Lev_Jakobson_PA

Report
NGOs and public service
quality in Russia: to resist the
departmental approach
Professor Lev Yakobson
Moscow, June, 2011
A disquieting picture
• 10 years after the Gref’s program: fewer than 40 per cent
of the program objectives were achieved
• What is the present condition of:
• education? Good – 10%, satisfactory – 50%, bad
– 36%
• health care? Good – 5%, satisfactory – 40%, bad
– 53%
Quality of public officials’ service (perception of
those who have applied for certificates etc.):
excellent – 4%, good – 26%, satisfactory –44%, bad –
30%
Is the level of corruption high or low? High – 83%, low
– 7%
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
To go beyond the administrative
reform
• The last decade: improvement of organization structures,
regulations and public servants incentives – still in the
agenda
• The tasks are more doubtful than solutions
• The state apparatus as the main arena of interest
representation
• Departmental approach to:
– agenda setting
– outputs and outcomes interpretation
• Do the authorities recognize and take into account the
interests of such people as you?- “Yes”-20 per cent,
“No”-69 per cent, “Don’t know”-21 per cent
Which of the following rights and freedoms are
the most important for you personally? (more
than one option could be selected)
Centre for Studies of Civil Society and Non-for-profit HSE
Which of the following human rights and
freedoms are you sure to posses?
Centre for Studies of Civil Society and Non-for-profit HSE
Do you think that associations and other non-government
nonprofit organizations should or should not participate,
together with the government, in providing social services in
education, healthcare, culture etc.?
Population
69
NGO managers
14
90
18
55
1
Top-rank federal social stratum
87
0%
20%
40%
should
should not
don't know
12
60%
80%
100%
Russian representative population survey (n = 1600),
Russian survey of NGO leaders (n= 1000),
Survey of Experts at the federal level (n = 303)
6
По Вашему мнению, чем могут общественные и другие негосударственные
некоммерческие организации в наибольшей степени помочь улучшению ситуации в
здравоохранении?
защищать права пациентов
44
контролировать работу медицинских
учреждений
41
привлечь в отрасль добровольные денежные
пожертвования
27
информировать население о качестве работы
медицинских учреждений
23
привлечь добровольный безвозмездный труд
16
самим активно работать в сфере
здравоохранения, оказывать услуги населению
15
затрудняюсь ответить
12
ничем
7
другое
1
0
10
20
30
40
50
Результаты всероссийского репрезентативного опроса населения, проведенного ЛИГО ГУ-ВШЭ (разработка программы исследования, включая
инструментарий, анализ полученных данных) и ВЦИОМ (сбор информации) в декабре 2008 года. Объем выборочной совокупности – 1600 чел.
7
How do you assess in general the contribution of the
public and other non-government and non-commercial
organizations to addressing social issues in our country?
4
Poopulation
32
30
34
2
Top-rank federal social
stratum respresentatives
31
NGO managers
55
26
0%
20%
49
40%
12
17
60%
80%
good
satisfactory
bad
difficult to say
8
100%
Russian representative population survey (n = 1600),
Russian survey of NGO leaders (n= 1000),
Survey of Experts at the federal level (n = 303)
8
The public sector at present: nobody is happy
(reсent representative opinion polls)
•
What is the present condition of:
• education? Good – 10%, satisfactory – 50%, bad – 36%
• health care? Good – 5%, satisfactory – 40%, bad – 53%
•
Quality of public officials’ service (perception of those
who have applied for certificates etc.):
excellent – 4%, good – 26%, satisfactory –44%, bad – 30%
•
Is the level of corruption high or low? High – 83%, low – 7%
•
Medvedev’s and Putin’s speeches
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
The public sector at present: nobody is happy
•
•
Typical shortcomings:
•
nominal equality – huge real inequality (mainly in terms of quality),
•
disproportions,
•
lack of efficiency incentives,
•
corruption
Cost-efficiency could be at least 1.25 times higher
(e. g. Е.Г.Ясин и др. Бремя государства и экономическая
политика: либеральная альтернатива. М., 2002)
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
Modernization: concentration for a jerk?
•
•
10 years after the Gref’s program
(Стратегия 2010: итоги реализации 10 лет спустя):
•
fewer than 40 per cent of the program objectives were achieved
•
public sector is the weakest point
(as compared, for instance, to financial sphere)
•
reforms are slow and inconsistent
To narrow field of the reform for breakthrough at a few decisive
directions?
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
Major obstacles: people, balance of interests, institutions?
•
The most typical view: a battle between good (benevolent, wise) and bad (selfinterested, corrupted, short-sighted) guys →
•
A bit less typical view: coalitions for / against modernization (INSOR) →
→Shortage of “troops”? → Don’t disperse them over a wide front
•
Let’s imagine: good guys (supporters of modernization) are free to reform the
public sector radically within the existing institutions of public governance and
management
•
The role of public governance institutions
•
Institutions of agenda setting in particular
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
Communication
•
Communication between the society and the authorities: speaking
thickly, hard-of-hearing (Monitoring of the Russian civil society) →
lack of information about particular needs and potential responses to
reforms
•
•
opinion poll (2009): Do the authorities understand and take into
account the interests of such people as you? - “Yes” – 20 per cent,
“No” – 69 per cent, “Don’t know” – 21 per cent
Consensus: poor condition of public governance and management
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
How did the Government act in the
period of the global economic crises?
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
Some typical features of implemented
and planned reforms - 1
•
Strong bias toward specific interests of a particular ministry
(governmental agency)
•
•
The recent police reform: the purpose – more safety for citizens, the
essence of the law– more centralized and better funded police
Reduction of a complex problem to particular concern of a ministry
•
Shortage of kindergartens and nursery schools. Ministry of education
and science: shorter stay – more kids are involved in preschool
education (but mothers still can not work)
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
Some typical features of implemented
and planned reforms - 2
•
Bias towards the most visible and easily administered aspects of a
problem
•
•
Excessive unification and centralization
•
•
Needs of elderly people: relatively fast growth of pensions (including those
for employed pensioners) vs. dramatic shortage and low quality of
services for most elderly and disabled persons
Medical insurance reform
Unfunded mandates to regional and local authorities
•
The new system of public employees’ salaries
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
The departmental approach
•
•
Federal ministries and other central agencies are principal actors in:
•
the agenda setting (recognition and interpretation of major problems,
challenges, and opportunities),
•
working out of the decisions
Reforms are structured in accordance with the structure of the
Government
•
Adequate treatment of a complex issue is possible if it implies
broadening of responsibility of the agency initiating the reform →
Usually blocked by other agencies
•
Social benefits and costs are taken into account with strong bias to
departmental benefits and costs
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
A case study: the public procurement reform
•
The System of Public Procurement in Russia:
the Road of Reform www.hse.ru
•
Prior to 2006: broad discretion → kickbacks as a custom → general
indignation → window of opportunity for reformists
•
Coincidence: the most radical among influential reformists + highprincipled executors
•
The idea (94-FZ): eliminate any administrative discretion
•
The dream: almost everything is bought by electronic auctions,
potential providers are completely anonymous
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
Success?
•
•
As a rule, prequalification (requirements on suppliers),
negotiation and contract correction are prohibited →
Unrealistic assumptions:
•
absolutely comprehensive and detailed requirements
on every product
•
instant, reliable and costless check of quality
•
instant and costless substitution or compensation
19 sets of amendments:
•
“exceptions” instead of diversification of procedures
•
exceptions rather for the most influential departments
than for types of goods
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
Success?- Corruption
•
More than a half the cases procurements are made with technical
violations of the law (SU-HSE Monitoring of public procurement)
•
Selective approach to control: risk of corrupted controllers
•
Business: public procurement is not less corrupted than it used to be
before Law 94-FZ has been adopted
•
In the procurement of COMPLEX products corruption opportunities
have been SHIFTED to the stages of planning, development of
specifications and order acceptance
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
Why it tends to turn out as always - 1
Representation and reconciliation of interests mainly through executive
branch → departmental division of labor and responsibility, “assembling”
mainly at the very top level (it is called “political”) → departmental vision
of the reform agenda as well as benefits and costs → tendencies to:
•
partial approach (FAS: planning is not our business) → almost inevitable
shift of costs and risks
•
departmental political priorities (FAS : competition vs. reliability)
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
Why it tends to turn out as always - 2
•
The change should be comfortable for the reform-promoting
department:
•
neither reduction of functions nor complication of their
implementation (FAS: probably, it make sense to have
sophisticated procedures for complex purchases, but one
should suggest an easy way to administer such procedures)
•
Ministry of Finance: struggle for balanced budget → the key
point: 94-FZ enables to save some money (often at the
expense of quality)
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
How a window of opportunity looks like?
How to sell a reform if it is generated inside state apparatus
without civil society requirement, advice and pressure?
•
Strong monopoly on interpretation, excessive role of
individual vies
•
Simple idea linked with major troubles of superiors
•
The Lenin’s (Napoleon’s) approach: let’s get involved into the
battle and then we’ll see what to do → “Soft reputation
constraint” → both “sellers” and “buyers” of the reform
prefer “exclusions” to revision of basic ideas
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
Potential outcomes
•
•
Successful reform initiated and driven by a department:
•
real positive changes in the field of the department’s responsibility
•
strengthening of the department’s administrative power
•
some loss at other fields
Resistance to strengthening and prevention of losses:
hard, long and distorting bargaining with other departments → a racer
converted into a camel (rather to mix of different animals)
↓
•
Reforms are slow and inconsequent (the public procurement reform is a
rare example of “a racer”)
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
Is the bureaucracy the only culprit?
•
“The receivers” are quite bad, but what is about “the
transmitters”?
•
Does “the elite” of a professional community actively
promote and defend common interest of the
community? - “Yes”:
•
•
school teachers – 24%, university professors – 13%,
doctors – 18%, businessmen and managers – 14%
Most people can be trusted – 18%
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
SPb, p. 4
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
Presentation - 4
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
Presentation - 5
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
Presentation - 6
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
Awareness of NGOs and participation in their activities
Know / heard about some types of NGOs and civil initiatives
2009
83%
2008
81%
2007
Yes
No
17%
19%
74%
0
20
40
26%
60
80
100
Participate in NGOs activities, are members of NGOs
2009
23%
2008
77%
21%
2007
79%
14%
0%
86%
20%
National
Research
University
Higher School
of Economics,
2011
*Basing
on results
of all-Russian
population
representative
40%
polls (2007-2009)
60%
80%
100%
Awareness of NGOs and participation in their activities
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
What can be done?
•
Modernization as a jerk under the present circumstances:
to strengthen the federal Government control of resource
allocation and institutional development for a number of cavalry
raids partially solving some of the most visible problems
•
The administrative reform - real and partially successful efforts:
•
•
to limit the numbers of agencies and their functions,
•
to improve regulations of officials’ activity,
•
to strengthen accountability to the higher organs of power
The key problem: agenda setting → The key factor:
interaction within the Government and between the civil society
and the authorities (selection of “agenda universe” elements for
institutional agenda)
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
Is the dialog possible?
•
Is the Government hostile to the civil society?
•
“Civil society voices” at the federal level
(nation-wide associations and “elites of professional communities”)
are not perceived as adequate representatives of wider group’s
interests
Факторы развития гражданского общества и механизмыего
взаимодействия с государством. М., 2008
•
Enhancing opportunities for optimal agenda setting on regional and
local levels
•
Indicators of civil society development
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
Russian NGOs: number of paid employees distribution
Do not know
4%
No employees in
organization
33%
31 persons and over
5%
1-5 persons
34%
6-10 persons
14%
11-30 persons
10%
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
Russian NGOs: number of volunteers distribution
Do not know
7%
1-5 persons
14%
6-10 persons
11%
Volunteers do
not participate
in organization
28%
11-30 persons
18%
over 100
10%
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
31-100 persons
12%
What kind of relationships do you have with…
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
Less centralized institutional development vs. standardization
•
Relatively high level of legally fixed social rights → Limit of
diversity and competition
•
•
Not to accelerate standardization of institutions and concentration
of administrative power at the federal level
•
•
But
Now just the opposite, e.g. health care
To involve private sector and NGOs in social service provision
National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011
[email protected]

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