Democracy or governance? The consequences for domestic peace

Report
Making Democratic Governance Work:
The consequences for prosperity, welfare and peace
Pippa Norris
Harvard and Sydney Universities
www.pippanorris.com
New book for Cambridge, Sept 2012
Structure
1. Theoretical questions and debate
• Does democratic governance expand prosperity,
welfare and peace?
2. Mixed research design and evidence
• Large N cross-national time series data 1984-2007
• Paired case comparisons
3. Overview of selected results
4. Conclusions and policy implications
–
Democracy alone is not enough
–
Simple logic, complex proof
–
Need to strengthen democratic accountability and
governance capacity for most effective development
outcomes
Making Democratic Governance Work
How Regimes shape Prosperity, Welfare and Peace
New York: Cambridge University Press
Pippa Norris
Contents
I: Introduction
1. Does democratic governance determine human security?
2. Theories of regime effects
II: Comparing regimes
3. The regime typology
4. Analyzing regime effects
III: Development outcomes
5. Prosperity
6. Welfare
7. Peace
IV: Conclusions
8. Why regimes matter
Core questions
• Intrinsic value of democratic governance is widely accepted
for human rights
• But what is the instrumental impact of regime types on other
development goals? Classic questions:
1. Is democratic governance good for economic prosperity?
2. Has this type of regime accelerated progress towards
achieving the Millennium Development Goals, social
welfare, and human development?
3. Does it generate a peace-dividend and reduce conflict at
home?
Context for this book
• Recent decades have seen expanded investment to
strengthen democracy and ‘good’ governance by international
community and domestic stakeholders
• World Bank, UN, bilateral donors, NGOs
• E.g. Today UNDP spends $1.2 to 1.5bn annually on
democratic governance
• Third-wave era has also witnessed dramatic changes in
transitions from absolute autocracy and processes of
democratization
• Have these changes generated significant benefits for human
development? Not clear and timely to review evidence.
100.0
90.0
Context: Contrasting trajectories of
democratization, 1980 - 2010
Chile
Venezuela
Korea, Rep
Gambia
South Africa
Mongolia
80.0
Turkey
70.0
Zimbabwe
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
Turkey
Sudan
Korea, Rep
Chile
South Africa
Venezuela
Gambia
Russia
China
Zimbabwe
Russia
China
Mongolia
Sudan
10.0
1980.0
2010.0
Note: Change is monitored through Freedom House liberal democracy standardized index.
Source: Freedom House
0.900
Contrasting trajectories of human
development, 1980-2010
Korea (Rep)
0.800
Chile
El Salvador
China
0.700
0.600
Korea (Rep)
Indonesia
Chile
India
0.500
El Salvador
0.400
0.300
Indonesia
China
India
Liberia
DRC
Zimbabwe
Zambia
Liberia
DRC
0.200
Zimbabwe
0.100
1980
1980
2010
2010
Note: Change is monitored through the UNDP 100-point Human Development Index.
Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2010.
Achieving the MDGs by 2015
• “Success is uneven within countries and regions.
• In 2015, more than 600 million people worldwide will still lack
access to improved water sources, almost one billion will be living
in dire poverty, and hunger will remain a global challenge.
• Mothers will continue to die needlessly in childbirth, and children
will still suffer and die from preventable diseases due to lack of
adequate sanitation or nutrition.
• Meanwhile, biodiversity loss continues apace and greenhouse gas
emissions continue to pose a major threat to people and
ecosystems.
• We need an agenda that is concrete, action-oriented and focused
on poverty eradication, inclusive economic and social
development, environmental sustainability and peace and
security for all.” (Ban Ki Moon, EcoSoc 2 July 2012)
The MDG Development Report 2012 http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/
Why a new study?
• Does democratic governance matter for development?
• Vital for advocacy, strategic choice of developmental
priorities, and achievement of MDGs
• Inconclusive and fragmented research literature
• Political science, welfare economics, and international relations
• Articles usually focus narrowly on one or two developmental
indicators
• Many technical challenges confront analysts
• Poor conceptualization and weak theories
• Little understanding of the underlying theoretical logic linking
democratic governance to human security
• Systematic bias in political science literature
• Extensive focus on liberal democracy but remarkably little on the
concept and measures of governance capacity
1. THEORETICAL DEBATE
Debate about the links
Democracy
promoters
Statebuilders
Skeptics
Prosperity,
welfare
and peace
Debate: skeptics
• Skeptics emphasize multiple ‘deep-drivers’ or fixed
conditions of economic growth, human welfare, and
peace
– Geography
• E.g. natural resources, physical capital, infrastructure,
agricultural production, access to trade, technology,
and communications, vulnerability to tropical
diseases and natural disasters, physical area, spillover from interstate conflict.
– Social structures
• E.g. ethnic fractionalization, religious cultures,
colonial histories, social inequalities, human capital,
population size
Skeptical claims
• Przeworski et al (2000):
• Type of democratic or autocratic regime has no impact on prosperity,
positive or negative
• Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008)
• Meta-review 84 empirical studies, same conclusions
• Ross (2004):
• Democracy has no impact on welfare outcomes like child and
maternal mortality
• Mansfield and Snyder (2007)
• Transition from autocracy heightens risks of war and instability
• Lipset (1958)
• Democratic governance is the consequence, not the cause, of
development (reverse causality)
• Jacob Zuma “You can’t eat democracy”
Debate: democracy-promoters
• Need to strengthen democratic governance, including elections held at an
early stage in any peace-building and transition process
• Range of authors: Mort Halperin, Joseph Siegle, Michael Weinstein, Larry
Diamond, Thomas Carothers, Michael McCaul
• Why? Intrinsic and instrumental benefits
• Michael McCaul: “As a system of government, democracy has clear
advantages over other kinds of regimes. Democracies represent the will of
the people and constrain the power of the state. They avoid the worst
kinds of economic disasters, such as famine, and the political horrors, such
as genocide, that occur in autocracies. On average, democracies also
produce economic development just as well as other forms of government.
Democracies also tend to provide for more stable government and more
peaceful relations with other states compared to other regime types.
Finally, most people in the world want democracy.”
Debate: State-builders
• Samuel Huntington (1968) :
– Development requires state-building first, expanding government capacity,
order, stability, and security i.e. strong executive capacity is an essential
precondition prior to democratic elections.
• Ideas revived during the last decade
– Robert Kaplan, Francis Fukuyama, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder
• State-builders challenge strategic order not the ultimate normative
desirability of democracy
• Strengthened by economists
– World Bank focus on ‘good governance’, the second generation neoliberal Washington consensus, and the ‘institutional turn’ in economics
(Douglas North) emphasizing property rights and rule of law (Rodrik)
Revised equilibrium theory
• False choices:
– Need for simultaneous balance in strengthening both
democracy and governance within certain structural
constraints
• Liberal democracy:
– Channel for public demands and state accountability
• Bureaucratic governance:
– Capacity to respond to these demands with provision
of public goods and services
PUBLIC
DEMANDS:
Democratic
Accountability
Governance
Capacity
CYCLICAL FEEDBACK LOOP
EXECUTIVE
AND
LEGISLATORS
PUBLIC SECTOR
GOVERNANCE:
POLICY
OUTPUTS
POLICY
OUTCOMES:
STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS
2. RESEARCH DESIGN
DEMOCRACY
GOVERNANCE
RESTRICTED VOICE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
EXPANDED
CAPACITY
LIMITED
CAPACITY
INCLUSIVE VOICE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
GOVERNANCE
DEMOCRACY
RESTRICTED VOICE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
INCLUSIVE VOICE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
EXPANDED
CAPACITY
Eg Singapore
Eg Chile
LIMITED
CAPACITY
Eg Somalia
Eg Ghana
DEMOCRACY
GOVERNANCE
EXPANDED
CAPACITY
LIMITED
CAPACITY
RESTRICTED VOICE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
INCLUSIVE VOICE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
Bureaucratic autocracies
Bureaucratic
democracies
(Mixed performance)
Patronage autocracies
(Least effective
performance)
(Most effective
performance)
Patronage democracies
(Mixed performance)
Governance capacity
• Concept of governance:
– The capacity of regime authorities to perform functions
essential for collective well-being.
– Max Weber: The capacity of the state to protect citizens
living within its territory and to manage the delivery of
public goods and services
• Measured:
– PRSG’s Quality of Government index combines three
components: (1) Bureaucratic Quality; (2) Lack of
corruption, and; (3) Law and Order.
– 100-pt standardized continuous scale 1984-2004
– Also dichotomized into patronage and bureaucratic states
Liberal democracy
• Concept of liberal democracy:
– The capacity of people to influence regime
authorities within their nation-state
– Robert Dahl’s polyarchy
• Measured:
– Freedom House index of political rights and civil
liberties (from 1972-date)
– 100-pt standardized continuous scale
– Dichotomized into autocracies and democracies
Bureaucratic
autocracies
Patronage
autocracies
Bureaucratic
democracies
Regime typology
Patronage
democracies
2008
Bureaucratic
autocracies
1984
Bureaucratic
democracies
Patronage
autocracies
Patronage
democracies
Dependent variables
• Economic growth
– Mean annual growth of income per capita in purchasing
power parity from the chain series index of the Penn
World Tables
• Human development
– Six MDG indicators
– Life expectancy; child mortality; health (TB); gender
equality in education; education opportunities; and the
UNDP human development index.
• Peace and conflict
– Measures of civil wars from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict
Dataset V4.0
Multivariate Controls
• Economic
– Trade flows
– Income (Per capita GDP)
• Geographic
– Location (Latitude)
– Area size (Sq.Km)
– Natural resources (Oil/gas rents)
• Social Structure
–
–
–
–
–
Linguistic fractionalization
Religious fractionalization
Human capital (secondary schooling)
Logged population size
Internal conflict
• Cultural traditions
– Muslim society
– British colonial legacy
• Global trends
– Year
Technical Challenges
•
•
•
•
•
•
Reciprocal causation
Omitted variable bias in many models
Poor conceptualization and measurement error
Case selection bias
Non-random missing data
Need mixed design:
– Large-N panel (county-year) with OLS regression and
panel corrected standard errors
– Thick case studies
3. DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS AND
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
Income growth by type of regime
Note: Mean annual growth of income per capita in purchasing power parity from the chain
series index of the Penn World Tables, 1984-2007.
Trends in economic growth
Growth by stable regimes
The impact of democratic governance
on economic growth
1a
1b
1c
Liberal democracy
Bureaucratic
governance
Democratic
governance
b
b
b
Liberal democracy (FH)
Bureaucratic governance
(ICRG)
-.004
p
PCSE
p
PCSE
.003
-.003
.007
p
PCSE
.023 *
.014
.032 *
.016
Note: The models present the unstandardized beta coefficients and the statistical significance of Ordinary
Least Squares linear regression models with Panel Corrected Standard Errors. The models control for prior
geographic, economic, social structural, cultural traditions, and global trends . The dependent variable is
income per capita in purchasing power parity from the chain series index of the Penn World Tables. *** p
<0.001, ** p <0 .001, * p < 0.05. Number of observations 5,767 N countries 95, N of years 20.
Human development by type of regime
Note: Development is monitored through the UNDP 100-point Human Development Index.
Source: UNDP Human Development Report.
Mortality rate for under-fives
per 1,000 live births, developing societies
140
121
120
100
89
73
80
52
60
40
20
0
Patronage autocracy
Patronage democracy
Bureaucratic autocracy Bureaucratic democracy
Child mortality is the ratio of deaths for children under five years old per 1000 live births 1990-2007(MDG
indicators). Developing societies are defined as those with per capita income of less than $10,000, measured
by income per capita in purchasing power parity from the chain series index of the Penn World Tables.
Educational opportunities in
developing societies
70
61
60
53
53
Patronage democracy
Bureaucratic autocracy
50
40
38
30
20
10
0
Patronage autocracy
Bureaucratic democracy
Educational opportunities: the gross male and female enrollment in secondary schools as a ratio of the
corresponding population age group, 1984-2007 (World Development Indicators/UNESCO). Developing
societies are defined as those with per capita income of less than $10,000, measured by income per capita in
purchasing power parity from the chain series index of the Penn World Tables. Coef of Assoc .376***
Gender equality in education,
developing societies
100
97
93
95
90
90
85
81
80
75
70
Patronage autocracy
Patronage democracy
Bureaucratic autocracy Bureaucratic democracy
Gender equality in education: the ratio of girls to boys enrolled in primary and secondary schools
(WDI/UNESCO);. Developing societies are defined as those with per capita income of less than $10,000,
measured by income per capita in purchasing power parity from the chain series index of the Penn World
Tables. Coef of Assoc .412***
Conflict by type of regime
Note: The mean levels of internal, interstate, and internationalized conflict experienced by type
of regime, 1984-2004. Source: Calculated from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
4. Conclusions
• We need to consider both democratic
accountability and governance capacity
• The analysis confirms that overall, even with
multiple controls, bureaucratic democracies
usually demonstrate the best record of
development, while patronage autocracies
commonly the worst performers
• Yet not wholly consistent across diverse indices;
depends, in part, on technical ‘fixes’
• Paired cases illustrate underlying processes and
dynamics
Implications?
• For political science:
– Need far better measures of governance capacity
• Teorell and Rothstein
• Fukuyama
• For international community
– Need to balance programs and consider the
interaction of democracy and governance
– Democracy alone or governance alone are not
enough
More details:
WWW.PIPPANORRIS.COM

similar documents