Olli Heinonen`s technical presentation [PPT].

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status
and Implications
Olli Heinonen
Belfer Center for Science and International
Harvard Kennedy School
19 November, 2013
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities
Fuel Fabrication
Others, planned
Nuclear Infrastructure
 Iran has not adhered to the resolutions of the UN Security
Council, but continued to build the nuclear program
including the supporting infrastructure
- Iran continues to manufacture centrifuges and their
- Iran is increasing the production of key raw materials
(zirconium, heavy water, high strength aluminum), but
depending still on imports (maraging steel, instrumentation)
The net result: Iran is increasing its nuclear capabilities, but the
international community knows less about them
20 % UF6 Is Not Medium Enriched Uranium
Production of Weapons Grade Material
 Production of 1 Significant
Quantity (SQ) of weapons
grade uranium from
natural uranium requires
about 5000 Separative
Work Unit (SWU) of
enrichment effort
 SQ-- The approximate quantity of
nuclear material required to
manufacture the first nuclear
weapon taking into account the
manufacturing losses.
Nuclear Material Stockpiles
 Current stock of UF6
 Quantity of concern
- Natural uranium ca 425
- 10 metric tons
metric tons
- 3-5 % enriched uranium ca
7.1. metric tons
- 20 % enriched uranium ca
200 kg
- 1.3 metric tons
- 250 kg
Enrichment Capacity
 Natanz and Fordow 18500
IR-1 centrifuges
 Natanz 1000 IR-2m
 Total number of
centrifuges and rotors
produced and their
locations are not known
Break out Scenarios
 There are various scenarios available starting with feeding of
natural, 3-5 % or 20 % enriched UF6, in Natanz, Fordow, or
elsewhere to produce weapons grade, 90 % enriched uranium.
Break out Times for 90 % UF6
 Examples of scenarios
 Time required for one SQ
- Use all current centrifuges
in Natanz and Fordow with
natural uranium
- Use all current centrifuges
in Natanz and Fordow with
3-5 % uranium
- Use 6000 IR-1 centrifuges
as tandem cascades with 20
% uranium
- Use 3000 IR-2ms at an
unknown location
 6 months
 2 months
 2 weeks
 1-2 weeks
Need for Enriched Uranium
 Bushehr LWR has a contract for fuel with the Russians
- annual reload 20 tons 4 % enriched uranium
- requires 120-140000 IR-1 centrifuges to produce
- requires yellow cake imports
 Tehran Research Reactor
- 20 years ago Iran imported about 120 kg 20 % enriched fuel,
which is close to being consumed
- Iran has produced 410 kg 20 % enriched UF6 ( 274 kg uranium)
 Iran states that it plans for four additional research reactors,
but has not disclosed details
 Iran plans to build additional LWRs, but no plans disclosed
When the IAEA Rings Bells ?
 IAEA inspects Fordow and Natanz every one or two weeks
 Uranium stocks ( natural, 3-5 % and 20 %) in Isfahan are
inspected less frequently; monthly
 IAEA cannot provide assurances that all facilities and nuclear
materials in Iran have been submitted to safeguards
 IAEA does not have knowledge how much “yellow cake” has
been produced in Iran, and where these materials are
 IAEA does not have knowledge about the number of
centrifuges produced
Add Time to Uranium Clock
 Action at known locations
- Ship all 20 % uranium out
 Time gained
- 2 months
- Convert all 20 % uranium to
oxide form
- Convert all 3-5 % uranium to
oxide form (cannot be done in
next 3 months)
- Ship all 3-5 % and 20 % out
- Allow a limited enrichment
capability, 3000 IR-1 or 3000
- > 1 month
- > 2 months
- 6 months
- > 1 month depending how much
3-5 % and 20 % UF6 stocks left
More Leash to the IAEA
From the beginning of the interim agreement
 Iran to declare all the centrifuge rotors manufactured and
their current location
 IAEA allowed to monitor rotors and their manufacturing
 All nuclear material (UF6, oxides) in Natanz, Fordow, and
Isfahan under IAEA remote monitoring
 Iran to declared and allow the IAEA to monitor yellow cake
The Heavy Water Reactor Program
 The IR-40 reactor will be commissioned in
 Ill suited for isotope production though
claimed to replace Tehran Research Reactor.
 Will be able to produce plutonium enough for
one nuclear device/year.
 Plutonium available earliest in 2016/17, but
requires a reprocessing plant to be built.
Add Time to Plutonium Clock
 Suspend the construction of the IR-40
 Suspend production of fuel for the IR-40
 Place the key components and materials of IR-40 under the
IAEA monitoring (heavy water, fuel loading machine, pumps
of the primary circuit)
The Stakes Are high
 It is not only about Iran, but the credibility of the
nonproliferation regime and the authority of the UN Security
Council are being tested
 When looking at the past experiences a comprehensive initial
declaration is essential for the success of the interim

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