Part 6: Discussion

Report
Understanding Network
Failures in Data Centers:
Measurement, Analysis,
and Implications
Group Research 1:
AKHTAR, Kamran
SU, Hao
SUN, Qiang
TANG, Yue
YANG, Xiaofan
(42 slides)
Summary



This is the first large-scale analysis of failures in a data
center network.
Based on data center networks and characterizing failure
events within data center, using multiple data sources
commonly collected by network operators, analyze and
estimating the failures, their impact, and the effectiveness of
network redundancy.
Key achievements: They found that commodity switches
exhibit high reliability which supports current proposals to
design flat networks using commodity components. They
also highlighted the importance of studies to better manage
middle boxes such as load balancers, as they exhibit high
failure rates. Finally, at both network and application layers,
more investigation is needed to analyze and improve the
effectiveness of redundancy.
OUTLINE








Part 1: Introduction
Part 2: Background
Part 3: Methodology and Data Sets
Part 4: Failure Analysis
Part 5: Estimating Failure Impact
Part 6: Discussion
Part 7: Related Work
Part 8: Conclusions and Future Work
FCAPS
Fault management
Part 1: Introduction
Data Center Networks
scalable, efficient, fault tolerant, and easy-to-manage
Three dimensions
1.
2.
Characterizing the most failure prone
network elements
Estimating the impact of failures.
3. Analyzing the effectiveness of network
redundancy
Part 2: Background
2.1 Data center network architecture
Equipment quantity proportion
ToRs
15%
LBs
10%
AggS, Core and
AccR
75%
2.2 Data center workload characteristics
Part 3: Methodology and
Data Sets
3.1 Existing data sets
1. Network event logs (SNMP/syslog)
2. NOC Tickets
Info about when and how events were discovered as well as when
they were resolved (operators employ it)
3. Network traffic data
4. Network topology data
3.2---3.4 Defining and identifying failures with
impact
 Link failures
 Device failures
“provisioning” (no data before, some data transferred during failure)
For link failures
Eliminating spurious notifications
Focus on measurable events
For device failures
At least one link failure within a time
window of five minutes
We only need failure events impacted network traffic
Part 4: Failure Analysis
Outline







Failure event panorama
Daily volume of failures
Probability of failure
Aggregate impact of failures
Properties of failures
Grouping link failures
Root causes of failures
Failure event panorama



All failures vs. failures with impact
Widespread failures
Long-lived failures
Daily volume of failures


Link failures are variable and bursty
Device failures are usually caused by maintenance
Table4: Failures per time unit
Probability of failure




Load balancers have the highest failure probability
ToRs have low failure rates
Load balancer links have the highest rate of logged failures
Management and inter-data center links have lowest failure
Aggregate impact of failures



Load balancers have the most failures but ToRs have the
most downtime
Load balancer links experience many failure events but
relatively small downtime
Load balancer failures dominated by few failure prone
devices
properties of failures




Time to repair
Load balancers experience short-lived failure
ToRs experience correlated failures
Inter-data center links take the longest to repair
properties of failures




Time between failures
Load balancer failures are bursty
Link flapping is absent from the actionable network logs
MGMT, CORE and ISC links are the most reliable in time between
failures
properties of failures



Reliability of network elements
Data center networks experience high availability
Links have high availability (having higher than 9’s of reliability)
Grouping link failures

To group correlated failures

Require that link failures occur in the same data center
Failures to occur within a predefined time threshold

Link failures tend to be isolated

Root causes of failures




Choose to leverage the “Problem type” field of the NOC
tickets
Hardware problems take longer to mitigate
Load balancers affected by software problems
Link failures are dominated by connection and hardware
problems
Part 5: Estimating Failure
Impact
5.1 Is redundancy effective
in reducing impact?
Several reasons why redundancy may not be
100% effective:
Network redundancy helps,
but it is not entirely effective.
1. bugs in fail-over mechanisms can arise if
there is uncertainty as to which link or
component is the back up.
2. if the redundant components are not
configured correctly, they will not be able to
reroute traffic away from the failed
component.
3. protocol issues such as TCP backoff,
timeouts, and spanning tree reconfigurations
may result in loss of traffic.
5.2 Redundancy at different
layers of the network topology


Links highest in the topology
benefit most from redundancy.
Links from ToRs to aggregation
switches benefit the least from
redundancy, but have low failure
impact.
Part 6: Discussion
Low-end switches exhibit
high reliability


×
Low-cost
The lowest failure rate
with a lower failure
probability
However, as populations
of these devices rise, the
absolute number of
failures observed will
inevitably increase.
Improve reliability of
middle-boxes



×
×
Load balancer links have the highest
rate of logged failures
Management and inter-data center
links have lowest failure
Need to be taken into account
The development of better
management and debugging
tools
Software load balancers running
on commodity servers
Improve the effectiveness of
network redundancy
Network redundancies in our system are 40% effective at masking the
impact of network failures.
×

One cause: due to configuration issues that lead
to redundancy being ineffective at masking failure
The back up link was subject to the same flaw as
the primary.
Separate control plane
from data plane
The cases of NOC tickets

The separation between control plane
and data plane becomes even more
crucial to avoid impact to hosted
applications.
Part 7: Related Work
Application failures
Other study [1] found:
×
The majority of failures occur during the TCP handshake as
a result of end-toend connectivity issues.
×
Web access failures are dominated by server-side issues.
These findings highlight the importance
of studying failures in data centers
hosting Web services.
Network failures
Some studies observe significant instability and flapping as a result of
external routing protocols [2].

Unlike these studies, not observe link flapping owing to our data
sources being geared towards actionable events.
Some studies find that 70% of failures involve only a single link [3].

Similarly observe that the majority of failures in data centers are
isolated.
Some studies also observe longer time to repair on wide area links [4].

Similar to the observations for wide area links connecting data
centers.
Failures in cloud computing
Some studies consider the availability of distributed storage
and observe that the majority of failures involving more than
ten storage nodes are localized within a single rack [5].

Also observe spatial correlations but they occur
higher in the network topology, where we see
multiple ToRs associated with the same
aggregation switch having correlated failures.
Part 8: Conclusions and
Future Work
Give your own opinion
about what you think is good or
bad about the paper, e.g. how
could it be improved?
References
[1] V. Padmanabhan, S. Ramabhadran, S. Agarwal, and J. Padhye. A
study of end-to-end web access failures. In CoNEXT, 2006.
[2] B. Schroeder, E. Pinheiro, and W.-D. Weber. DRAM errors in the wild:
A large-scale field study. In SIGMETRICS, 2009.
[3] A. Shaikh, C. Isett, A. Greenberg, M. Roughan, and J. Gottlieb. A
case study of OSPF behavior in a large enterprise network. In ACM
IMW, 2002.
[4] D. Turner, K. Levchenko, A. C. Snoeren, and S. Savage. California
fault lines: Understanding the causes and impact of network failures.
In SIGCOMM, 2010.
[5] K. V. Vishwanath and N. Nagappan. Characterizing cloud computing
hardware reliability. In Symposium on Cloud Computing (SOCC), 2010.
The figures come from the project paper, Understanding Network
Failures in Data Centers: Measurement, Analysis, and Implications.
The End
THX

similar documents