Drugs & Alcohol Recovery Lessons Learnt from Payment by Results Ray Smith October 2013 The 2010 Drug Strategy said the government would explore if paying by results would incentivise recovery PbR for Recovery • The Government wants to test the concept of paying for successful outcomes • Eight local areas from across England were chosen to test PbR for two years • No new funding was provided, local areas used their existing budgets Minister established a co-design group to develop a pilot programme PbR for Recovery • Government officials from: Department of Health National Treatment Agency Home Office Ministry of Justice Department of Work & Pensions Department for Education Cabinet Office • Local area commissioners • Service provider and service user representatives • Invited experts (including DrugScope) The group developed a ‘national’ model based on the client journey PbR for Recovery CJ referral Independent service Assessment & tariff-setting Referral to provider GP referral Confirmation of outcomes to trigger payments Provider 2 Provider 1 Provider 3 Provider 4 Advocacy for clients Relapse & re-presentation Outcomes achieved Self referral LASARS Prime provider/ provider framework Sustained recovery The 8 were able to adapt the model to reflect local priorities, leading to unique approaches PbR for Recovery Pilot LASARS Provider Interesting Fact Bracknell Forest DAAT Prime, end to end Bracknell Forest have placed the largest stretch on their providers to reduce re-offending Enfield DAAT Prime, IOM support Enfield have included lots of local outcomes to reflect local needs Kent DAAT Prime, end to end A holistic view to recovery means providers only get paid after progress on the full range of client needs Lincolnshire Providers with audit 2 competing providers Strong focus on working with current providers to deliver a new service Oxfordshire DAAT / IOM 1 Harm reduction & 1 recovery provider Oxfordshire use a local incentives aimed at moving people from harm minimisation to recovery Stockport DAAT / IOM 4 providers different services / clients Providers will not be in competition with each other, but will work with different groups Wakefield Providers with audit Consortium Wakefield have developed a local employment metric Wigan Providers with audit New providers in 2013 Wigan are assessing all clients on a cohort basis for all the outcomes Payment can be made made against 9 outcomes across 3 outcome domains PbR for Recovery The outcomes Interim outcome Final outcome Free from Drug(s) of dependence Reduced Reoffending Health and Wellbeing Drug and/or alcohol use significantly improved COHORT Reduction in the average offending compared to the baseline Ceased injecting Abstinence from presenting drug Successful completion of treatment Does not re-present in either the treatment or Criminal Justice System for 12 months Improved housing Hepatitis B course taken (3 injections) Health and wellbeing (client achieves a normative quality of life) PbR for Recovery Lessons Learnt • The pilots have been running for 18 months • Performance is mixed, • • • four have improved outcomes four have seen successful completion rates fall, some dramatically. There have been lessons learnt that can be applied to other local areas contemplating PbR Significant resources needed Feedback Providers will need to realise that PbR will be resource intensive and will require managing a lot of data. LASARS are still a new concept and some models require a considerable amount of resource. WHAT THE PILOT AREAS SAY It takes a considerable amount of time and resources to develop and implement PbR. Have management and monitoring systems ready well in advance. Given that providers’ payments are dependent on reported outcome achievement, providers need to ensure that data is robustly recorded and systematically reported, while commissioners need to be confident that they understand the outcome data and can answer providers’ queries and challenges. It requires even more monitoring than traditional commissioning processes because it is data intensive and new. Commissioners need to monitor performance closely to ensure correct tariff have been set and that outcome achievement is correctly recorded and independently audited. Deciding outcomes & setting payment structures Feedback PbR can be complex. We are glad we decided to allocate a fairly low proportion of the overall contract price to outcome payments. It was big enough to focus providers attention but small enough to help build relationships with our provider. We needed to change tariffs after year one. We had to decide whether to pay outcomes on basis of year of entry to treatment or year of achievement of outcome. This is complex but there are benefits to deciding this early on. WHAT THE PILOT AREAS SAY Having a large number of outcomes adds complexity to the system. Setting tariffs takes a long time. Longer than you might think. We wanted to have a balance of interim and final outcome measures. However this has meant we have a large number of outcomes which makes the process complicated. Commissioners need to be clear on how to measure and contract against outcomes and how to tender for it. The ability to change tariffs the value you attach to the achievement of outcomes by clients – is necessary and can be complex. Providers need to develop their understanding of which interventions are likely to deliver outcomes LASARS The LASARS complexity setting function influences the amount of money a provider can receive so it is essential that clients are accurately assessed. Commissioners need to closely audit the function so that providers don’t suffer as a result of poor LASARS performance. Some pilots have seen a big increase in activity but we don’t know why yet. It could be due to more focus on assessments, chasing appointments or a clearer pathway into treatment. WHAT THE PILOT AREAS SAY Our LASARS function is more resource intensive than we had originally anticipated. Feedback It is essential that LASARS function effectively as providers of recovery services rely on this function. LASARS that focus on a very narrow assessment role may find it difficult to recruit sufficiently qualified and experienced staff, due to the restricted nature of their job roles. Some LASARS may be resource intensive. So design needs to be carefully considered. Consider the additional work if you want to add all your existing clients. One bit of the pilot system we will definitely keep when the pilot is over is the LASARS function. Contracts Examine your contract to ensure they are flexible enough to allow both sides to exit before it gets to the point where a provider does not get paid because outcomes haven’t been met. This protects the organisations and the service users. We worked closely with our provider to design a flexible contract. WHAT THE PILOT AREAS SAY Feedback It looks like our provider may achieve better results than we anticipated so we are glad we placed a cap on our contract. Tariffs are based on estimates of success. If success is greater budgets need to be protected. Consider introducing a cap on payments to be made. Build in flexibility into the contract to make changes to payments or to allow both sides a chance to exit if things don’t work out. Good relationships between commissioners and providers is key. We forgot to factor in the pension costs when TUPEing staff across. This has made the contract more expensive than initially anticipated. As in any contract, consider carefully how you will address break clauses and TUPE issues, to ensure continuity of service provision to a group of highly vulnerable individuals. Data • The success of a PbR system hangs on collecting and interpreting accurate and robust data. PbR for Recovery • You need appropriate resources at a local level to understand what the data is telling you. • Government analysts have identified a considerable level of unexplained variance (chance/luck) in some outcome data, which cannot be adjusted for. If performance is significantly affected by chance/luck, the outcome data is unlikely to be a robust reflection of provider input. Conclusion The three key messages that pilots shared are PbR for Recovery • PbR appears to be successful in sharpening providers’ focus on achieving outcomes for sustained recovery. • Implementing PbR appears to be taking up a significant amount of dedicated time and staff to monitor performance – both for commissioners and providers. • Understanding what the data does and does not show and sharing this information between commissioners and providers is essential to making the PbR approach work.