File

Report
Active Assailant and Emergency Response
Procedures
Deputy Chief - Jason Trevino
Sergeant - Ray Price
FBI
SWAT
OUR WAY
HISTORY

One or more persons who are randomly or
systematically involved in the act of using
deadly force on others & it appears, based on
available intel that the suspect will not stop
their aggressive, hostile actions without
immediate & direct law enforcement
intervention.
The ongoing loss of life should be the primary
motivator for L.E. intervention

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On-going scenario based training utilizing air
soft, conducted at area schools (16-24 hours)
Teaching/Training with school staff
Emergency Combat Medicine (REMSA TCCC)
Training/Coordinating with local agencies
Interior/Exterior perimeter training
Hallway/Room clearing
QUICK REFERENCE OF EMERGENCY CODES
EMERGENCY
CODE
Code Blue
WHEN TO USE IT
HOW TO CALL IT
WHAT TO DO
Medical Emergencies
Over intercom “Code
Blue” and give
location to respond:
3X
Code Blue Team to
respond
Threat on or near
Campus
Serious security
emergencies
(includes gunfire)
Bomb Threats
Over intercom
“Code Red,
Lockdown” 3X
and call 911
Stay in classroom,
lock door, close
door, and take
cover.
Code Yellow
Threat Outside
of the Building
(Interior is safe)
Over intercom –
Say “Code Yellow”
“Shelter in Place”
3X
Close door, seal off
room and listen/look
for instructions.
Code Green
Situation is
Normal
Code Red
*See WCSD Flip Charts or Safety Protocols for more detailed information.
Exterior and Interior
Interior:
 Disturbance inside the building
 Active Assailant
Exterior:
 Environmental Issues
 Neighborhood Disturbance
 Outside Law Enforcement Action
 Wildlife
Lockdowns are predominately initiated by
exterior factors.
Shelter in place
 Outside/Off property or campus threat
(Examples: Fire Department, Law Enforcement,
Hazardous Materials, etc.)
 PROCEDURES:

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Secure Perimeter and doors.
Cover windows.
Report/Email your status (Example: GREEN, Room 145)
Continue class room instruction
Wait for further instructions
Clear by “All clear, Green”
*Fire Alarm activation requires escort by LE or Fire*
LOCK DOWN

IMMEDIATE life threatening crisis
on the property/campus.
(I.E. Subject/s with weapons, active assailant)

PROCEDURES:
Immediately secure in a room.
 Cover windows.
 Report/Email your status (Example: GREEN, Room 145)

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Status Cards NO longer utilized in windows!
Released by Law Enforcement (door keyed
open)
*Fire alarm activation requires escort by LE or Fire*

ALL students/staff are accounted for and safe.

Missing student, extra students, have information.

Have students /staff with LIFE THREATENING
injuries, need immediate assistance.
STAFF NAME
John Doe
Jane Doe
Mickey Mouse
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
etc…
ROOM #
W1
W2
Clinic
G Y R (+) OR (-)
NOTES:
X
X
X
-3 Sent Tim, Tommy, Terry to Clinic
3 Have Tim, Tommy, Terry from W2


#1 goal of law enforcement is to stop the
suspect(s)
Everything else that takes place should support
the #1 goal.
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Provide dispatch/responding units with
details as available
Make sure school has initiated a lockdown if
appropriate
Make decision to engage/isolate suspect(s) or
wait for additional officers
Solo/Single officer entry is trained and promoted by the
WCSD PD
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70% of these successes have been by solo
officers.
15% by two-officer deployments.
15% by three-officer deployments.
There have been zero successes for anything
initiated by four officers or more.
Immediate Response – Going directly to the sight
and sound of violence.
Search Response – Unaware where the threat is
and begin searching for the threat until the sight
and sound of violence is found.
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As additional units arrive, the IC should be
directing them as to where to go.
Additional entry elements should be formed
and implemented until the suspect(s) have
been stopped.
*Windows Left to Right
identified by numbers*
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Kansas City (MO) PD Sgt. Ward Smith and a
Force Science Analyst did a two-year study.
Over 920 officers were observed in 2011.
The targets used were 2-D, full-color, life-size
photographs of male and female subjects, some
threatening and some not.
Included were armed targets that had a silver
KCPD badge affixed either to the figure's belt
or hanging from a simulated chain at chest
level.
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The targets were programmed to
simultaneously turn toward officers being
tested for variable amounts of time.
Officers were instructed to "take appropriate
action"--to scan, move and use cover, to
discriminate under time compression between
shoot and no-shoot targets, and to fire until
adversaries were defeated.
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Officers were briefed that they would be
responding to assist an undercover
plainclothes officers in an arrest situation.
It was stressed to identify each target and
officers were warned that they needed to pay
close attention and be alert.
Each fired about 125 rounds in the exercise.
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Overall, a no-shoot target with a belt badge was six
times more likely to be shot than one with a neck
badge.
Even under full-light conditions, belt-badge targets
were hit 1,272 times, compared to 196 hits for neckbadge targets.
Under low light, belt-badge targets were hit 5,288
times, with neck-badge targets taking 843 hits.
Combining both badge-placement locations, the
no-shoot targets were four times more likely to be
shot under low-light conditions than in a brightlight setting.
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923 veteran officers were observed in 2012.
2011 results were reviewed before they began.
Shots mistakenly fired at belt-badge targets still
far outweighed those striking chain-badge
targets under both full-light and low-light
conditions.
The total numbers of inappropriate shots fired
were down remarkably.
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Hits to brightly lit belt-badge targets plunged
82% and to neck-badge targets 88%.
In low light, belt-badge targets drew 90% fewer
shots and neck-badge targets showed a 92%
reduction.
Making the officers aware of the blue-on-blue
risk had a very positive result.
Exposure to the problem was a memorable way
to have a life-saving impact.
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Tactics & Survival Training Unit
Los Angeles County (CA) SD
Within the first 20 scenario's the PC was shot
95% of the time.
They weren’t challenged.
Their badges weren’t seen.
They carried their badges on the belt, around
the neck, in hand near their weapon, and in
hand up in the air.
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Badges on belts were not readily identified because
responders were focused on the PC officers'
weapons in hand.
Badges around the neck were not readily identified
because responders were focused on the PCs'
weapons and hands (in the role players' shooting
stance, the neck badges were not visible).
A badge held in the support hand next to a PC
officer's weapon was not readily identified because
responders focused on the PC's weapon and
shooting stance.
Even when the PC officers' weapon was taken
away, they were fired upon because responders
identified their shooting-stance behavior and
thought the badge being pointed was a gun.
The most effective badge position identified was the
“HALO” position.
 PC officers' held their badges high above their
heads, rotating the badge around like a halo. This
allowed the badge to be presented in all directions,
as close to 360 degrees as possible.
 Contact teams were less apt to engage the PCs
because they recognized the position as less
threatening, even though the PC held a gun in the
other hand.
 This position drew the attention of contact officers
and bought enough time for them to focus on the
raised hand holding the badge.
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Train first responders that not everyone holding a gun
is a suspect.
Establish a challenge protocol to limit the likelihood of
blue-on-blue error. (role-players being shot dropped
down to 50% after stressing the importance of
challenge procedures)
The longer the PC presents himself holding a gun or
displaying armed behavior, the higher the likelihood of
being misidentified and fired upon.
As a PC choosing to respond to an armed threat, it was
recommend keeping your weapon concealed as long as
possible as you maneuver to a position of advantage.
Only present the weapon when you absolutely,
positively have to engage threats.

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After engaging and conducting necessary afteraction procedures, immediately holster, conceal
the weapon, move to cover, and be prepared to
“Halo" your badge.
Train your officers in situational awareness to
understand they are an UNKNOWN person
when in plainclothes and their behaviors when
holding a gun may be perceived as a threat to
other first responders (uniformed as well as
plainclothes and off-duty).
Deputy Chief Jason Trevino
[email protected]
Sergeant Ray Price
[email protected]
Washoe County School Police
775-348-0285

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