Slide 1

Report
SID, The Netherlands
Responding to World Poverty:
Human Rights and the Christian Faith
Thomas W. Pogge
Professorial Research Fellow at the Centre
for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at
ANU; Professor of Philosophy at Columbia
and Oslo Universities
The Human Cost of Poverty I
Among 6373 million human beings (2004), about
850 million are undernourished (UNDP 2005, p. 24),
2000 million lack access to essential drugs (www.fic.nih.gov/about/summary.html),
1037 million lack access to safe drinking water (UNDP 2005, p. 44),
1000 million lack adequate shelter (UNDP 1998, p. 49),
2000 million have no electricity (UNDP 1998, p. 49),
2600 million lack adequate sanitation (UNDP 2005, p. 24),
799 million adults are illiterate (www.uis.unesco.org),
211 million children (aged 5 to 14) do wage work outside their family —
8.4 million of them in the “unconditionally worst” forms of child labor, which
involve slavery, forced or bonded labor, forced recruitment for use in armed
conflict, forced prostitution or pornography, or the production or trafficking of
illegal drugs (ILO: A Future Without Child Labour, 2002, pp. 9, 11, 17-18).
1
The Human Cost of Poverty II
“Worldwide 34,000 children under age five die daily from
hunger and preventable diseases” (US Department of
Agriculture: U.S. Action Plan on Food Security, 1999, p. iii,
www.fas.usda.gov/icd/summit/pressdoc.html). The latest figure is
10.6 million per year (UNICEF: The State of the World’s Children
2005).
One third of all human deaths — some 18 million per year or 50000
daily — are due to poverty-related causes (such as starvation,
diarrhea, pneumonia, tuberculosis, measles, malaria, perinatal and
maternal conditions) which could be prevented or cured cheaply
through food, safe drinking water, vaccinations, rehydration packs,
or medicines. Women and girls are substantially overrepresented
among those suffering these deprivations (UNDP: Human
Development Report 2003, New York: Oxford University Press 2003,
pp. 310-330; UNIFEM; UNRISD 2005).
2
Death Toll of Century's Atrocities
http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/war-1900.htm
3
Millions of Deaths
Worldwide Poverty
Deaths 1990-2005
300
World War Two
1939-45
50
Mao's Great Leap
Forward 1959-62
30
Stalin's Repression
1924-53
20
World War One
1914-18
15
Russian Civil War
1917-22
9
Congo Free State
1886-1908
7.5
Korea and Vietnam
1951-54, 1965-74
5.5
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
4
Shares of World Population:
Poorest Households versus Richest Countries
Persons in the
poorest households
(1.1% of global
income, or about
$440 billion)
41%
43%
Persons in the
richest countries
(80.5% of global
income, or about
$32,064 billion)
Others (18.4% of
global income, or
about $7,330 billion)
16%
5
Income Poverty Relative to the World Bank’s
“$1/day” and “$2/day” Poverty Lines
“$1/day” ($1.075/day PPP 1993)
Amounts
Per Year
“$2/day” ($2.15/day PPP 1993)
Poverty
Line
Poverty
Gap
Consumption
Poverty
Line
$392.88 PPP
1993
28.4 percent
71.6 percent
or today ca.
or today ca.
$785.76 PPP
1993
42 percent
or today ca.
or today ca.
$154 PPP
2005
$387 PPP
2005
$1082 PPP
2005
$454 PPP 2005
$628 PPP
2005
$70 to $280,
depending on
purchasing
power of poor
country’s
currency
$20 to $80,
depending on
purchasing
power of poor
country’s
currency,
ca. $40
On average
$50 to $200,
depending on
purchasing
power of poor
country’s
currency,
ca. $100
On average
At market
exchange rates,
per Person
$140 to $560,
depending on
purchasing
power of poor
country’s
currency
$60 to $240,
depending on
purchasing
power of poor
country’s
currency,
ca. $120
On average
$80 to $320,
depending on
purchasing
power of poor
country’s
currency,
ca. $160
On average
ca. 1089
million
extremely poor
people;
(17% of
humankind)
ca. $44 billion
(versus $27732
billion social
product of the
rich countries
containing
15.5% of
humankind)
Aggregates
(1 billion = 1000
million)
ca. 2735
million
very poor
people;
(43% of
humankind)
ca. $330 billion
(versus $32064
billion social
product of the
rich countries
containing
15.9% of
humankind)
ca. $440
billion
(ca. 1.1 percent
of the global
product)
or today ca.
$541 PPP
2005
ca. $109
billion
(less than 0.3
percent of the
global product)
In US$ PPP,
per Person
Poverty Gap
Consumption
58 percent
or today ca.
6
Shares of Global Income:
Poorest Households versus Richest Countries
18.4%
1.1%
The poorest households
(43% of humankind)
The richest countries
(16% of humankind)
Others (41% of
humankind)
80.5%
Calculated in terms of market exchange
rates so as to reflect the avoidability of poverty.
7
Reported Changes in
Population Below $1/Day:
China and the Rest of the World
(Chen and Ravallion 2004)
Millions of Persons
1200
1000
Rest of the
World below
$1/day
800
600
Chinese below
$1/day
400
200
0
1987
2001
Year
8
Reported Changes in
Population Below $2/Day:
China and the Rest of the World
(Chen and Ravallion 2004)
Millions of Persons
2800
2400
Rest of the
World below
$2/day
2000
1600
Chinese below
$2/day
1200
800
400
0
1987
2001
Year
9
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
cumulative real per capita 20.0%
gain/loss over 1990-2001
period
10.0%
0.0%
-10.0%
1st
2nd
3rd
10th
20th
30th
40th
Percentiles of World Population Based on Consumption Expenditure
50th
highincome
countries
10
From UNDP: HDR 2002, p.202
ODA in $m
Country
2000
ODA as % of GNP
1990
2000
ODA per capita
of donor country
1990
2000
ODA to LDCs
Net grants by NGOs
as % of total
as % of GNP
1990
2000
1990
2000
Norway
1,264
1.17
0.80
277
276
43
33
0.13
0.11
Sweden
1,799
0.91
0.80
207
223
38
29
0.06
0.01
Canada
1,744
0.44
0.25
79
55
28
17
0.05
0.02
Belgium
820
0.46
0.36
95
91
40
25
0.03
0.03
Australia
987
0.34
0.27
52
56
18
21
0.02
0.04
United States
9,955
0.21
0.10
55
35
18
20
0.05
0.04
Netherlands
3,135
0.92
0.84
178
221
32
25
0.09
0.08
13,508
0.31
0.28
96
102
18
15
(.)
(.)
Finland
371
0.65
0.31
137
80
37
29
0.03
(.)
Switzerland
890
0.32
0.34
120
137
41
30
0.05
0.06
France
4,105
0.60
0.32
129
80
28
24
0.02
..
United Kingdom
4,501
0.27
0.32
55
79
31
31
0.03
0.04
Denmark
1,664
0.94
1.06
246
348
39
32
0.02
0.02
Austria
423
0.25
0.23
55
60
26
23
0.02
0.03
Luxembourg
127
0.21
0.71
71
320
31
32
..
0.04
5,030
0.42
0.27
108
71
26
23
0.05
0.05
Ireland
235
0.16
0.30
18
68
36
48
0.07
0.11
New Zealand
113
0.23
0.25
29
34
19
24
0.03
0.03
Italy
1,376
0.31
0.13
56
27
39
27
..
(.)
Spain
1,195
0.20
0.22
23
34
19
12
0.01
..
Greece
226
..
0.20
..
25
..
8
..
..
Portugal
271
0.24
0.26
18
30
70
43
(.)
..
0.33
0.22
78
67
26
22
0.03
0.03
Japan
Germany
53,737
T
11
Related Annual Amounts
Global Crude Oil Consumption
(at $30/barrel)
$850
OECD States' Post-Cold-War
"Peace Dividend" (2003)
$527
$440
US Defense Budget
Proposed Global
Resources Dividend
$320
OECD Official Development
Assistance (ODA 2003)
All ODA to Least Developed
Countries (22% of ODA)
All Contributions to
International NGOs
ODA Toward Meeting Basic
Needs (7.7% of ODA,2003)
$0
$68,5
$15
$7
$5,3
$200
$400
$600
in Billions of US Dollars
$800
12
The 1996 World Food Summit in Rome:
“We pledge our political will and our
common and national commitment to
achieving food security for all and to
an on-going effort to eradicate hunger
in all countries, with an immediate [!]
view to reducing the number of
undernourished people to half their
present level no later than 2015.”
www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3613e/w3613e00.htm
13
MDG 1 – Eradicate Extreme
Poverty and Hunger
Target: To halve, between 1990 and 2015, the
proportion of people whose income is less
than $1 a day.
The target has largely been met in East Asia
and the Pacific, but Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin
America and the Caribbean, and parts of
Europe and Central Asia are falling short.
www.un.org/millenniumgoals/MDG-Page1.pdf
14
Halving Extreme Poverty by 2015
MDG-1 Compared to the Promise of the 1996 World Food Summit in Rome
Millions of Persons living
below $1.08 PPP 1993 per day
1300
1218,5
1200
1100
1000
883,5
900
800
700
600
500
1990
1995
2000
2005
Years
2010
2015
15
Christian Responses to Poverty
1. Charity – neighbor, worst-off
… earth given to all in common
2. Justice – right to aid (St.Ambrose)
… structures of sin (John Paul II)
3. Harm – the Fifth Commandment?
participation in design or imposition of
social institutions that foreseeably
lead to massive harms that are
foreseeably avoidable.
relevance of causal explanation of harm.
16
Global
Institutional
Order
.
National Institutional
Schemes of the Various
Developing Countries
Poor and Vulnerable
Citizens in the
Developing Countries
17
Is Severe Poverty Homegrown?
“Rich countries cut their tariffs by less in the Uruguay Round than poor
ones did. Since then, they have found new ways to close their markets,
notably by imposing anti-dumping duties on imports they deem ‘unfairly
cheap.’ Rich countries are particularly protectionist in many of the sectors
where developing countries are best able to compete, such as agriculture,
textiles, and clothing. As a result, according to a new study by Thomas
Hertel, of Purdue University, and Will Martin, of the World Bank, rich
countries’ average tariffs on manufacturing imports from poor countries
are four times higher than those on imports from other rich countries. This
imposes a big burden on poor countries. The United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates that they could export $700
billion more a year by 2005 if rich countries did more to open their
markets. Poor countries are also hobbled by a lack of know-how. Many had
little understanding of what they signed up to in the Uruguay Round. That
ignorance is now costing them dear. Michael Finger of the World Bank and
Philip Schuler of the University of Maryland estimate that implementing
commitments to improve trade procedures and establish technical and
intellectual-property standards can cost more than a year’s development
budget for the poorest countries. Moreover, in those areas where poor
countries could benefit from world trade rules, they are often unable to do
so. … Of the WTO’s 134 members, 29 do not even have missions at its
headquarters in Geneva. Many more can barely afford to bring cases to the
WTO” (The Economist, 25 September 1999, page 89).
18
World Bank Chief Economist Nick Stern: “Cutting Agricultural
Subsidies” -- globalenvision.org/library/6/309
In 2002 the rich countries spent about $300 billion on export
subsidies for agricultural products alone, roughly six times their
total development aid. Cows receive annual subsidies of about
$2,700 in Japan and $900 in Europe — far above the annual
income of most human beings. He also cited protectionist antidumping actions, bureaucratic applications of safety and sanitation
standards, and textile tariffs and quotas as barriers to developing
country exports: “Every textile job in an industrialized country
saved by these barriers costs about 35 jobs in these industries in
low-income countries.” Stern was especially critical of escalating
tariffs — duties that are lowest on unprocessed raw materials and
rise sharply with each step of processing and value added — for
undermining manufacturing and employment in developing
countries, thus helping to confine Ghana and Cote D'Ivoire to the
export of unprocessed cocoa beans, Uganda and Kenya to the
export of raw coffee beans, and Mali and Burkina Faso to the
export of raw cotton. He estimated that full elimination of
agricultural protection and production subsidies in the rich
countries would raise agricultural and food exports from low and
middle-income countries by 24% and total annual rural income in
these countries by about $60 billion (about three quarters of the
global poor live in such rural areas).
19
Rules Governing Medical Research I
Under the TRIPs agreement, inventors of new
drugs are rewarded by a 20-year monopoly. This
regime prices most existing drugs out of the
reach of the global poor. It also skews medical
research toward the affluent: Medical conditions
accounting for 90 percent of the global disease
burden receive only 10 percent of all medical
research worldwide. Pneumonia, diarrhea,
tuberculosis and malaria, which together account
for more than 20 percent of the global disease
burden, receive less than one percent of all public
and private funds devoted to health research. Of
the 1393 new drugs approved between 1975 and
1999, only 13 were for tropical diseases.
Rules Governing Medical Research II
One obvious alternative is a regime under which inventor firms are
rewarded in proportion to the impact of their invention on the global
disease burden.
This solution would end the morally untenable situation of the drug
companies, which must now, to recover their costs, price life-saving
medications out of the reach of vast numbers of poor patients. The
solution would align the interests of inventor firms and the generic
drug producers. The former would want their inventions to be
widely copied, mass-produced, and sold as cheaply as possible,
because this would magnify the health impact of their inventions. If
new drugs were sold at the competitive price, near the marginal
cost of production, many poor patients would gain access to drugs
they now cannot afford. And affluent patients would gain as well, by
paying substantially less for drugs and medical insurance.
This solution would also greatly expand research into diseases that
now attract very little research: dengue fever, hepatitis, meningitis,
leprosy, trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness and Chagas disease),
river blindness, leishmaniasis, Buruli ulcer, lymphatic filariasis,
schistosomiasis (bilharzia), malaria, tuberculosis, and many more.
In time, this one rule change alone would easily halve
the number of annual poverty deaths.
Other Global Institutional Features
A global “Polluter Pays” regime that would raise funds
from countries in proportion to their citizens’ and
corporations’ contributions to transnational environmental
pollution. Funds to be used for poverty eradication on the
theory that the global poor generally benefit least, and
are least able to protect themselves, from pollution.
Rules setting a global minimum wage and minimal global
constraints on working hours and working conditions in
order to preclude the current “race to the bottom” where
poor countries competing for foreign investment are
outbidding one another by offering ever more exploitable
and mistreatable workforces.
22
Global Institutional Order
Governments of the
More Powerful
(G-7) Countries
National Institutional
Schemes of the
Various Developing
Countries
Citizens of the
More Powerful
(G-7) Countries
Poor and Vulnerable
Citizens in the
Developing Countries
23
The International Resource Privilege
… we confer upon a group in power includes the liberty to
effect legally valid transfers of ownership rights in the
country’s resources. Thus a corporation that has purchased
resources from the Saudis or Suharto, or from Mobuto or Sani
Abacha, has thereby become entitled to be — and actually is
— recognized anywhere in the world as the legitimate owner
of these resources. This privilege has disastrous effects in
poor but resource-rich countries. Whoever can take power in
such a country by whatever means can maintain his rule,
even against widespread popular opposition, by buying the
arms and soldiers he needs with revenues from the export of
natural resources. The resource privilege thus gives insiders
strong incentives toward the violent acquisition and exercise
of political power, thereby causing coup attempts and civil
wars. It also gives outsiders strong incentives to corrupt the
officials of such countries who, no matter how badly they
rule, continue to have resources to sell and money to spend.
The International Borrowing Privilege
… includes the power to impose internationally valid legal
obligations upon the country at large. Any successor government
that refuses to honor debts incurred by an ever so corrupt, brutal,
undemocratic, unconstitutional, repressive, unpopular predecessor
will be severely punished -- at minimum be excluded from the
international financial markets. The international borrowing
privilege facilitates borrowing by destructive rulers, and thus
helps such rulers maintain themselves in power even against
near-universal popular discontent and opposition. It imposes
upon democratic successor regimes the often huge debts of their
corrupt predecessors (Rwanda!), thereby sapping the capacity of
such democratic governments to implement structural reforms
and other political programs, thus rendering such governments
less successful and less stable than they would otherwise be. And
it strengthens incentives toward coup attempts: Whoever
succeeds in bringing a preponderance of the means of coercion
under his control gets the borrowing privilege as an additional
reward.
Global Institutional Order
Governments of the
More Powerful
(G-7) Countries
National Institutional
Schemes of the
Various Developing
Countries
Citizens of the
More Powerful
(G-7) Countries
Poor and Vulnerable
Citizens in the
Developing Countries
26
Human Rights Violators
1. Interactional Cases
(a) Unfulfilled human rights
(b) Causally traceable to human agent
(c) Active agency
(d) Official capacity
(e) Intends, foresees, or should foresee.
27
(c) Active Agency Condition
… can be satisfied by someone who
accepts, or remains in, some position
and then fails to fulfill responsibilities
associated with it in a way that leads to
unfulfilled human rights.
Examples: life guard ignoring emergency,
police officer ignoring crimes.
28
(b) Collective HR Violations
(Relevance of other Contributors)
HR violators may make contributions that
are neither necessary nor sufficient for
harm (many acting together each with
marginal contribution = zero; division of
labor such that, but for another, one´s
contribution would have been harmless)
Extends to “upstream” contributors and
chain-of-command situations.
Extends to facially harmless contributions
(navigator)
Extends to democratically authorized
decisions.
29
Human Rights Violators
2. Institutional Cases
(a) Human rights deficit (may be statistical)
(b) Causally traceable to social rules / institutional
order
(c) Active individual contribution to designing or
imposing social rules that harm
(d) Official character of rules, with claim to moral
legitimacy and moral duty of compliance.
(e) Agent intends, foresees, should foresee that rules
produce human rights deficit and that there is an
alternative institutional design that would not.
30
(b) HR-Violating Character
of an Institutional Order
An institutional order is human-rights violating if all four
are true:
1. The institutional order is associated with a massive
human-rights deficit among its participants.
2. This association is reasonably avoidable through some
alternative design of this institutional order.
3. The association in (1) is foreseeable.
4. Its avoidability (2) is also foreseeable: We can know
that the alternative institutional design would do much
better in terms of giving participants secure access to
the objects of their human rights.
31
Individual Moral Claim I
A human right to X gives you a moral
claim against all others that they not
harm you by cooperating, without
compensating reform and protection
efforts, in imposing upon you an
institutional order (national, global, …)
that contributes to your lacking secure
access to X as part of a foreseeable and
foreseeably avoidable human rights
deficit.
32
Individual Moral Claim II
“Everyone is entitled to a social and
international order in which the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be
fully realized” (§ 28) —
including the “right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of
himself and of his family, including food,
clothing, housing, and medical care” (§ 25).
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
33
34
Population Living in
Extreme Poverty by Region
www.un.org/millenniumgoals/MDG-Page1.pdf
Population Living in
Extreme Poverty by Region
www.un.org/millenniumgoals/MDG-Page1.pdf
World Bank Upbeat
“After increasing steadily over the past two
centuries, since 1980 the total number of
people living in poverty worldwide has fallen
by an estimated 200 million — even as the
world’s population grew by 1.6 billion.”
James D. Wolfensohn: “Responding to the
Challenges of Globalization: Remarks to the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Governors,”
Ottawa, November 17, 2001
www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/whatsnew2001.htm
37
World Poverty: 1820-1998
http://econ.worldbank.org/prr/globalization/text-2857/, page 8
38
The Conventional (World Bank)
Method of Defining Poverty
1. Stipulate an international poverty line
(IPL) defined in terms of the purchasing
power that some arbitrary US$ income
had in the United States in some
particular base year. The World Bank has
successively introduced two IPLs under
the ‘$1/day’ label, defining as extremely
poor those living in households whose
income per person falls below,
respectively:
$365/year PPP 1985
or
$393/year PPP 1993 39
The Conventional (World Bank)
Method of Defining Poverty
2. Use official purchasing power parity
conversion factors (PPPs) to translate
the chosen $-amount into other-currency
amounts deemed to be equivalent in
purchasing power in the chosen base
year. This yields national poverty lines
supposedly equivalent to the IPL in the
IPL’s base year. For example:
Naira 4560/year in Nigeria in 1993 =
= $393/year PPP 1993 =
= Rupees 2756/year in India in 1993
40
The Conventional (World Bank)
Method of Defining Poverty
3. Use the national consumer price indices
(CPIs) of the various countries to inflate
or deflate each country’s national poverty
line for the IPL’s base year so as to derive
national poverty lines for the same
country for other years. For example:
$293/year in the US in 1985 =
= $393/year in the US in 1993 =
= $504/year in the US in 2003
Rs 1562/year in India in 1987 =
= Rs 2756/year in India in 1993 =
= Rs 5510/year in India in 2003
41
The Conventional (World Bank)
Method of Defining Poverty
3. Use the national consumer price indices
(CPIs) of the various countries to inflate
or deflate each country’s national poverty
line for the IPL’s base year so as to derive
national poverty lines for the same
country for other years. For example:
$293/year in the US in 1985 =
= $393/year in the US in 1993 =
= $504/year in the US in 2003
Rs 1562/year in India in 1987 =
= Rs 2756/year in India in 1993 =
= Rs 5510/year in India in 2003
42
World Bank Poverty Estimates are Not
Robust w.r.t Choice of PPP Base Year
The World Bank’s switch in PPP base year — from
1985 to 1993 — produced the following changes:
For most countries, poverty lines were uniformly
lowered for all years -- e.g. by 20% for the US and
by 61% for Mauritania.
For a few countries, poverty lines were uniformly
raised for all years -- e.g. by 42% for Nigeria.
As a consequence, Mauritania’s poverty rate estimate
(1990 survey) was lowered from 31.4% to 3.8%,
while Nigeria’s poverty rate estimate (1985 survey)
was raised from 31.1% to 72.2%.
Likewise, the 1993 poverty rate for Latin America was
lowered from 23.5% to 15.3%, while the 1993
poverty rate for Sub-Saharan Africa was raised from
39.1 to 49.7 percent.
43
How International Purchasing Power
Comparisons are Base-Year Dependent
Country A AV
Country B BV
[A’s CPI V-W]
AW
[A’s CPI W-X]
|
|
|
[PPP of| Year W]
|
|
|
[B’s CPI V-W]
BW
[B’s CPI W-X]
Base Year W
AX
BX
[A’s CPI X-Y]
AY
|
|
|
[PPP of | Year Y]
|
|
|
[B’s CPI X-Y]
BY
Base Year Y
44
How International Purchasing Power
Comparisons are Base-Year Dependent
Currency
Units
8 |
|
|
|
4 |
|
|
|
2 |
|
|
|
1 |
|
|
|
1/2 |
|
|
~
V
W
X
Y
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|A-currency
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
~
Years
45
How International Purchasing Power
Comparisons are Base-Year Dependent
Currency
Units
8 |
|
|
|
4 |
|
|
|
2 |
|
|
|
1 |
|
|
|
1/2 |
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|
~
V
W
X
Y
|
|
|
|
| B-currency
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
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~
Years
46
How International Purchasing Power
Comparisons are Base-Year Dependent
Currency
Units
8 |
|
|
|
4 |
|
|
|
2 |
|
|
|
1 |
|
|
|
1/2 |
|
|
~
|
|
|
|
|
|
V
W
X
Y
| B-currency
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|A-currency
|
|
|
|
|
|
~
Years
47
How International Purchasing Power
Comparisons are Base-Year Dependent
Currency
Units
8 |
|
|
|
4 |
|
|
|
2 |
|
|
|
1 |
|
|
|
1/2 |
|
|
~
|
|
|
V
W
X
Y
| B-currency
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| A-currency
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
~
Years
48
Poverty Trend 1987-98
49
Growth in Real Income for Different Groups of World
Population over 1990-2001 Globalization Period
WDRs & iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp
2nd
% increase in income relative to 1990
1.45
1.4
5th
1.35
10th
1.3
1.25
20th
1.2
30th
1.15
1.1
40th
1.05
50th
1
1990
1993
1996
year
1999
2001
highinco me
co untries
50
Growing Income Disparity
Ratio (Top Fifth to Bottom Fifth)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
51
Year
Income Disparity:
1820 - 1997
Logged Ratio (Top Quintile to
Bottom Quintile)
5
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Year
52

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