### PPT

```Ideal Models in Symmetric
Cryptography
Stefano Tessaro
UC Santa Barbara
Visions of Cryptography
Weizmann Institute
Crypto-History
2000 BC
[oversimplified]
Cryptographic algorithms designed from scratch, no
proofs, …
1982
Provable security: Security of cryptosystems
formalized and proven under computational
assumptions.
Amazingly successful
The Sky is the Limit!
Encryption, signatures, multi-party computation, secure
delegation, functional encryption, FHE, …
This Talk – In a Nutshell
This talk: Biased selection of problems which cannot be studied
within the traditional framework of provable security.
Leitmotif: Security proofs are in ideal models (e.g. random
oracle model, ideal cipher model, etc.)
Two high-level goals:
1
2
Survey a set problems not as widely considered by the
core theory community.
Thought-provoking: Foster discussion on ideal models,
and show why “we are stuck with them”.
Ideal Models
Random-oracle model
[FiaSha86,BelRog93]
Cryptographic primitives – Set P of valid “instances”
Generic-group model
 Functions {0,1}* → {0,1}n
[Sho97]
 Permutations {0,1}n → {0,1}n
 Pairs (f, op), where f: Zq → {0,1}n, op(f(a), f(b)) = f(a + b)
Ideal-P model:
1. Pick P u.a.r from P
2. Every algorithm (i.e.,
attacker, schemes) given
P
C
Rationale: Ideal primitive P has all security properties expected
from P-candidates.
Ideal Models
Fact. [CaGoHa98] Security proofs in ideal models are not
“sound”.
This talk. Problems motivated by design of efficient and highlysecure constructions of symmetric cryptographic primitives
(block ciphers, hash functions).
Ideal models used in security proofs:


They are only way to give “provable” answers.
Security against limited attacker class (i.e., generic attacks) is
partially justified by existing cryptanalytic attacks.
“A proof in an ideal model is better than no proof at all.”
Outline
Three selected examples:
1
From Weak to Strong Block Ciphers
2
Hash Functions and Key Derivation
3
Building Ideal Primitives
Pseudorandom Functions [GoGoMi84]
Keyed function F: K × X → Y
Random function R: X → Y
SK
R
F
F(SK,x)
x
x
D
D
0/1
R(x) = \$
Time T
0/1
Definition. F (T, Q, e)-PRF:∀(T, Q)-distinguishers D:
Pr[D → 1|left] – Pr[D → 1|right] < e
[Typically: e = negl for T, Q = poly(k) - here we care about concrete security]
PRFs ⟹ efficient symmetric encryption, MACs, …
Candidates: Block Ciphers
E.g.: AES, DES, 3DES, IDEA, BLOWFISH, …
M
E
C
SK
C
E-1
M
SK
|M| = |C| = n (e.g. n = 128)
M’ ≠ M
E
SK
C’ ≠ C
|SK| = k (e.g. k = 128, 256, …)
For every SK: Block cipher is a
permutation on n-bit strings
Pseudorandom Permutations [LubRac85]
Block cipher E: K × X → X
Random permutation P: X → X
SK
P
E
E-1(SK,y)
E(SK,x)
(-,y)
x
(+,x)
-1(y)
P
P(x)
(-,y)
(+,x)
x
D
D
0/1
0/1
Definition. E (T, Q, e)-PRP:∀(T, Q)-distinguishers D:
Pr[D → 1|left] – Pr[D → 1|right] < e.
STRONG-PRP
Pseudorandom Constructions
Building PRFs / PRPs from weaker pseudorandom objects is a
central problem both in theoretical and applied cryptography.
Example. PRF from PRP
PRP
E
C
E
PRF?
Standard-model provable-security:
If E is (T, Q, e)-PRP then C is (T’, Q’, e’)-PRF, where T’ ≈ T
Important: We always have T’ < T.
Our Problem: From Weak to Strong Ciphers
• Design weak component
• Iterate weak component multiple times
Sequential composition of weak ciphers
M
E
E
E
K1
K2
K
C
Used for 3DES, where E =
DES is insecure (widespread
in the electronic payment
sector)
3
• DES best attack: 242
• 3DES best attack: 290
Expectation: Breaking construction strictly
harder than breaking component
Hope: T’ > T! Cannot show this in the standard model under any
reasonable assumption on E …
Amplification of Generic Security
Observation. (Exhaustive key search) E can always be
distinguished with 2k computation and Q = O(k/n) queries.
M
E
E
E
K1
K2
K
C
3
“Generic” Security Amplification: Prove that there is no generic
attack – treating E as a black-box – which breaks sequential
composition with complexity less than T’ >> 2k.
The Ideal Cipher Model [Sha49]
k: E uar from
∀SK
∈
{0,1}
SK
Two
query types:
ESK(M)
(+,
SK, M)
the set of all permutations
IC
ESKPrimitive
queries
⟹
“Local”
computation
-1(C)
(-, SK, C)
n → {0,1}n
{0,1}
 Construction queries ⟹ Key-dependent access to primitive
SK
(+, SK, M), (-, SK ,
C)
QP queries
C
IC
D
P
IC
D
QC queries
(+, M), (-, C)
0/1
0/1
Definition. C is (QC, QP, e)-strong PRP if ∀(QC, QP)-distinguishers D:
Pr[D → 1|left] – Pr[D → 1|right] < e
The General Problem
SK
C
IC
D
0/1
P
IC
D
0/1
Problem. Find efficient C which is a (QC, QP, e = negl)-strong PRP
for QC, QP both as large as possible.
QC ≤ 2n
Q P < 2n + k
Two-fold Sequential Composition
z
y
x
E
SK1, SK2
(+,(+,
SKSK
1, x)
2, y)
E
EE
SK1
IC
SK2
yz
(+, x)
z
Two-fold Sequential Composition
SK1, SK2
y’[SK’2]
x
E
E
z
EE
P
y[SK’1]
SK11
SK’
IC
SK’
SK22
D
Meet-in-the-middle attack: [DifHel76]
• z ← C(+, x)
• ∀SK’1: y[SK’1] ← IC(+, SK’1, x)
• ∀SK’2: y’[SK’2] ← IC(-, SK’2, z)
• If ∃SK’1, SK’2 : y[SK’1] = y[SK’2] then output 1
• Else output 0
Fact 1. Pr[D → 1|left] = 1
0/1
Fact 2. If k < n/2: Pr[D → 1|right] < 1/2
DESX [Rivest, 1984]
E
SK1
SK
SK2
Theorem: [KilRog01]
DESX is a (QC, QP, e = negl)-strong PRP if QC * QP < 2n + k.



Result meaningful even when k = 0 [EveMan96]
Proof succeeds even if SK1 = SK2 [DunKelSha11]
Essentially optimal for one-call constructions [GazTes12]
3DES
Caveat: If QC approaches 2n, then distinguishable with QP = 2k
queries.
Alternative: Back to sequential composition! (used in 3DES)
E
E
E
SK1
SK2
SK3
Theorem: [BelRog06,GazMau10]
3DES is a (QC, QP, e = negl)-strong PRP as long as QC ≤ 2n and QP <
2n/2 + k.
3DES – Proof Approach
p
p1
p
p1
K = 2k
…
p2
…
pi
…
pj
…
pK
pk
…
pK
Lemma. Hard to distinguish with fewer than 2k + n/2 queries.
For random i, j, k: pi, pj pk = p
Beyond Length 3
E
E
E
SK1
SK2
SKl
Expectation: Security increases with l.
Theorem. [Lee13] Security for QP → 2k + min{k,n} when l →∞.
Increasing Efficiency [GazTes12]
SK’’
E
E
SK
SK’
Theorem: [GazTes12]
2XOR-Cascade is a (QC, QP, e = negl)-strong PRP if QC ≤ 2n and QP
< 2k + n/2.
[Same security as 3DES, one block cipher call less]
SK’3
SK’2
SK’1
SK’l
SK’l + 1
E
E
E
SK1
SK2
SKl
Theorem. [LPS12,Lee13,Gaz13,CheSte13]
Security for QP → 2k + n when l →∞.
Optimal!
Outline
Three selected examples:
1
From Weak to Strong Block Ciphers
2
Hash Functions and Key Derivation
3
Building Ideal Primitives
Hash Functions
Practical hash-function constructions are usually only analyzed
in ideal models.
Example: Block-cipher based hash-functions [PGV93]
H(X, Y) = Z
X
E
Z
Y
Goal: Optimize concrete security / # calls tradeoff for
standard security properties [Hundreds of papers!]
Key-Derivation Functions
Goal: Derive secret-key from low-entropy secret (e.g., password) – PKCS#5
standard
pw || salt
H
H
…
H
SK
Randomly chosen per KDF
evaluation
Expectations:
1. Time to break should increase linearly with iteration length.
2. Time to break should increase linearly with number of independent
instances.
Theorem. [BeRiTe12] Expectations are true for KDFs from the
PKCS#5 standard (in the ROM).
Outline
Three selected examples:
1
From Weak to Strong Block Ciphers
2
Hash Functions and Key Derivation
3
Building Ideal Primitives
So far: Construction C of a primitive Q from a primitive P
achieving specific goal, with security proof in ideal-P model.
Most ambitious goal.
Construction C(.) using ideal primitive P
s.t. C(P) “as good as” ideal primitive Q.
“If an application is secure in the ideal-Q model,
then it is secure in the ideal-P model, where calls to
Q are replaced by calls to C(P).”
Indifferentiability [MaReHo04]
Keyless, deterministic construction
C
P
Q
D
0/1
SIM
D
0/1
Definition. C (QC, QP, e)-indifferentiable: ∃(efficient) SIM∀D:
Pr[D → 1|left] – Pr[D → 1|right] < e
[Typically: efficient = poly(QC, QP), e = negl(k)]
Composability [MaReHo04]
Arbitrary security game G
SIM
Q
P
C
G
G
0/1
0/1
Pr[G → 1|Q] = negl
Pr[G → 1|C(P)] = ?
Indifferentiability ⟹ Pr[G → 1|C(P)] = negl
Indifferentiability Constructions
Literature on indifferentiability encompasses by now hundreds
of papers
Typical example. Random oracles from ideal ciphers
IV
M1
E
E
E
M2
truncate
Ml
Theorem. [CDMP05] Construction is indifferentiable from a
random oracle in the ideal-cipher model.
Standard security notion for hash function constructions (e.g., in SHA-3
competition)
“Hash function has all security properties of a random oracle.”
Ideal Ciphers from Random Oracles
F1
F2
F14
Theorem. [HoKuTe11] 14-round Feistel is indifferentiable
from a random permutation.
Much more complex than converse. [CoPaSe08]
Indifferentiability Constructions
Other constructions
Random oracles from fixed input-length random oracles with
optimal security […, MauTes07,…,DodSte11,…]
graphs.
Ideal ciphers from random permutations
[ABDMS13,LamSeu13]
Multi-Stage Games
Q
G1
Examples:
• Deterministic
encryption
• Leakage resilience
• …
G2
0/1
Observation. [RSS11] Indifferentiability does not imply
composition for multi-stage games.
Multi-Stage Games
New Goal: Find good indifferentiability-like notions with
composition properties for multi-stage games.




Reset indifferentiability [RSS11]: Distinguisher is allowed
to reset simulator.
Reset indifferentiability sufficient for secure composition
in the multi-stage setting.
Many impossibility results: Traditional indifferentiability
results are impossible for reset indifferentiability
[DGHM13,BBM13,…]
…
Conclusions
 Ideally, we would like to avoid ideal models.
 A large number of relevant security questions can
only be answered using ideal-model security
proofs.
 Ideal models give rise to a rich area of works with
interesting theoretical questions.
Thank you!
DESX – Proof Idea
E
SK1
Extend the ideal world:
1
P
SK2
SK
Transcript:
• TC = {(w, z)}, size QC
• TP = {(SK’, x, y)}, size QP
IC
D
2
Random
SK, SK1, SK2
Lemma 1: e ≤ Pr[D
wins]
D wins if
• ∃(w,*) ∈ TC: (SK, w ⊕ SK1, *) ∈ TP
• ∃(*,z) ∈ TC: (SK, *, z ⊕ SK2) ∈ TP
Lemma 2: Pr[D wins] ≤ 2 QC QP / 2n +
k
```