Instituting a Safety Culture in our Transportation System

Report
Instituting a Safety Culture in our
Transportation System: Parallel Visions
w/some comments on
Los Alamos, New Mexico
LA-UR-07-3261
Khalil J. Spencer
Chair, LANL Traffic Safety Committee
Chair, Los Alamos County Transportation Board
Board Member, Bicycle Coalition of New Mexico
Information taken from ongoing projects by:
 National Center for Bicycling and Walking
 The American Automobile Assn. Foundation
 LANL’s Traffic Engineering Staff (Charlie Trask,
John Bradley… and others
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1
Some background for this talk
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Presented as invited talk at Pro-bike/Pro-walk 2006
Traffic Justice Project (i.e., I’m not speaking for LANL)
Hence relevance to Bike to Work Day
Added LANL crash data (thanks, Charlie Trask and John
Bradley) for relevance to local traffic situation
TJP: How do we better protect people, esp. most
vulnerable users: cyclists and pedestrians?
Promote justice, i.e., instead of designing cars which
are safe to crash into other cars (crash-mitigation),
design transportation so it is safe for all,
including the most vulnerable users—those not in
cars!
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2
Present situation at LANL
(look at Charlie’s & John’s data)
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Scores of crashes (up to 100) per year
Many crash-related complaints, injuries, some
debilitating injuries, and three total deaths (1 since
2000)
Many are “at fault” accidents
What are the costs to business, i.e., sick time, traffic
delays, lost productivity, worker morale? (Steve Booth
research idea)
OSHA: When a worker has an on-the-job crash that
results in an injury, the cost to their employer is
$74,000. Costs can exceed $500,000 when a fatality is
involved.
Can we institute a safety culture that extends to our
drive time and reduces the risk?
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3
LANL Crash Data
LANL/DOE road crashes per year
No. of Crashes
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Year
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complaints, injuries, and fatalities
complaints and
casualties
50
40
K
killed
30
incapacitated
20
visible injuries
complaints
10
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
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5
% "daytime, clear
and dry"
roadway conditions
100.00%
80.00%
60.00%
40.00%
20.00%
0.00%
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Year
UNCLASSIFIED
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6
% of crashes at intersections
100.00%
80.00%
60.00%
40.00%
20.00%
0.00%
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Year
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7
Accident type codes: some clearly involve
error or malfeasance
1
Loss of Traction
13
Rollover
2
Driver Inattention
14
Animal
3
Poor Visibility
15
DWI
4
Too fast/speeding
16
Asleep at Wheel
5
Right angle
17
6
Rear-ender
Failure to Yield
7
Sideswipe
18
Brake Failure
8
Head-on
19
Cross Centerline
9
Pedestrian
20
No Pass Zone
10
Bicycle
21
Follow too close
11
Hit and Run
22
Evasive action
12
Parked Vehicle
23
Other
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% of crashes w/mistakes, citations, errors
(author's somewhat subjective interpretations from listed
"accident type code")
100.00%
80.00%
60.00%
40.00%
20.00%
0.00%
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Year
UNCLASSIFIED
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9
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0
UNCLASSIFIED
Slovenia
Russian Federation
United States
United Kingdom
Turkey
Switzerland
Sweden
Spain
Slovak Republic
Portugal
Poland
Norway
New Zealand
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Korea
Japan
Italy
Ireland
Iceland
Hungary
Greece
Germany
France
Finland
Denmark
Czech Republic
Canada
Belgium
Austria
Australia
U.S. vs. elsewhere: 2005 road fatalities per million
population (source: European Conference of Ministers of Transport)
250
200
150
100
50
10
Trends not good, either
fatalities per million pop
200
US
150
W. Europe
100
50
0
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
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2007
11
Can we do better?
Tanker catches fire, causes Calif. road collapse
Fallen interchange connects highways to OaklandSan Francisco Bay Bridge – from MSNBC.com
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High hazard
industries (HHI)
mitigate risks, drive
down accidents,
reduce corporate &
public risk
What if we used a
HHI model to
manage traffic
safety?
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What is a “safety culture”
and how would it work?
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A worldview that asserts that safety is
not a goal, but a core value that must
be preserved in the workplace
Not sacrificed to expediency
Core values drive goals and objectives,
not the other way around.
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13
Parallel Visions: AAA Foundation
and NCBW
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AAA Foundation:
promote a “safety culture.” (develop) a Safety
Culture Index (SCI), with which to quantify the
present state of affairs ...
(focus) upon developing safety cultures in highway
safety agencies at the state and local levels
National Center for Bicycling and Walking:
redefine societal perspective on motor vehicle
crashes, reducing their occurrence, and…
significantly decreasing the …number of injuries
and fatalities.
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14
But the problem…context!
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Chapter 9: Fragments of a Movement—(Lisa
Lewis, Partnership for Safe Driving)
“Many…movements (for roadway safety) … have
something in common…organizing around a
single problem…without awareness of or
concern for the context in which it is occurring…”
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A Safety Culture provides such a context
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15
So how does one achieve a safety
culture?
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Competing visions of safety:
“Garbage Can” (Cohen, et al. 1972) model—safety is
one of the competing, sometimes incompatible interests
at the table (i.e., the present traffic situation).
High Reliability model: safety is a compelling interest
and core value.
(see Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety, Charles
Perrow, Normal Accidents
In a safety culture, safety is a core value. All aspects of
an endeavor are constrained by how they influence
safety (nuclear, airline, chemical industries)
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ALARA: borrowed from the nuke industry
—sets minimizing injury as a core value
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“As Low As Reasonably Achievable”
ALARA asks and we answer before we start: how do we
minimize accident/injury while accomplishing the goals of
the organization?
Goals must be worth the residual risks after mitigation
Integrated approach: examine all aspects of a problem for
the risk analysis before endeavor goes forward.
Retains focus on safety as core value in spite of other
competing values (faster, cheaper, sexier, bigger)
Translates into tangible concepts in accident minimization,
as follows…
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ALARA Tools
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Substitution of a less dangerous device such as a
bicycle, transit, Corolla (i.e., a small car)
Reduced exposure: lower VMD requirements for
same connectivity--smart P&Z
Engineering Controls that protect and control
without user input: Antilock Brake Systems, Stability
Management Systems, speed governors linked to
GPS
Administrative Controls that elucidate hazards and
social engineering (speed laws, driving tests)
Personal Protective Equipment such as seat belts,
helmets. Use indicates awareness of safety.
Realistic, often-repeated training and drills to
ensure competency in a crisis: real driver ed.
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18
Weaknesses of these “tools” if not seen
as parts of a safety culture
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Inconsistent with “closed course, don’t try this at home” or “"The
(Nissan) Frontier sends a message: 'Get out of my way'."
Unsafe driving in North American automobile commercials, P. C.
Shin, D. Hallett, M. L. Chipman, C. Tator and J. T. Granton Jour. of
Public Health Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 318–325
Create passive behavior, i.e., the gizmo will protect me “
Engineered controls can be expensive (SMS) or seen as
“oppressive” (GPS-based speed limiters)
Admin. rules (traffic laws) ignored if insufficient negative
consequences for violating them
Vehicle structure mismatch can defeat defensive measures (i.e.,
body-on-frame truck vs. unibody subcompact)
Low quality of driver training & licensing not reflective of real world
safe driving requirements, (none required for bike-walk)
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19
Safety culture: behavioral-based
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Get inside people’s heads!
Civil, not defensive driving (society, not “me”)
Change risky behavior before it leads to an
incident
40,000 dead and 2.5 million injured per year.
Convince people that they have a stake in the
outcome: their lives or those of their loved
ones
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20
Some behavior that needs to change:
inattention to driving and speeding
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(Apr. 2006) Virginia Tech Transportation
Institute and NHTSA report on inattention
almost 80 percent of crashes and 65 percent
of near-crashes involved some form of driver
inattention within three seconds of the
event*.
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* ~1 football field at 60 mph
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Inattentive driving
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Breaking news 4:29 pm: One dead in
Highway 14 collision(6/27/07 Santa Fe
New Mexican)
Santa Fe Sheriff Solano said a 16-year-old
boy was headed south on N.M. 14 at 2:30
p.m. when he reached down to grab
something he dropped on the floorboard. His
truck drifted into the northbound lanes and
hit a Honda Accord head-on, killing the 47year-old woman who was driving.
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Speeding and Motorist
miscalculation
Most motorists underestimate
the distance needed to stop.
The effect this difference has
on the outcome of a crash or
emergency situation can
mean the difference between
life and death.
With acknowledgements to
Bob McQuinn for this slide
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Accountability
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Instead of auto “no fault”, use airline and nuke
model: zero accidents are the goal and people &
systems accountable for harm done
Long-term paradigm-shift in DWI is a potential
model
Use of devices such as legally-certified EDR’s
(automotive black boxes) to provide better
crash data & better understanding of why
crashes happened, assign responsibility fairly
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What would an ALARAbased safety program look like?
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A theme: crash prevention, not “crash control”
Most vulnerable users define safety standards
(“Vision Zero” model—Sweden)
Parts not ends in themselves, but part of a whole
Accountability and recurrent training, certification
Evaluate risk factors for a clear understanding of
how traffic works BEFORE operational decisions are
made.
Ownership: not imposed, but buy-in
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What would an ALARA-based
safety program look like?
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Constant review and improvement (feedback)
“High reliability organization” rather than a
“garbage can” of competing and incompatible
interests, which means…
Traffic engineers, marketers, law enforcement,
lawmakers, health professionals, safety
modelers, advocates, P&Z, end-users all on
same page.
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Traffic Safety Locally: Diamond Drive, Los
Alamos, NM
Grade
school
+ res
res
Grade
school +
res
Middle
School +
res
res
High School +
UNM
to LANL
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UNCLASSIFIED
Downtown
+ res
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Original Diamond Drive Profile-no
shoulders or ADA sidewalks: “car is king”
Don’t fall...
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New Diamond Profile—shared sovereignty?
Bike lanes, ADA sidewalks, bus pullouts & ped
crossing island shelters
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At the local level: Education
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One principle employer (LANL) & school
district. If these institute a safety-culture
based drive-bike-walk training program,
would cover lion’s share of residents
Police Chief has regular community
safety meetings
Safety op-eds by LAPD, BSC, T-Board
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At the local level, Enforcement
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Low crime,so police can concentrate on traffic, since
it could be people’s greatest risk.
LAPD has recently increased patrols, underage
alcohol sales stings, and DWI checks
MANY have DOE security clearances. These are
revocable for bad character. Fines (esp. speeding) >
$250 must be reported. Can this be used as a
“stick” to hold LANL drivers to a higher standard?
Make LANL employment contingent on safe sitewide driving behavior
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At the local level, Engineering
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Diamond re-design in consideration of hazards (HS,
College, and LANL on same main drag) (Co Bike Plan,
“complete streets”)
Safety as high priority. (roundabouts vs. signalized
intersections)
County’s new transit system (less dangerous device,
alternatives for youth and elderly).
Large, higher speed roads (Trinity Drive) should not be
a design feature of urban areas unless they are both
grade separated and do not impede other modes or
community access.
Effective traffic calming
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Central Ave: 85%-ile < posted 25 mph
speed limit
Bulbouts & lane width
reduction in
commercial/government
district
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Proposed model: Sweden’s Vision Zero
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The concern for human life and health is an
absolutely mandatory element in the design
and functioning of the road transport system.
This means that a road traffic safety mode of
thinking must be clearly integrated into all the
processes that affect safety within the road
transport system. The level of violence that the
human body can tolerate without being killed or
seriously injured shall be the basic parameter in
the design of the road transport.
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