EU as a Security Actor

Report
EU as a Security Actor
Zdeněk Kříž
Emergence of CFSP
In the new security landscape, the EU was expected to increase its influence.
Security issues did not belong to the EU agenda before the Maastricht Treaty came into force in 1993.
In 1954 Western European Union (WEU) was established.WEU was not a part of the European Communities and
stood outside their structures during the Cold War.
In 1993, Maastricht Treaty came into force and established the European Union based on three pillars: 1. European
Communities (European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC) and the
European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom), 2. Common Foreign and Security Policy and 3. Police
and Judicial Cooperation.
The EU had been organized according to this structure until the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009.
The second CFSP-pillar was based on intergovernmentalism. It meant that all decisions were made by unanimity
(junanimity) between members in the Council of Ministers and there was very little influence by the other
institutions on the CFSP agenda.
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CFSP Goals and Nature
During the Cold War, clear choices were made in respect of the Atlantic solidarity, civilian power,
intergovernmentalism and integration and identity objectives. However, these traditional choices were to come
under serious pressure during the post-Cold War era.
The Treaty of Lisbon took effect in December 2009 and brought an end to the pillar structure. The CFSP's
objectives are to:
1.
Safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union.
2. Strengthen the security of the Union in all ways.
3. Preserve peace and strengthen international security.
4. Promote international cooperation.
5. Develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The consensus decision making process was preserved.
The CFSP is a ‘co-ordination mechanism’, which sees input from both the Member States and Community
institutions.
Member States maintain control over the fiscal, diplomatic and military resources that can potentially be accessed by
the EU.
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Emergence of ESDP I
It must be reiterated once more again that the foreign and security policy of the EU is not a substitute for
national foreign and defense policies but rather an addition to them.
The EU members states act on the basis of consensus.
The European Council (the heads of state or government) and the Council of the European Union (also
called the Council of Ministers) are the key actors.
Two events led European governments to develop the European defense policy. The first one were the
Balkan wars.
French motives were fuelled by the desire to counter-balance the US influence.
The second event was the British change in government in 1997.
Tony Blair’s Labor government was determined to demonstrate UK’s central role in Europe.
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Emergence of ESDP II
At the December 1998 meeting at Saint-Malo - capacity for autonomous action.
In June 1999, the Cologne European Council Summit - a new ESDP policy was established.
Today, ESDP is called the Common Security and Defense Policy – CSDP since Lisbon Treaty came into
force in 2009.
It was not in contradiction with US preferences.
“Helsinki Headline Goal” - Rapid Response Force of about 60,000 troops within 60 days to perform the
Petersberg (Pítrsberg) tasks.
That means the force would actually have to number around 180,000 troops so as to provide rotating
replacements for the initial forces.
The EU Military Staff generated the "Helsinki Headline Catalogue,” which specifies which capabilities are
required.
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Improving tools I
A year later, in 2000, the civilian dimension of ESDP/CSDP was defined at the Feira European Council
Summit.
5,000 police officers available on a voluntary basis by 2003.
The ESDP was incorporated into the EU 2001 by the Treaty of Nice.
The Civilian Headline Goal adopted by the EU in 2004
The Headline Goal 2010 in order to improve European military capacities.
Unfortunately, there is still a lack of military capacities for carrying out expeditionary operations.
In February 2004, France, Germany and the United Kingdom released a paper outlining the
"Battlegroup Concept” - 1,500 personnel and deployable within 15 days.
These groups would be principally available for UN request as well.
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Improving tools II
Larger member states will generally contribute their own Battle Groups, while smaller members are
expected to create common groups.
Forces are provided by individual member states on voluntary basis.
From 1 January 2005, the Battle Groups reached initial operational capacity: at least one Battle Group was
on standby every 6 months.
No Battle Group has been deployed so far.
The European Defense Agency (EDA) was established in July 2004 and is based in Brussels. It makes
proposals, coordinates, stimulates collaboration, and runs projects.
In sum,the EU draws on military and civilian resources from its Member States.
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CSDP structure and instruments
The European Council (Nice, December 2000) decided to establish permanent political and military CSDP structures.
The Political and Security Committee (PSC)
The European Union Military Committee (EUMC)
The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD)
The European Union Military Staff
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EU operations and missions
In sum, the EU has no standing army. Instead, under its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP),
it relies on ad hoc forces contributed by EU countries
The EU has played an increasingly important role in shaping regional security in the past decade.
With some 20 missions on 3 continents, the EU's role as a security provider is rapidly expanding.
For a map of CSDP missions, see http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/euoperations?lang=en
The Western Balkans and the EU neighborhood constitute the priority areas of interest. The second area
of interest is Africa.
As for financing, there are three types of financing for CSDP missions: administrative expenditure
comes from the CSDP budget (part of Union budget); personnel costs are financed by the Member
States and running projects are funded by the European Commission.
Significantly higher attention has been devoted to the military operations.
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EU operations – Western Balkans and Africa
The most important EU military operation was Concordia carried out in Macedonia - the first EU military operation.
After the EU took over responsibility from NATO mission Allied Harmony, which took place between 2001-2003.
The core aim of Operation Concordia was, at the explicit request of the Macedonian government, to contribute
further to a stable secure environment and to allow the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework
Agreement.
The most complex EU military operation is Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina – since 2004.
Althea took over responsibility for stabilization in Bosnia-Herzegovina when NATO concluded its Stabilization Force
(SFOR) mission there.
The Berlin plus mechanism was activated.
As of April 2012, Althea’s troop strength stands at about 1,400.
Furthermore, the EU has been especially active in Africa, conducting 10 CSDP missions on that continent since 2003.
But sometimes Western countries just protect its political and economic interests.
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European Security Strategy
The European Security Strategy (ESS) - released in 2003,.
Its headline reads: "A Secure Europe In A Better World.
The ESS mainly concentrates on effective multilateralism, international law and the enhanced role of international
institutions and tribunals.
List of global challenges and security threats includs regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
terrorism, state failure, organized crime, disease, and destabilizing poverty.
The EU should seek the construction of a rules-based, multilateral world order.
The document asserts that the described threats and challenges cannot be adequately addressed by military means.
Attention is especially paid to strengthening governance and human rights, and to assisting economic development
through such means as trade and foreign assistance.
ESS formulated the so-called “soft power” attitude.
Nevertheless, it is not comparable with the US NSS. EU is not a federation and EU members run their own foreign
and security policies.
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Lisbon Treaty
The Lisbon Treaty has changed the institutional framework of the EU, including the CFSP
and CSDP, by establishing the European External Action Service (EEAS) headed by
the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the ESDP was
renamed the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) (CSDP Handbook).
Lisbon Treaty aimed at highlighting the goal to create a Common Security and Defense of
the EU.
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EU/NATO relation I
Both organizations are sometimes seen as competitors.
Most EU members also belong to NATO and vice versa.
Since the end of the Cold War - the issue of whether the European Union would be transformed into a
sufficiently strong and stable political actor to be able to replace NATO.
The contemporary EU focus on soft security is an appreciation of the NATO primacy in institutional
terms.
The EU history - the ‘civilian power’ tradition and paying more attention to soft power tools.
The EU is now willing to project its power abroad and NATO is willing to support such brave policy.
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EU/NATO relation II
The main tool is Berlin plus agreement adopted in March 2003. The EU was guaranteed (garentíd) access
to NATO planning capabilities for the preparation and execution of EU-led crisis management
operations.
The “NATO first” policy is applied.
EU plannig cell was set up at NATO in 2006.
These arrangements were quickly tested as in March 2003 by the EU’s Operation Concordia.
Political disagreements between member states – and particularly between Turkey and Cyprus - have
essentially paralyzed the entire ESDP-NATO relationship for years.
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EU/NATO relation III
NATO and the EU, have tended to work side by side - sometimes cooperatively as in
Afghanistan, sometimes competitively, as in Sudan and Kosovo.
Due to bad EU/Turkey relations, it is highly improbable that Turkey will allow the EU the
access to NATO capacities in future.
Are NATO and the EU complementary or competitive institutions?
We do not know the final state of the EU integration process. All possible ways are opened.
Three problematic security issues - EU-USA, EU-Turkey and UK-France.
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EU – US. Security Relations
The EU-USA relationship has been the key factor in the new European security environment.
American global priorities are shifting from Europe to Asia.
Britain and France, EU countries, are generally not equipped to play a robust leadership role in the defense
policy beyond basic territorial defense.
The interoperability of US and European forces is becoming increasingly difficult, particularly for the
smaller European states.
Economic crisis in Europe.
Therefore the division of labor between NATO and the EU is the reality.
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EU – Turkey
The EU-Turkey relations makes EU-NATO relations more complicated.
In the 1990s, Turkey has enjoyed something of a strategic renaissance - geopolitical status change from
‘forgotten Cold War outpost’ to ‘major regional power’ in the greater Middle East and Central Asia.
Turkey is more self-confident and thinks that its political model combining Islam and democracy can be
attractive for countries in the region.
Turkey has sought to stifle all possibilities for cooperation on a practical level between the EU and
NATO – Cyprus issue.
This is why the NATO-ESDP discussions on Kosovo and Afghanistan were not possible.
Cyprus has blocked EU business, for instance Turkey’s participation in the EDA (European Defence
Agency) or prospective EU-NATO cooperation in respect of counter-terrorism.
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CSDP – NATO – UK and France
Britain and France - two main visions on Europe’s possible institutional futures in terms of
security architecture.
‘Business cannot be done as usual’.
Britain understands that retaining an American commitment to European defense means that
there is a pressing need to create a stronger European ‘pole’ to the Atlantic alliance - EU.
On the French side - NATO should remain collective self-defense organization.
The EU should be the main platform for carrying out Petersburg expeditionary operations.
France, the US influence on European security should be diminished.
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EU as Security Actor?
Emergence of a stronger European political actor have not been fulfilled yet.
The EU has not filled the gap and the bi-polar ‘west’ has failed to come into existence. The EU is not an
emerging superpower. Member states’ national interests are very similar but not same. What is more
important, a European nation does not exist.
The post-Cold War notion of the EU as a ‘rising’ power of significant economic importance is over.
The EU is a very important security player that has a lot of civilian crisis management capabilities at its
disposal. Therefore the EU is able to complement NATO activities.
The EU is more willing to provide civilian capabilities for other security institutions.
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