Summary Presentation of Haiti Challenges Leading to Policy Level Findings Lessons from the Norwegian Portfolio in Haiti Lessons Learned Socio-Economic indicators Poorest country of the hemisphere with a GDP: $1,155 USD and a HDI rank of 145th in 2010. Population in 2007: approx. 9.1M Life expectancy at birth: 55 Maternal mortality rate: 523 (Norway: 10) Youth literacy rate 2000-07: M: 76%/F: 87% largely funded by external sources, including transfers from the diaspora Transparency Int. Rank: 146th in 2010 Political variables Small number of years under democratic rule since independence, which include 20 years of US occupation. Dominant influence of autocratic rulers in the period. Weak central and local institutions since the mid1980s. Major negative effects of embargo during military rule (1990-1994). Increased economic and political influence of narcomoney after 1994. Split between legislative and executive branches after the return to democracy and throughout the Aristide period. Fragmentation of funding strategies without clear connection to identifiable national programmes or to Haitian counterparts hindered the portfolio’s capacity to link with overarching objectives. Late production of an umbrella policy statement capable of bringing together this fragmented portfolio created a vacuum with the correlated lack of clear direction (coherence and linkage). The balance between political objectives and development objectives was very unstable fluctuating from one to the other. This made evaluation criteria of development projects seem non pertinent. Important tools were not developed such as conflict analysis and context sensitive management approaches, both weakened the portfolio in the Haitian environment. Consequently risk analysis came late in the portfolio’s development cycle; it did not inform monitoring and it relative absence was a weak foundation for evaluation operations. Monitoring mission agenda marked a clear choice of discussing transparently with all parties and stakeholders. Norway’s MFA was viewed as a team player. It had a very positive ripple effect on other donors. Peacebuilding, dialogue and political processes require flexibility, personal engagement (and support) and risk management, within a programme framework. Commitment (personal or institutional) cannot be a substitute to more organized and reflexive forms of interventions. Emergency procedures and their shortcuts should give way to rebuilding and consolidating focused approaches. Doing so requires the breaking down of existing institutional dichotomies between political and development stakeholders in donor countries. A first step towards improved accountability and learning for stakeholders can be to document key outputs and outcomes through participatory monitoring. Systematic participatory monitoring can be a transparent tool for accountability in project management even in conflict or emergency situations. The challenge – not to be underestimated – is to find ways to implement participation in data collection and feed-back of information. As early as possible after the intervention, the objective of creating systems for institutional learning, knowledge management and transfer as well as monitoring/quality assurance by decision makers must become a priority. These activities must include network building operations and information/lessons learned sharing. A strategy for any fragile or conflict-prone state must address continuity of interventions, local ownership and sustainability of these conflict prevention and peace building interventions.