Monitoring the INF and START Treaties

Monitoring the INF and START
American Physical Society
November 2, 2013
Dr. Edward Ifft
Tools of Verification
• Declarations and data exchange
• National Technical Means (NTM)—specifically
authorized by treaties, if operating in accordance with
international law
• International Technical Means (CTBT, Open Skies)
• Cooperative measures
• On-Site Inspections
• Perimeter and Portal Continuous Monitoring (PPCM)
• Telemetry
• Unique identifiers
• Open sources, civil society
INF Verification
• Signed 1987; EIF 1988
• Banned all ground-launched missiles with ranges
between 500 km and 5,500 km
• Extensive declarations
• 5 types of intrusive OSI, including PPCM at Votkinsk,
Russia and Magna, Utah
• Cargoscan X-Ray machine at Votkinsk (SS-20 vs. SS-25)
• Detailed procedures for conduct of OSI
• Detailed procedures for conversion or elimination of
systems, including missile launch to destruction
INF Verification
• All systems converted/eliminated by 1991;
about 846 U.S. systems, 1846 Soviet systems
• OSI continued until 2001—complicated by
presence of U.S. systems in 5 basing countries
in Europe
• About 850 inspections conducted
• Established model for OSI in later treaties
INF Verification
• SS-25 ICBM deployments at former Soviet INF
bases led to use of neutron counters by U.S.
inspectors at these bases
• Special Verification Commission (SVC)
• Still in force—12 USSR successor states
• Russia would like to make INF multilateral and
threatens to withdraw
START I Verification
• Signed 1991; EIF 1994
• Emphasis on verification—Cold War mentality—Gorbachev
• 124 definitions; 153 different notification formats
• Detailed Verification Protocol
• Massive MOU on data exchange, photos
• 12 types of OSI—most important were Data Update
inspections (15/yr) and RV inspections (10/yr); elimination
inspections increased toward the end
• U.S. PPCM continued at Votkinsk (no Cargoscan)
• USSR declined PPCM at Promontory, Utah
• Special verification regime for mobile ICBMs
• Telemetry: no encryption or encapsulation—
exchange of tapes; “Geek Week;” important
for numbers of RVs and throw-weight
• Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
(JCIC); over 100 Agreed Statements and
Common Understandings
• 4 successor states to USSR: Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus, Kazakhstan
• Treaty expired 2009—could have been
renewed, but replaced by New START
Moscow Treaty (SORT)
• U.S.-Russia only; EIF 2002, replaced by New
• Reductions in deployed warheads only
• No provisions for verification, reductions
schedules, elimination procedures
• Partially relied on START I verification regime
while START I remained in force
• Aberration, not a precedent
New START Treaty
• EIF February 5, 2011
• Duration 10 years—can be renewed for 5 years
• Reductions within 7 years to:
-- 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers
[equipped for nuclear weapons]
-- 1,550 warheads on these 700 delivery vehicles
-- 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM and
SLBM launchers and heavy bombers [equipped for
nuclear weapons]
NEW START Verification
• Verification regime made “simplified and less
costly;” more information, less access
• 90 definitions
• OSI consolidated and quotas reduced:
--Type 1: deployed system sites, 10/yr.
--Type 2: non-deployed system sites, 8/yr.
• Numbers of inspectable sites on both sides
reduced, due to base closures
• OSI of eliminations consolidated into Type 2
(“accumulations”)—will probably be infrequent
NEW START Verification
• Attribution rules from START I gone (except for
nuclear heavy bombers—HB=1 warhead)
• No special regime for mobile ICBMs
• Team is told exact number of warheads on each
system at that site when inspection begins
• Over 3,000 notifications to date
• Unique identifiers on all systems
• Access to telemetry reduced—up to 5 flights/yr.,
chosen by testing side
Counting Rules
• START I: assume all deployed launchers contain a
missile; attribute maximum number of warheads
allowed for each type of missile (heavy bombers
• New START: count only missiles “emplaced” on/in
deployed launcher at any given time; count
warheads actually deployed on deployed missile
at any given time (HB= 1 regardless)
• Causes constant fluctuations in the count and
challenging verification task—solved through
declarations and intrusive OSI
Special Verification Requirements
• Exhibitions: 1-time exhibit of new/converted
system to demonstrate distinguishing features or
confirm technical characteristics: B-1B, B-2A,
SSGN, RS-24 completed
• 4 U.S. SSBNs converted to SSGNs: 1-time
exhibition of each within 3 years, plus 6
additional inspections over life of the Treaty (if in
port during Type 1 OSI)
• INF, START I, New START all allow hand-held
neutron counters to distinguish between nuclear
and non-nuclear objects
NEW START Verification
• Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC)
• State Dept. 2013 Compliance Report: . . .”U.S.
certifies the Russian Federation to be in
compliance with the terms of the New START
Treaty.” U.S. has raised implementationrelated questions with the Russian Federation
through diplomatic channels and in the BCC
(details classified)

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