the information.
Included:
- Anything that has already been collected (possibility of excluding anything obtained
through coercive measures)
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- Which already exists and to which the police have access without coercive measures
(whether or not judicial authorisation is required)
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2. Exchanging information
(2.1. Legal procedure for exchange of information)
2.1.3. Exclusion from use as evidence
Information collected at a preliminary stage of the investigation  If the
information is to be used as evidence, obligation to use judicial
cooperation channels:
To obtain the info (it has not yet been transmitted)
•
To ‘validate’ the info (if it has already been transmitted)
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•
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2. Exchanging information
(2.1. Legal procedure for exchange of information)
2.1.4. Involvement of the judicial authority
•
Art. 39: where the law makes access subject to the authorisation of the judicial authority
 use judicial cooperation channels
FD of 2006:
-
Judicial authorisation may still be required if necessary for access to the
information at national level
-
The fact that judicial authorisation is required may not be in itself an obstacle to
exchange via police channels
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•
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2. Exchanging information
(2.1. Legal procedure for exchange of information)
2.1.5. Grounds for refusal (FD of 2006)
the information is already in the possession of the police services but was
obtained by means of coercive measures (choice left to the Member States)
•
conventional grounds for refusal: national interests, protecting the ongoing
investigation or the safety of an individual.
•
possible to refuse to execute requests that appear to be manifestly
disproportionate
•
requests relating to minor offences may be refused.
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•
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2. Exchanging information
(2.1. Legal procedure for exchange of information)
 new legal procedure not revolutionary but clarifies the separation between police
cooperation and judicial cooperation.
 The decisive factor is no longer the fact that the information is subject to judicial
supervision, but the fact that the request does not concern obtaining evidence.
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 Application of Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA evaluated in late 2011.
Relatively low level of implementation.
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2. Exchanging information
2.2. Direct access to police databases
Prüm Treaty (2005) integrated, at least the part relating to direct access to databases,
into the EU law by Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008
Direct access to databases:
•
Vehicle registrations
•
Fingerprints (hit / no hit)
•
DNA (hit / no hit)
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Access via a central contact point in each Member State
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Access limited to a case-by-case search
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General comments
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2. Exchanging information
(2.2. Direct access to police databases)
Direct access to vehicle registration records
The access to vehicle registration records is the most extensive under the Prüm system.
This is truly direct access to the data, including personal data. This access is via the
EUCARIS system.
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As at 1 November 2012, the following countries were ‘interconnected’: DE, AT, ES, BE,
FR, LU, NL, RO, SI, FI.
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2. Exchanging information
(2.2. Direct access to police databases)
Direct access to fingerprints records
Hit / no hit access: only tells you whether a fingerprint is known
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Via mutual legal assistance if the information is requested for the purposes of obtaining
evidence
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Possibility of obtaining info via police cooperation in other cases (with 8-hour time limit for
urgent cases, cf FD 2009/960/JHA) and then ‘validating’ information that proves
necessary for evidential purposes
As at 12 October 2012, the following countries are connected to certain others but not all are
necessarily interconnected (see the table for further details): BG, CZ, DE, ES, FR, LT, LU, NL,
AT, SI, SK. See appendix for detailed info.
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If a fingerprint is known, how can more information be obtained?
2. Exchanging information
(2.2. Direct access to police databases)
Direct access to DNA records
Hit / no hit access: only tells you whether a fingerprint is known
If a fingerprint is known, how can more information be obtained? In theory, possibility of using
police cooperation channels if not at the stage of obtaining evidence but mutual legal
assistance probably required by most States.
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As at 12 October 2012, the following countries are connected to certain others but not all are
necessarily interconnected (see the table for further details): BG, DE, ES, FR, LV, LU, NL, AT,
RO, SI, SK, FI. See appendix for detailed info.
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3. Stakeholders and channels
1. Europol
2. The SIS
3. Interpol
4. Liaison officers
5. Financial intelligence units
6. Cooperation in border areas
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7. Police chiefs Task Force
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3.1. EUROPOL
3.1.1. Fact sheet
• Europol Convention of 26 July 1995, amended several times and replaced by
‘Europol Decision’ 2009/371/JHA of 6 April 2009
• Became operational on 1 July 1999
• Headquarters: The Hague
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• Composition: about 500 officers + liaison officers
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3.1. EUROPOL
3.1.2. Introduction
Main function: making structured information relating to criminal investigations available to
national authorities and carrying out strategic and operational analysis of this information.
Relationship with the work of the investigating judge – Europol assistance can
occur:
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• in advance of the work of the investigating judge (the information provided by or via
Europol may contribute to an investigation being opened)
• during the investigation itself (Europol’s assistance may make it possible, for example, to
highlight links with ongoing investigations in other Member States).
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3.1. EUROPOL
3.1.3. Objectives
=> Improve the effectiveness of police cooperation by providing assistance
to national police authorities.
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Europol is not a European ‘FBI’
=> no investigative power of its own and supervision over investigations
retained at Member State level
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3.1. EUROPOL
3.1.4. Competences
3.1.4.1. Material field of action: Exhaustive list but broad types of crime
3.1.4.2. ‘Temporal’ fields of action: prevention and suppression
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3.1.4.3. ‘Territorial’ field of action: must generally involve at least two
Member States
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3.1. EUROPOL
3.1.5. Structure
a) Management board
b) Director
c) Staff
d) Europol National Units (UNE)
= interface between the national level and Europol
•
Often grouped with Interpol national bureau, SIRENE bureau etc.
•
Mandatory channel for transmitting information to Europol
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•
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3.1. EUROPOL
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3.1.5. Structure
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3.1. EUROPOL
3.1.5. Structure
National situation
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Indicate here the contact details of the ENU in your country
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3.1. EUROPOL
3.1.5. Structure
e) Liaison Officers and National Liaison Bureaux
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Each Member State seconds at least one liaison officer to Europol.
•
On average, four liaison officers from each Member State.
•
= extension of the ENU: contact between the ENU and Europol goes through them.
•
Cooperation not only within Europol but also between liaison officers (bilateral coop)
Indicate here the contact details of the Europol liaison officers in
your country
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National situation
3.1. EUROPOL
3.1.6. Europol’s reach
3.1.6.1. Exchange, sharing and analysis of information
Main added value of Europol = ability to process and analyse information
•
3.1.6.1.1. Exchanging info
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 Not strictly Europol, but rather the channel of the liaison officers at
Europol
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3.1. EUROPOL
•
3.1.6.1.2. Providing information: the Europol information system (EIS)
- Operational since 2005
- Contains data on perpetrators and suspects
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- Accessible online to the ENUs and liaison officers
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3.1. EUROPOL
•
3.1.6.1.2. Providing information: the Europol information system (EIS)
Practical example
Conducting an investigation into drugs trafficking, the Austrian police suspect X
of playing a coordinating role in the criminal organisation. By entering
X’s personal data into the EIS, the Austrian ENU discovers that X is also a suspect in a
similar investigation conducted by the Italian police. Following this information, the
Austrian liaison officer will contact his Italian colleague in The Hague to initiate
cooperation.
For example, in late 2011, the EIS contained data on 183 240 objects and 41 193
individuals, and 111 110 searches were run through the system in the past year. The
crime areas concerned were drug trafficking (25% of all objects), trafficking in human
beings (23%), forgery of money (18%), robbery (10%) and fraud (5%) .
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3.1. EUROPOL
•
3.1.6.1.3. Information analysis: analysis work files
=
Temporary files created for a specific crime issue
Practical example (part I)
Italy requests the creation of an analysis work file on the trafficking of
human beings from Central Asia.
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3.1. EUROPOL
•
3.1.6.1.3. Information analysis: analysis work files
Each Member State may choose whether to participate
In 2005, 18 analysis work files were created at Europol
Practical example (part II)
France and Belgium decide to participate in the analysis work file, since, based
on information provided by Italy, the French and Belgian police believe it is likely that
one or more joint criminal networks are involved. The analysis group therefore
comprises Italian, French and Belgian and Europol analysts.
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3.1. EUROPOL
•
3.1.6.1.3. Information analysis: analysis work files
Participants add info to the analysis file
The file contains detailed data about individuals (broader than suspects and perpetrators)
Practical example (part III)
As part of a case falling within the field of action of analysis work file F, the
Belgian police monitor X, who is suspected of acting as a contact with prostitution
networks, for several months. They encode data in the analysis work file regarding X,
such as surname; first name; address; vehicle; places frequented; lifestyle; personality
traits; identifying physical characteristics etc.
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3.1. EUROPOL
•
3.1.6.1.3. Information analysis: analysis work files
Practical example (part IV)
The Italian police seize a mobile telephone during a search. The
telephone is fitted with an anonymous prepaid card but, following contact
with the telephone operator concerned, the Belgian police are able to draw up a
list of the telephone numbers with which communications have taken place
during the previous months. All these telephone numbers and their subscribers,
if known, will be encoded in the analysis work file.
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3.1. EUROPOL
•
3.1.6.1.3. Information analysis: analysis work files
Expected results: bringing to light hidden characteristics that can be used
by investigators, such:
revealing a modus operandi
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identifying the routes used by the criminal organisation
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the role played by certain individuals in the network
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…
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3.1. EUROPOL
•
3.1.6.1.3. Information analysis: analysis work files
Role of the judicial authorities in the analysis work files
 varies from one State to the next
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 in some States, the decision to start adding info to the file falls to the
judicial authority
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3.1. EUROPOL
3.1.6.1.4. SIENA platform
•
Latest of Europol’s key tools.
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Enables interconnection between Europol databases, information
exchanged bilaterally by liaison officers at Europol, and national
databases.
•
Will automate the transmission of information to Europol.
•
Eventually, it will also act as a platform for the exchange of information
between databases in the Member States.
•
330,000 messages exchanged in 2011 via SIENA
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•
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3.1. EUROPOL
•
3.1.6.1.5. Europol strategic analysis
Includes the annual report on the organised crime threat analysis
 taken into account by the Council to identify annual priorities
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 source of European criminal policy and the security plan
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3.1. EUROPOL
3.1.6.2. Europol’s involvement in managing investigations
Protocol of 30 November 2002:
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Europol may request (non-binding) that national authorities initiate
investigations
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Europol may participate in joint investigation teams (see Module 4)
3.1.6.3. Material, logistical and expert support
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Various resources, expertise e.g. in euro counterfeiting. Hosts the European
Cybercrime Centre
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3.1. EUROPOL
3.1.7. Cooperation beyond the EU
Europol partnerships with third States and international organisations
 Require formal agreements
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 These agreements may include the exchange of personal data
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3.1. EUROPOL
3.1.8. Conclusion => at European level, judicial officers involved in judicial cooperation
will generally liaise with Eurojust and/or the European Judicial Network
But contact with Europol may occur at various stages:
the decision to open the investigation may be based on information transmitted by Europol
(analysis work file);
2.
investigators may approach Europol liaison officers as a channel for requesting certain
information from other Member States;
3.
searches of the EIS by investigators may lead to new developments in the investigation,
for example by revealing links with other cases;
4.
an investigation may be facilitated by insights gained from a Europol analysis work file;
5.
if a matter is referred to Eurojust, it may consult Europol and request its assistance;
6.
setting up a joint investigation team should lead to Europol employees being asked to
participate in that team.
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1.
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3.2. The SIS
3.2.1. Introduction
The Schengen Information System (SIS) = to issue an alert for persons
and objects for measures to be taken if the person or object is found in one
of the Schengen States
•
Created by the 2000 Conv.
•
Work underway to replace the SIS with the SIS II, more effective, but
significant difficulties in this project. The SIS II should be operational in
2013.
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•
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3.2. The SIS
3.2.2. Territorial scope
•
‘Old’ EU member countries of the Schengen area: Germany, Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Finland.
•
‘Recent’ EU countries that joined the Schengen area on 21 December
2007: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Rep., Hungary,
Slovenia, Malta
•
Non-EU member countries of the Schengen area: Iceland, Norway +
(December 2008) Switzerland
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As at 1 September 2009:
3.2. The SIS
3.2.2. Territorial scope
The following countries should have access in the next few years:
•
EU countries that are future members of the Schengen area: Cyprus,
Bulgaria and Romania
•
EU countries not members of the Schengen area: United Kingdom
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=> Ireland has indicated its commitment to joining the SIS, but this process
appears to have stalled.
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3.2. The SIS
3.2.3. Structure
•
A central system located in Strasbourg (C-SIS).
•
National systems (N-SIS), ‘mirrors’ of the C-SIS
•
One authority per Member State responsible for inputting the data
National situation
• One SIRENE bureau per State responsible for supplementary exchanges of
information
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Indicate here the SIS central authority for your country
3.2. The SIS
3.2.4. How it works
•
Several types of alert, defined by the object (that which is inputted) and the
purpose (measure to be taken if the object is found)
•
Main alerts:
- Persons wanted for extradition purposes or on the basis of an EAW (see
Module 8)
-Alerts for objects with a view to seizure
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- Alerts for persons or vehicles with a view to discreet surveillance
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3.2. The SIS
3.2.4. How it works
Issue of an alert: by the SIS national central authority but on any request
from a competent authority
•
Executing the alert: in the event of a hit, the authority that finds the person
or object must take the requested measure attached to the alert (e.g.
seizure of the object).
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•
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3.2. The SIS
3.2.4. How it works
Access to the SIS:
•
in principle, the SIS is not an investigative tool, only a checking tool
•
However: accessed by Europol, Eurojust and potentially by the State
security agencies (SIS II)
National situation
Indicate here the authorities with access to the SIS in your country
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Indicate here the contact details of your SIRENE bureau
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3.2. The SIS
Practical example
1. Alert request by a competent authority of State A
(E.g.: As part of a drug trafficking case, police in Marseilles (France) want to trace a vehicle with
registration number XYZ. They request an alert for the vehicle in order for it to be searched.
3. If appropriate, transmission of supplementary information via the SIRENE Bureaux
E.g. By way of supplementary information, the French SIRENE Bureau transmits the fact that
the search is based on the suspected presence of heroin in the vehicle.
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2. Verification and encoding by the SIRENE Bureau of State A
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3.2. The SIS
Practical example (part II)
4.
Automatic updating of the C-SIS
5.
Transmission of the alert to the N-SIS of the other Member States and validation of the
alert by the SIRENE Bureaux of the other Member States
=> The alert is now operational throughout the Schengen Area.
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3.2. The SIS
Practical example (part III)
6.
‘Hit’ in Member State B and execution of the requested action
E.g.: During a routine road traffic check, Barcelona police stop vehicle XYZ. The officer in
question transmits the vehicle’s details to his information centre; having checked the
national data base, the information centre informs the officer that the vehicle is the subject
of an alert and that a search is required. The officer carries out the search but does not find
any trace of drugs in the vehicle.
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3.2. The SIS
Practical example (part IV)
7.
Transmission of information about the ‘hit’ from the SIRENE Bureau of State B to the
SIRENE Bureau of State A.
E.g.: The Spanish SIRENE Bureau transmits the following information to the French
SIRENE Bureau: place and time of the check, persons present in the vehicle, result of the
search.
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3.3. Interpol
Located in Lyon (France), purely intergovernmental (no founding convention)
3.3.1. Structure and functioning
- A General Assembly and a General Secretariat (450-500 employees)
- In each Member State, a National Central Bureau (NCB)
National situation
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Indicate here the contact details of the Interpol NCB for your country
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3.3. Interpol
(3.3.3. Operational action)
• the I-24/7 network: technical link between the NCBs and Interpol
• Interpol alerts:
- Red notice: arrest and extradition
- Blue notice: additional information on suspects
- Yellow notice: missing person
- Black notice: unidentified corpse
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-….
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3.3. Interpol
(3.3.3. Operational action)
Each alert must be validated by the General Secretariat (72 hr time limit)
Interpol = alerts only
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No obligation to arrest the person in the event of a red notice, depends on
the instruments binding the two countries
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3.3. Interpol
(3.3.3. Operational action)
Interpol Alert / SIS Alert
•Interpol is still used because:
- SIS not yet accessible throughout EU territory
- always a risk that the person has left EU territory
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=> Interpol red notice not equivalent to an EAW (><SIS)
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3.4. Liaison officers
• Initially a bilateral initiative
• Importance of a person permanently located in the other State, direct
contact, interpersonal links etc.
• Non-binding framework set at EU level (Council Decision of 27 February
03)
• Importance of regular meetings of EU liaison officers in third countries (e.g.
Russia)
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• Ensure that each EU country benefits from the assistance of the liaison
officers of other Member States
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3.5. Financial intelligence units
•Set up in each Member State in the context of combating money laundering.
•Requirement for certain professions to transmit intelligence relating to
suspicious transactions (money laundering or financing terrorism) to the
national FIUs. The primary task of the FIUs is to process this intelligence.
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•Council Decision 2000/424/JHA of 17 October 2000: organising information
exchange between the FIUs of the different Member States, which therefore
represent a preferential channel for exchanging information in the areas of
money laundering and financing terrorism.
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3.5. Financial intelligence units
National situation
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Indicate here the contact details of the FIU for your country
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3.6. Cooperation in border areas
• The minimum = Schengen Conv. (cross-border surveillance and hot pursuit)
for the Schengen States
• But some States go further vis-à-vis some of their neighbouring countries
• E.g. the ‘joint police stations’ bringing together officers from two States in
single location near the border
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• Joint patrols etc.
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3.6. Cooperation in border areas
National situation
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Enter here useful information regarding specific cooperation in the border
areas of your State.
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3.7. Towards an effective and coherent EU strategy
The EU is developing a ‘policy cycle on organised and serious crime’
intelligence-led policing method.
4-year cycle:
- Based on the SOCTA (Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment)
produced by Europol = threat analysis
- SOCTA sent to the COSI (Standing Committee on Internal Security,
reporting to the EU Council) and to the Council to identify priorities
- Priorities implemented by EU and national stakeholders
- Interim assessment
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- New SOCTA and new cycle after 4 years
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3.7. Towards an effective and coherent EU strategy
Priorities identified in 2011:
Weaken the capacity of organised crime groups active or based in West Africa to traffic
cocaine and heroin to and within the EU
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Mitigate the role of the Western Balkans, as a key transit and storage zone for illicit
commodities destined for the EU and logistical centre for organised crime groups,
including Albanian-speaking organised crime groups;
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Weaken the capacity of organised crime groups to facilitate illegal immigration to the EU,
particularly via southern, south-eastern and eastern Europe and notably at the GreekTurkish border and in crisis areas of the Mediterranean close to North Africa;
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3.7. Towards an effective and coherent EU strategy
Priorities identified in 2011:
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• Reduce the production and distribution in the EU of synthetic drugs, including new
psychoactive substances;
• Disrupt the trafficking to the EU, particularly in container form, of illicit commodities,
including cocaine, heroin, cannabis, counterfeit goods and cigarettes;
• Combat against all forms of trafficking in human beings and human smuggling by
targeting the organised crime groups conducting such criminal activities in particular at
the southern, south-western and south-eastern criminal hubs in the EU;
• Reduce the general capabilities of mobile (itinerant) organised crime groups to engage
in criminal activities;
• Step up the fight against cybercrime and the criminal misuse of the internet by organised
crime groups.
> Module 5: police cooperation > 3. Stakeholders and channels
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3.7. Towards an effective and coherent EU strategy
Involvement of the judicial authorities in this cycle may take place at three
levels:
Participation of national judicial authorities in the COSI;
•
Implementation of the priorities identified by the Council;
•
Eurojust participates in the policy cycle, both before and after;
•
The Consultative Forum of Prosecutors General aims to ensure national
public prosecutors are involved in this strategy and in the work of the
COSI.
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•
> Module 5: police cooperation > 3. Stakeholders and channels
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=> Being able to benefit form the flexibility and effectiveness of the
exchange of police information >< weighty and formal nature of judicial
cooperation
=> In cases of transnational organised crime: Europol may be at the origin
of the investigation or provide support for analysing the information
=> In many transnational cases: the SIS is a useful and effective alert
system
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=> Liaison Officers = often a useful ‘lever’ for facilitating contacts with the
other State
The contents and opinions expressed herein are solely that of the EJTN, and the European Commission cannot be held responsible
for any use that may be made of these contents and opinions.
Conclusion
> Module 5: police cooperation > 3. Stakeholders and channels
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