governing the commons: Chap. iii

Report
Alberto De Luigi
14/03/2013
GOVERNING THE
COMMONS
ELINOR OSTROM (1990)
CHAP
III
WHAT ARE THE CPRS
(COMMON POOL RESOURCES)
The CPRs are natural or man-made
resource system:
• The use and benefits of CPRs are
not excludable, without costs, to
potential beneficiaries
• The overexploitation of CPRs can
harm the stock of resources itself
(tragedy of the commons)
In-depht analysis
EXAMPLES OF CPRS
•
•
•
•
Fisheries (seas or rivers)
Grazing lands (meadows)
Forests providing timber
Irrigation systems (water,
canals)
HOW TO AVOID
THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
• CENTRALIZATION:
the state imposes sanctions and punishments,
ensuring that everyone cooperates.
Problems:
no complete informations, costs in monitoring and
administration. The state could fail.
• PRIVATIZATION: assigning the property rights on
these resources
Problems:
1) it presumes the existence of a central authority
and its costs 2) it’s difficult to create property rights
to fugitive resources 3) dividing the commons may
impoverish who benefits from them
THE THIRD WAY
• The third way is represented by the long-enduring, selforganized and self-governed CPRs
• They are actually commons, with a system of
appropriation and the parallel existence of private
property:
appropriators use or consume resources, or «immediatly
transfer ownership of resource units»
• Long enduring: they survived for long periods. They are
«robust» or in «institutional equilibrium» as meant by Shepsle
(1989): changes in according to an ex ante plan
• Self-organized and self-governed: we will see these
features through the examples
TÖRBEL IN SWITZERLAND
Mountain meadows and forests
• Uncertain environment:
Different microclimates due to:
1. Steepness of slope and wide range of
altitude
2. Paucity of precipitation
3. Exposure to sunlight
TÖRBEL IN SWITZERLAND
Mountain meadows and forests
• Social structure:
All the citizens vote the village statutes that
provide an alp association (originally
established in 1483) with annual meeting to
manage the alp
The association elect officials:
they hire the alp staff, impose fines (they keep
½ of the fine for themselves), organize the
distribution of manure and annual
maintenance work (paths, corrals..)
TÖRBEL IN SWITZERLAND
Mountain meadows and forests
• The «cow rights»: in summer (period for
grazing) each cow sent by a family to the
mountain must be counted. The amount of
cows determine:
1. The portion of land they can appropriate
for grazing
2. The amount of cheese and timber (wood
for construction and heating) the family will
receive at the annual distribution
TÖRBEL IN SWITZERLAND
Mountain meadows and forests
• Cutting trees for timber:
1. The officials mark the trees ready to be harvested
2. The households organize work teams for cutting
trees (dividing the work equally)
3. The timber is collected in equal stacks
4. A lottery assign particular stacks to the households
TÖRBEL IN SWITZERLAND
Mountain meadows and forests
• Inheritance system:
appropriation rights and provision duties are
inherited by individual males who own private
property in the village ad remain citizens of the
village
• Population-control measures: late marriages,
high rates of celibacy, long birth spacing,
considerable emigration
FEATURES OF THE TÖRBEL COMMONS
• Uncertain environment
• Appropriation and private property goes side-by-side
• Individuals live side-by-side year after year, they
expect their children and grandchildren to inherit
their land: their discount rates are low
• They spend time governing themselves, but the rules
and monitoring systems require relatively low costs
• (more the 5 Netting conditions)
VILLAGES IN JAPAN
Mountain meadows and forests
• Uncertain environment: many different microclimates
• Social structure: a village that contains a defined
number of households (since at least 1600)
• Inheritance system: an household (with rights on the
commons) cannot divide itself without the permission
from the village
• Population-control measures: households with many
members have considerable disadvantages in their
access to the commons (pop. growth extremely low)
VILLAGES IN JAPAN
Mountain meadows and forests
• Land for winter fodder are assigned with annual
rotation. The cutting starts as the bell tolls; the hay
cut is collected in equal bundles and assigned by
lottery
• There are written rules about the obligation of each
household to contribuite a share to the collective
work (as creating firebreaks for annual burning)
• Detectives hired by the villages (or eligible males
rotate into these positions) patrol the commons
looking for unathorized users
VILLAGES IN JAPAN
Mountain meadows and forests
• Punishments for the offenders:
Fines are imposed with escalation penalties,
depending on the past behaviour of the offender
Fines are paid to the detective (cash and saké for
light infractions)
The contrabanded harvest is retained by the village
until the violator has paid an extra fine to the village
The most serious sanction is the banishment from the
village
HUERTA IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS
IN SPAIN
Irrigation systems
Uncertain environment: limited quantity of rainfall
and variation from year to year.
All the systems are successful:
• Valencia has the least efficient system
• Murcia-Orihuela is in the middle
• Alicante is the most efficient
(national authorities have here more control)
VALENCIA IN SPAIN
Irrigation systems
• Social structure:
• Farmers meets every two (or three) year (since 1435)
to elect:
1. the syndic for their canal (manage waterworks,
fines)
2. other officials
3. The Junta de gobierno (an executive commitee)
The Tribunal de las aguas is a water court that for
centuries meets every thursday morning
VALENCIA IN SPAIN
Irrigation systems
• Distribution of water:
Each farm receives water in a rotation order, from
the head to the tail end of the canal
If a farmer fails to open his headgate when water
arrives, he misses his turn. No one knows exactly
when it arrives
When water arrives the farmer can take all the
water he want (without wasting it)
In periods of drought: rotation scheme is modified,
given priority to farms whose crops are in the most
need of water
VALENCIA IN SPAIN
Irrigation systems
• Monitoring systems:
Review the decisions of syndics;
is composed by the syndics
Tribunal de las Aguas
Elected by farmers, watch the ditch-riders,
impose fines to the farmers, manage
waterworks
Syndics
Consult with the sindycs
Executive committee
Elected by the farmers
Ditch-riders
patrol the canals,
paid by the farmers
Irrigators
Since they don’t know when exactly water
arrives, while they are waiting they can
monitor ditch-riders and other farmers
MURCIA AND ORIHUELA IN SPAIN
Irrigation systems
• Distribution of water:
Each farmer is assigned a «tanda», a period in which
he may withdraw water
In case of drought the officials post a new schedule
for rotation
• Justice:
- Murcia: The Council of Good Men is a water court
composed by 5 syndics and 2 inspectors (chosen by
lottery over 30 communities)
- Orihuela: court with only 1 judge
Procedure: oral, public, summary and cheap (as in
Valencia)
ALICANTE IN SPAIN
Irrigation systems
• Rights to withdraw water separated from ownership
• Private water companies sell rights to the water supply
• Price of water varies in relation to the amount available
• Who has contribuited to the construction of the new Tibi
Dam has rights to the «new water» supply created by the
dam
• Rights to «old water» supply (previously acquired) can now
be sold or rented only to those who own land eligible to
receive «new water»
ALICANTE IN SPAIN
Irrigation systems
• Social structure:
a general assembly meets annually to approve
budget and taxes, assessed against the holders of
water rights
the assembly decides matters brought before it by
the executive commission
both are costantly looking for new water and
contractual arrangements with private firms
ALICANTE IN SPAIN
Irrigation systems
• When purchasing scrips (rights on water supply):
- Informal market on Sunday morning
- The formal auction on Sunday
- On market days
• When farmer wants to irrigate, tells to his ditchrider, who opens the headgate (in the other
huertas farmers do it themselves)
• Given the water, scrip will turn in
ZANJERA IRRIGATION COMMUNITIES
IN THE PHILIPPINES
Irrigation systems
• Social structure:
The Zanjera federation incorporates many zanjeras, the
smallest one with 20 members, the larger 73 (1980 data)
The federation is formally a «private corporation», it has
the status of «juridical person» in the Philippine Water
Code and therefore is eligible to obtain water rights
Each zanjera is responsible for its own financial and
internal affairs and owes no financial obligations to the
federation
Each one has a border of directors, the chairman is called
maestro. They elect also a cook and other officials
ZANJERA IRRIGATION COMMUNITIES
IN THE PHILIPPINES
Irrigation systems
• Zanjera membership («sharing of the land»
contract):
they band togheter to construct the irrigation
system
each atar holder (it’s like a farmhouse) has one
vote and the right to farm a plot (usufruct)
each one is obligated to contribute many day’s
work and celebration per year (1980 data: 86 max,
32 min), plus a share of the material required for
construction.
ZANJERA IRRIGATION COMMUNITIES
IN THE PHILIPPINES
Irrigation systems
• Each farmer is assigned a
plot in each section
• Plots at the tail end are
assigned to officials as
payment for their services
(enhance incentives to
get water at the tail end)
• In draught period the
bottom section of land is
not irrigated
ZANJERA IRRIGATION COMMUNITIES
IN THE PHILIPPINES
Irrigation systems
• Constructions of irrigation system:
• Every year (even four times per year) the river wash out
the dum, and the irrigation system must be rebuilt!
• Each zanjera forms a teamwork, all the teams build the
dum jointly
• The cooks prepare food during the exhausting working
period (they build a dum between swirling waters)
• The maestro motivates the team (persuasive power and
sanctions)
ZANJERA IRRIGATION COMMUNITIES
IN THE PHILIPPINES
Irrigation systems
• Attendance rate at the work for community: 94% (1982)
(amazing, given the fact of no direct monetary payment)
• Low level of fines imposed, almost always paid
• The system of water allocation could be more efficient, but
many members of lower zanjeras also partecipate in other
zanjeras, adjusting imbalances. They don’t perceive the
allocation of water like a problem
Furthermore, costs avoided in:
- deciding another arrangement (time, energy cost)
- adjusting to an externally-imposed procedure
SIMILARITIES ABOUT LONG-ENDURING
SELF-GOVERNING CPRS
• Uncertain environment
• Appropriation and the parallel existence of private
property
• Discount rates are low: individuals live side-by-side year
after year, they expect their children and grandchildren to
inherit their land
• They spend time governing themselves, but the rules and
monitoring systems require relatively low costs
• Changes in according to an ex ante plan
• (remember the 5 Netting conditions)
THE DESIGN PRINCIPLES OF CPRS
(speculative, not necessary conditions)
1. Clearly defined boundaries:
close to outsiders: more potential appropriators = more discount
rate and probable overuse.
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and
local conditions:
good-fitting rules to local conditions
3. Collective choice arrangements:
1)people affected by the operational rules have themselves
originally designed and initially agreed to the rules (even if centuries
ago)
2) they can now participate in modifying these rules
3) Repeated setting when reputation is important and norms are
shared
THE DESIGN PRINCIPLES OF CPRS
(speculative, not necessary conditions)
4. Monitoring:
1) monitors are accountable to the appropriators or are the
appropriators
2) punishing (monitoring) is costly and punishment produce
public goods available to everyone. But not where the two
actors most concerned with cheating are in direct contact with
one another
5. Graduated sanctions:
1) Sanctions depending on the seriousness and context of the
offense
2) «quasi voluntary compliance» (Margaret Levi, 1988): they
choose to comply when they are not being directly coerced;
the non compliant are subject to coercion, if caught.
It happens because they perceive that the collective object is
achieved and others comply (no one «sucks»)
THE DESIGN PRINCIPLES OF CPRS
(speculative, not necessary conditions)
6. Conflict-resolution mechanism:
1) appropriators and officials have rapid access to low-cost
local arenas to resolve conflicts
2) who make honest mistake may be allowed to make up
their lack of performances
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize:
the rights of appropriators are not challenged by external
governamental authorities, even when appropriators don’t
create formal governamental juridictions
8. Nested enterprises (for CPRs that are part of larger system):
different nested level in wich facing different problems
(different levels in the Philippine federation for main canal or
lateral canal)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
In order of publication:
• Netting, Robert McC., What Alpine Peasants have in
Common, in Human Ecology 4(2): 135-146, 1976
• Levi, Margaret, Of Rule and Revenue, University of California
Press, Berkeley, California, 1988
• Shepsle, Kenneth A., Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from
the Rational Choice Approach, Journal of Theoretical Politics 1
(April): 131-147, 1989
• Ostrom, Elinor, Governing the Commons, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1990
END
DIFFERENT KIND OF GOODS
EXCLUDABLE
from
consumption
RIVALROUS in
consumption
PRIVATE GOODS
cars, ipod,
bread, clothes
NONEXCLUDABLE
from
consumption
COMMON
GOODS
Common-pool
resources
NON-RIVALROUS
in consumption
CLUB GOODS
satellite tv (sky),
swimming pool,
metropolitan
PUBLIC GOODS
national
defense,
lighthouse
NOTE: LUCA MARIO HAS COPIED IT FROM ME xD
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THE DISCOUNT RATE
• When (CC-DD) / (DC-CC) is large the discount rate is low
• Lower discount rate (1)
p1
p2 C
D
C
4,4
0,5
D
5,0
1,1
• Higher discount rate (1/3)
p1
p2 C
D
C
2,2
0,5
D
5,0
1,1
similarities
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Torbel
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COMMONS RATHER THAN INDIVIDUAL
PROPERTIES – THE CONDITIONS
(according to Netting, 1976)
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
Value production per unit of land is low
Frequency of use and yeld is low
Possibility of improvement or intensification is low
A large territory is needed for effective use
Large groups are required for capital-investment
The example of Törbel in Switzerland, or the villages
in Japan (meadows and forests as CPRs) reflects
these conditions
similarities
Torbel
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